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HISTORY OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE Essays

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in six volumes

MOSCOW "International Relations" 2014

HISTORY | RUSSIAN FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE Essays

Volume 1

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before 1917

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In this edition, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) wants to acquaint readers with the real side of the
work of Russian intelligence officers. Veteran professional intelligence officers who personally took part in many

intelligence operations of recent decades. The first volume deals with the history of the Russian intelligence agency from the 17th century to 1917.

For a wide range of readers.

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Foreword

"History of Russian foreign intelligence" in terms of content, period covered and volume is the first such publication.

Intelligence is a necessary mechanism that solves a number of important state tasks. This has been proven by history. This is also proved by modernity.

Is it possible to talk about the originality of Russian intelligence, its unique features? Of course, there are a number of characteristics that distinguish intelligence regardless of its nationality: methods and techniques of work, a structure that allows the extraction of materials of a political, military, scientific, technical, economic nature, the use of the so-called "human factor" - in other words, agents, trusted relationships, the use of technical means. But, nevertheless, I would like to say about the features of Russian intelligence. Maybe they (let readers abroad not judge me) are somewhat more than others, patriotism, selflessness, less than others (both for subjective and objective reasons), the influence of the material factor on activity an intelligence officer, a greater propensity for self-sacrifice for the sake of his people.

Of course, "the family has its black sheep" - this is typical for all intelligence services in the world. But maybe our "freaks" are still uglier than others. Let me recall the words of former CIA leaders Helms and Colby that they did not know a single defector from Soviet intelligence who was not guided by material considerations, in other words, motives for gain. This cannot be said about all foreign persons who have come to cooperate with us.

When we lead the reader in our multi-volume book from epoch to epoch, then for all the disparity of individual events, for all their specificity, the general main direction of activity can be traced.

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reconnaissance news. At any historical stage, under any system, in any circumstances, it defended the interests of the state. Isn't this where the emphasis on the depoliticization of intelligence comes from, to which we have consciously come today, in the post-Soviet era? Naturally, this depoliticization is relative. The state has always defended and defends the interests of not only the national, but also the ruling groups. And intelligence has always been and remains a reflection of the state. As the reader will see, one of the Russian intelligence officers at the beginning of the 20th century, P.I. Rachkovsky served not only the interests of the Fatherland, but also the tsarist police department, spying on Russian political emigration abroad. Intelligence was not isolated from the tragic Stalinist repressions. But what is important to note is that, not being a law enforcement agency, it is less than others guilty of what happened and, being most connected with foreign countries, having absorbed the elite of the armed forces, it suffered from bloody repressions to a greater extent than others. Dozens, hundreds of intelligence officers were excommunicated from their profession, arrested, shot.

The issues of depoliticization, deideologization of intelligence are especially important and relevant in our time. In what way do they appear? Intelligence - it must be said with all firmness - does not participate in the internal political life of Russia. Of course, each of its officers and employees not only can, but must also have sympathy or antipathy for one or another political, social force in the Russian Federation. Mankurt, a robot devoid of feelings, emotions, attachments, rejection of what he considers bad, cannot be a scout. But he cannot be guided by his political likes or dislikes in his daily work. There he should think only about the national interests of the country - this, paradoxically as it sounds, is the depoliticization of intelligence. Naturally, at the same time, the intelligence officer must be committed to democratic values and faithful to the law - this is extremely important for everyone without exception.

A few words about the rejection of the ideologization of foreign intelligence. This term did not exist at all until 1917. However, during the existence of the USSR, intelligence, like any other state tool, could not but be ideologized. The Cheka, the NKVD, the KGB, including foreign intelligence, were the weapons of the party, and it was in this capacity that they carried out their activities under Marxist-Leninist slogans.

The best sources, foreign assistants were acquired by Soviet intelligence on an ideological basis. While still deputy director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, I knew well and closely the senior research fellow Donald McLane, who worked there. This was one of the smartest and most educated people who met

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lis on my life path. D. McLane worked for Soviet intelligence in the past. Director of one of the leading departments of the British Foreign Office, he possessed information of paramount, sometimes vital value for Moscow, and passed this information on to us. D. MacLane, coming from a family of Scottish lords, was guided by non-material considerations. No matter how we feel now about our ideological past, it was the ideas of this past that led McLane and many like him to Soviet intelligence.

Many predicted that the de-ideologization of the SVR in the current conditions would deprive us of the opportunity to enter into cooperation with foreign sources of information. This turned out not to be the case. Now we are not talking about the ideological basis for the acquisition of foreign assistants. But the political interest of many people in cooperation continues to operate - now not with Soviet, but with Russian intelligence. Behind this are the unwillingness to see the world as "unipolar", and fears of the threat of a unilateral redrawing of post-war European borders, and an understanding of the role of Russia as a factor of stability in Europe and in the world as a whole.

So the de-ideologization of intelligence has by no means eliminated or even undermined it as the most important instrument of Russian policy.

Whether intelligence is needed or not is a purely rhetorical question. Not a single more or less large, and even more so great state is not capable and will not be able to do without it. It will obviously die out with the liquidation of states, but such a prospect exists only in theory and is not visible in life. Meanwhile, there were two periods in the history of Russian intelligence when the need for its existence was either not recognized or was questioned. The first of them is the formation of the Russian state. Intelligence during this period had not yet taken shape as an independent institution of state power, it arose and formed not only "under the roof", but also as an integral part of the diplomatic building. We witnessed the second period in the recent past, when the euphoria of the exit from the Cold War so clouded the minds that some people in Russia began to preach the rejection of intelligence in the era of "civilized relations" that the world is approaching.

How fast is this approximation? One way or another, but in not a single state - the former enemy of the USSR in the era of the Cold War - is the question of the need to preserve intelligence

not debated at all. About changing the emphasis in its activities - yes. On the rejection of certain methods of work - also yes. But never - about the rejection of intelligence as the most important tool of state policy.

In 1992, I was interviewed by an English journalist who asked me whether, from my point of view, Russia was ready to refuse

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from conducting intelligence work on England, if England accepts the same conditions in relation to Russia? In our interconnected, closely intertwined world, resolving such an issue on a bilateral basis is, of course, impossible. What if all countries together decide to abandon intelligence? Well, then it can be discussed, but, to be honest, only incorrigible dreamers can believe in such a prospect.

One of the features of Russian intelligence is continuity, loyalty to the best traditions of the single-profile services that preceded it. We have never renounced and do not renounce all that is good, useful, important for the state, society, people, which was developed over many decades and centuries in Russia by the predecessors of the SVR, including, of course, in the Soviet Union. But the recognition of continuity does not at all mean a rejection of a critical attitude to one's history. The reader will also understand this from the "History of Russian Foreign Intelligence", which shows not only the "bright" but also the "dark" sides of its activities.

The multi-volume book brings the reader to the modern foreign intelligence of Russia. What does it do after the end of the Cold War, what tasks does it solve, on whose altar does it give strength, health, and sometimes even the lives of its officers?

It can be considered that at the end of the 20th century Russia is going through one of the most difficult stages of history. The economic crisis, unsettled relations between the center and part of the periphery, the threat of territorial disintegration or, in any case, the rejection of its individual parts, resistance to reintegration processes in the CIS, the political need to defend the position of an independent great power in the international arena, fears related to the fact that the Russian Federation enters the world economy mainly as a raw material element, while other great powers have already taken and are successfully pursuing a course towards the development of science-intensive high-tech production - all these are signs of a difficult time. But even in the most difficult days, not one of the mature politicians doubted that Russia - with its huge human potential, great history, outstanding contribution to world civilization, innumerable natural resources, great groundwork in fundamental science - can't get stuck at this stage. It was, is and will be a great power. Intelligence, among other important state mechanisms throughout the history of the Russian state, helped it overcome difficult periods - this is also another canvas that unites the essays into a single whole.

Moreover, the process of overcoming the crisis situation of the 1990s, which arose both from the legacy of the past and from the mistakes and shortcomings of the time when these lines were written, took place in far from one

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significant international setting. Yes, in the 1980s and early 1990s, a chapter in international relations was closed, when two ideologically different forces stood on opposite sides of the barricades, preparing to go to battle. The division of the world into two systems has ceased to exist - consequently, the ground for deterministic permanent opponents of Russia has also disappeared. But the world has not become less complicated because of this. The national interests of our state, which used to recede into the background, and often were sacrificed in the fight against permanent ideological opponents or the support of permanent ideological allies, have become paramount in their significance, have come to the fore. This had at least two consequences: a sharp intensification of searches for the fields of coincidence of these

interests with other states, and in case of their non-coincidence - determination of ways to protect national interests in a non-confrontational, political way.

However, has it always been possible to do this? The complex nature of the answer to this question is reinforced by the fact that, after the collapse of the USSR, the zone of regional conflicts significantly expanded, which spread to the territories of many national republics of the former Soviet Union, that is, reached the borders of Russia, wedged into Europe, where the Bosnian crisis not only gave rise to threat of destabilization in all the Balkans, but has also become a "magnet" that attracts attention and material assistance to the warring parties from states sometimes hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away from the region.

The danger of the expansion of conflicts has sharply increased, as they have developed in the conditions of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growth of international terrorism. The most negative influence on these conflicts (and, obviously, this influence will remain for a long time to come) is the long-term, utterly shaken situation in Afghanistan - the Central Asian conflict zone closely adjoins this country.

Islamic extremism, that is, the violent forms of the spread of militant Islam, which aims to introduce the Islamic model of the state, has extended its destabilizing influence not only to the Central Asian, but also to the Caucasian conflict zone - and, probably, will continue to spread for a long time to come. In the post-Cold War period, inter-ethnic tensions also intensified.

Naturally, at all stages of its development, Russian foreign intelligence, as shown in the multi-volume book, supplied the top leadership of its country with reliable, largely proactive information and analytical assessments of its experts built on its basis. At the same time, the main direction of its work was and remains the monitoring of all those processes that, under unfavorable

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for Russia, development could be detrimental to its interests. By the end of our century, such threats include:

- the activities of external forces trying to deepen or simply play on the weaknesses of Russia itself, its disagreements with other states - the former parts of the USSR; one of the priorities of intelligence in the mid-1990s was to neutralize the efforts made to thwart centripetal tendencies both in Russia itself and within the Commonwealth of Independent States;

- prospects for replenishment of the "club of nuclear states", for a number of third world countries to adopt various WMD systems, for a political decision to be made in some of them, laying the foundation for a movement towards the possession of nuclear weapons;

- _ the likelihood that the countries that were participants in the Cold War would enter new, destabilizing weapons systems - intelligence is obliged to timely notify the relevant Russian state structures about the development and implementation in other countries of new types of weapons and military equipment.

Not only the collection of information, analysis and synthesis of it, forecasting the development of the situation, but also an active role in the implementation of the country's foreign policy - this is the historical role of intelligence, acting with its own specific methods.

At the same time, one of the important tasks of intelligence has been and remains assistance in pursuing an active foreign policy of Russia in both the western and eastern (Chinese, Arab, Asia-Pacific, etc.) directions. The History of Russian Foreign Intelligence shows this retrospectively. The need to solve such a problem is also confirmed by the period that came after the departure from the Cold War, which by no means leveled the importance of the geopolitical factor,

did not in the least reduce the need to achieve a favorable geopolitical situation for Russia.

It is not out of place, obviously, to recall how important it has always been and remains for Russia mutually beneficial, equal, economic relations with other states, foreign private firms that do not infringe on its interests and what dangers for it, what damage to its economy sometimes such contacts turn around. The task of intelligence is to warn in time about the dangers, "traps", the true value of sometimes dubious proposals in the field of economic, scientific and technical cooperation.

The most important task of the Foreign Intelligence Service both yesterday, today and tomorrow will be to assist in increasing the defense potential and accelerating the social and economic development of Russia.

In the early 1990s, such a phenomenon as the interaction of Russian intelligence with the intelligence services of many foreign states, including NATO countries, gained a certain momentum. Collaboration

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Communication is developing along the lines of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, combating international terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and exchanging information about the situation in "hot spots". Isn't Russian intelligence losing its positions in such, at first glance, not quite natural cooperation? Definitely - no. It is not carried out as a substitute for intelligence activities. It is impossible - and the SVR demonstrates this in practice - not on an equal footing. At the same time, it is mutually beneficial and serves to solve problems in the field of coinciding interests.

Russian intelligence since July 1992 has been operating on a legal basis, fixed in the Law "On Foreign Intelligence", in the "Regulations on the Foreign Intelligence Service", approved by the President of Russia.

And now back to the multivolume. Veteran professional intelligence officers with many years of experience working abroad, who personally took part in many intelligence operations of recent decades, were involved in its preparation. Archival materials were made available to the authors. Memoirs, notes, fragments from books previously prepared by scouts were used.

"History of Russian foreign intelligence", of course, is not a chronicle and, moreover, not diaries.

And no one set himself the task of recreating the past day after day. Such an approach would be simply unrealistic. In the process of work, sometimes difficulties arose in restoring a particular picture or episode from separate surviving, often disparate and contradictory fragments. After all, secret archives were created not for the sake of writing the history of intelligence, but for everyday operational needs.

Writing essays was also hampered by the fact that in the pre-war and later years, many intelligence officers were slandered and expelled from life. Often, documentation related to their official activities also disappeared. Much had to be restored bit by bit. Many witnesses and participants in recent affairs and intelligence operations, those who keep pages of its history in their memory, are dying. That is why the authors of the publication considered it expedient to make available to the public those materials that they already have. The History of Russian Foreign Intelligence does not contain conjecture, the truth is not sacrificed for embellishment. Even when the names of a number of persons have been changed for the purpose of secrecy, the true basis of events remains.

Of course, intelligence is a particularly protected, delicate organism. Its purpose is to reveal not their own, but other people's secrets. But secrecy and publicity can be compatible. Of course, official secrets should remain so for the time being if their hasty disclosure could harm the public interest.

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or the interests of at least one single person who was involved in the performance of reconnaissance missions and honestly performed his duty. But this does not mean at all that you need to close or "cover" everything and everything. As practice shows, this leads only to negative results. The intelligence profession, information about which is given to the reader "from third parties", is misunderstood, in a distorted form. There are many examples of how dubious revelations of individual "writers", "denouncers" and "reformers" from intelligence are published in pursuit of a sensation. As we can see, the stony silence sometimes gives rise to malice, unrestrained, irresponsible ranting.

By publishing this publication, the SVR seeks to acquaint readers with the real side of the work of Russian intelligence officers, hoping to arouse a good interest in their difficult but noble profession.

Academician E.M. PRIMAKOV, Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service

October 1994

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Forerunners

Coming to the topic of our essays, first of all I would like to define what is meant by the word "intelligence". What it is? They say that the profession of a scout is one of the oldest on Earth, and in confirmation of this they quote from the Old Testament or from the Sumerian epic about Gilgamesh, which tells how Utnapishtim, the prototype of the legendary Noah, did not immediately leave the ark on the seventh day after the flood, took care, decided to first check the situation in the vicinity and released the birds for reconnaissance. Needless to say, the epic of Gilgamesh is a wonderful literary monument of one of the first civilizations in the world. But is it possible to rank Noah or Utnapishtim almost among the founders of the glorious chivalry of the "cloak and dagger"? Is this legal?

Indeed, the word "intelligence" in its original, original sense implies the conduct of some kind of secret survey with a special purpose. In this broad sense, intelligence has existed since time immemorial.

In the cave age, the question was classically posed simply: to be or not to be? And our Neanderthal ancestor did not need special brains to figure out, that is, to conduct an "examination with a special purpose": will the "meal" be tough? Otherwise, the hour is uneven, and you yourself will fall into a trap! And, of course, this "estimate" is not intelligence, but an elementary desire for survival, the instinct of self-preservation, which is characteristic even of animals.

Another thing is that it is this instinct, the need to ensure one's own security, the ability to protect oneself, to secretly find out the intentions and capabilities of a potential adversary and, without disclosing one's plans, to forestall an impending attack - all this, to one degree or another, is a component part (although only part) of the capacious concept of "intelligence".

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The famous Greek historian, "father of history" Herodotus told us in detail about how the powerful Persian king Darius went to fight with our distant ancestors, the Scythians. It was in 512 BC. By that time, Darius had created a gigantic empire that stretched from India to Greece. Under his dominion were such ancient kingdoms as Egypt and Babylon. Having crossed the Bosphorus with an army of 700,000, Darius conquered Thrace and Macedonia, crossed the Danube and moved into the Scythian steppes of the Black Sea region.

The Scythians are a brave, warlike people. But the instinct of self-preservation was not alien to them either. They had not enough warriors against Darius, and the weapons were not the same: the Persians had iron, but the Scythians had not yet come into use, only wooden arrows and spears with bone and bronze tips. But the Scythians had one advantage: their army consisted of cavalry, and the army of Darius was mostly on foot. The Scythians were dashing horsemen, they shot arrows well from the saddle, deftly threw darts. Their undersized horses were strong and hardy. All these pros and cons had to be weighed and a decision made.

Having received information about the number and weapons of the approaching enemy, the Scythian commanders "conferred and decided" not to enter into an open battle with the Persians, but began to retreat in front of Darius together with their families, nomadic wagons, herds of cattle, moving farther and farther into the boundless steppe, and along the way, wells were filled up, grass was burned out. So the Scythians crossed the Don, began to rise to the Volga.

The Persians, chasing them across the devastated land, never managed to overtake the nomads. The army of Darius was tired, many, experiencing thirst and hunger, died on the campaign. Meanwhile, the Scythians were safe and sound.

Then, as Herodotus narrates, Darius sent his ambassador to the Scythian king with the following speech:

"Why are you all running away? If you think you are stronger, then fight me. And if you consider yourself weaker than me, submit and come to me, your lord, with earth and water in your hands."

To this the Scythian king replied:

"Out of fear, I never ran away from anyone. I still lead the same life that I have always led, and I do not run away from you at all. In our country there are no cities, no gardens, no fields. Therefore, we have nothing to fear that our property will be conquered or devastated by someone. We have nothing to protect. We live in the same way in every place. Where we are, there is our homeland. So, we have nothing to hurry to join the battle with you. And if you yourself want to fight, find the tombs of our ancestors - then you will know how we will stand up for them! Instead of water and land, I will send you others

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gifts. And for the fact that you call yourself my master, I will still pay you off.

And Darius retreated. His army had a hard time on the way back to the Danube. There is a legend that it was at this time that the Scythian ambassadors brought Darius a mysterious "gift": a bird, a mouse, a frog and five arrows. For a long time the Persians puzzled over its meaning. Finally, a wise "translator" was found who interpreted this to Darius as follows: "If you Persians do not fly away like a bird into the sky, or hide in the ground like mice, or jump into lakes like frogs, then you will not come back and perish by our arrows."

Darius, the most powerful ruler of the world, with the remnants of his army, barely carried his feet beyond the Danube. The semi-savage Scythians, who did not yet own iron, did not know the settlement and literacy, turned out to be the winners. Using modern terminology, one could say: they managed to get information about the superior forces of the enemy in time, correctly assess the situation and pre-empt the attack that was being prepared for them.

The combination of military prowess with intelligence, natural ingenuity allowed the Scythians to accomplish what many other peoples of the contemporary ancient world could not do. Mind, information, knowledge - in English "sheShrepse", this word simultaneously means "intelligence". Yes, and in Russian it is a single-root word: "to know" - to know, "to explore" - to recognize, recognize, acquire information, knowledge.

The word "intelligence" was well known at the dawn of the creation of a state in Rus' - a princely, specific state, when, according to N.M. Karamzin, "there was still no convenient relationship between the possessions of one power, no general and firm charters, no order in civil degrees, and people, stubborn in their independence, obeyed the only one who held the sword over their head."

However, in the annals of that time, we would look in vain for any mention of special intelligence agencies or professional intelligence officers. The state apparatus was still too weak, and the circle of external relations too narrow and limited, for intelligence to then be able to stand out as an independent state service. This lacked two very important components: developed statehood and developed foreign policy ties. Meanwhile, intelligence was already beginning to operate.

In the work of the Byzantine historian of the tenth century Leo Deacon! tells how in 971 the Emperor of Byzantium John I Tzimiskes "set out to undertake a campaign against the Ross." Along the way, "he met two messengers of the Scythians, who, under the guise of an embassy, arrived in order to reconnoiter the forces of the Romans (that is, the Byzantines). When they began to reproach the Romans, claiming that they were suffering injustice, the emperor ordered, knowing full well the reason for their arrival,

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so that they go around the entire camp, inspect the ranks of the soldiers, and after going around and inspecting, they go back and tell their leader in what excellent order and with what obedient army the emperor of the Romans is going to war against them.

As is known from history, John Tzimiskes managed to push back the detachments of the Kyiv prince Svyatoslav and subjugate the northeastern part of the Bulgarian kingdom, but he did not dare to go to Rus'. Curiously, did he know about the fate of Darius?

In the ancient Russian chronicles one can find literally single episodes that are of interest to one degree or another from the point of view of the history of intelligence. There is now, for example, the professional term "well-wisher". It is understood as a foreigner who voluntarily, on his own initiative, offers his services to intelligence, as a rule, in the form of transferring secret information, oral or more often documentary, while counting on an appropriate remuneration. Professional intelligence officers treat "well-wishers" very carefully, trying, before using their services, to check whether they are a "setup" by the enemy's special services, otherwise you yourself risk becoming an object of provocation.

But in the case that will be discussed, there was no risk. In 988, the Grand Duke of Kiev Vladimir, having gathered a large army, approached the Greek city of Chersonesos (located near present-day Sevastopol) on ships. "This trading city," writes N.M. Karamzin, built in the deepest antiquity by the people of Heracleia, retained its existence and glory even in the 10th century, despite the great devastation made by wild peoples in the vicinity of the Black Sea, from the time of Herodotus' Scythians and Goths and Pechenegs. He recognized the sovereignty of the Greek Emperors over himself, but did not pay tribute to them; elected his superiors and obeyed his own Republican laws. Its inhabitants, trading in all the marinas of the Black Sea, enjoyed abundance.

Vladimir, stopping in the harbor or bay of Kherson, landed an army on the shore and surrounded the city from all sides. Since ancient times, bound to liberty, the people of Kherson defended themselves courageously. The Grand Duke threatened them to stand under their walls for three years if they did not surrender, but the townspeople rejected his proposals, hoping, perhaps, to have an ambulance from the Greeks; they tried to destroy all the works of the besiegers and, having made a secret dig, as the chronicler says, at night they carried away to the city the earth that the Russians poured in front of the walls in order to surround them with a rampart, according to the ancient custom of military art.

Fortunately, there was a well-wisher to Vladimir named Anastas in the city. This man shot an arrow at the Russians with the inscription: follow you,

to the East, there are wells that supply water to the people of Kherson through underground pipes; you can take it away. The Grand Duke hastened to take advantage of the advice and ordered to dig up water pipes (of which traces are still visible near the current ruins of Kherson). Then the citizens, exhausted by thirst, surrendered to the Russians."

It is curious that even the name of the well-wisher, Anastas, has been preserved. What was his nationality? Most likely Greek. What motives did he have? As they say, history is silent about this. But it is important to note something else: the case with Anastas could tell the Russians that unshakable truth, which later turned into an aphorism: "a good agent is worth an entire army."

Let us consider one more case from the annals of the time of Prince Vladimir. The reader, of course, knows the word "disinformation". The term "active measures" or "assistance measures" may also imply disinformation or actions that could mislead the enemy. It turns out that the ancient Russians, in difficult times, showed remarkable ingenuity and resorted to what a professional intelligence officer would now call "active measures". Let's go back to N.M. Karamzin: "Vladimir (in 997), wanting to gather a large army to repel the Pechenegs, he himself went to Novgorod; but these tireless enemies, recognizing his absence, approached the capital, surrounded Belgorod and cut off communication between the inhabitants and the surrounding places. After some time, there was a famine, and the people, having gathered at the Veche or council, expressed their desire to surrender to the enemies. "The prince is far away," he said, "the Pechenegs can only kill some of us; and we will all die of hunger." But the clever old man's cunning, though not entirely probable, saved the citizens. He ordered to dig two wells, put in them one cad with a well-fed (honey broth on water), the other with dough, and call the foremen of the enemy, as if for negotiations. Seeing these wells, they believed that the earth itself produces food tasty for people there, and returned to their princes with the message that the city could not lack food supplies. The Pechenegs lifted the siege.

Even if the entire history cited by the chronicler is regarded not as a true story, but as a legend, then, nevertheless, it can be assumed that the ancient Russians were quite capable of this kind of cunning, a kind of distracting maneuver.

The ancients knew as well as we did about the enormous advantages that timely information about the secret plans of the enemy could provide. In this respect, such a case, this time quite reliable, is noteworthy.

In the summer of 1380, the Grand Duke of Moscow Dmitry Ioannovich (later nicknamed Donskoy) sent to Mamai a "cunning husband", the boyar Zakharia Tyutchev, giving him a lot of gold, silver

ra and two translators. This ambassador, according to the Nikon chronicle, heard in the land of Ryazan about the betrayal of the local prince Oleg, as well as about the union of the Lithuanian prince Yagaila with Mamai, and let Dmitry know about it. In early September, the conspirators intended to meet on the banks of the Oka and move together to Moscow. The Grand Duke immediately sent the "first guard" to check the information received, "in order to find out about the enemy." The "Guard" returned with the news that Mamai definitely intends to "fight Russia". Then the Grand Duke ordered the army to gather in Kolomna on August 15, so that, without waiting for the connection of Mamai with Oleg and Jagiello, to deliver a preemptive blow to him.

Meanwhile, Zakharia, having arrived in the Horde, in the name of the Grand Duke asked Mamai, as it should be, about his health. Mamai, as the legend testifies, threw off the shoe from his right foot and boldly told him: "I will give the net ... from my foot that has fallen away." And, turning to his soldiers, he allegedly said: "Take the gifts of Moscow and buy yourself whips; the gold and silver of Prince Demetrius will all be in my hand; I will divide its land to those who serve me, and I myself will set the camel's flock to feed."

The defeat of Mamai in the Battle of Kulikovo was the beginning of the liberation of Rus' from the Tatar-Mongol yoke. Quick and decisive actions by Dmitry Donskoy did not allow Oleg and Jagiello to connect with Mamai, and both of them fled to Lithuania.

It is known about the further fate of Zakharia Tyutchev that he responded boldly, with dignity to Mamai's daring attacks and was almost killed by the Murzas from the khan's entourage. However, Mamai restrained them and invited Zakharia to his service. The cunning Zacharias, as the chronicle narrates, did not refuse, but asked to be allowed to send Demetrius's embassy first. Mamai wrote a letter to the Grand Duke, offering to surrender: "Come to me, until I have mercy on you." Zakharia, accompanied by four khan's murzas, was sent to Dmitry, but near the Oka he met an advance detachment of Russian troops, "tied up these four murzas, tore up the Khan's letter, sent one Tatar to tell their sovereign about it and returned safely to Moscow."

Was Zakharia Tyutchev a scout? At that time, such a profession did not yet exist. He was a "cunning husband". He managed to obtain secret information, brought it to the attention of his leadership in a timely manner, which allowed him to correctly assess the current situation and inflict a preemptive strike on the enemy, which had such important consequences for the entire subsequent history of the state.

Before the formation of intelligence as a professional civil service, it was, of course, still very, very far away. On this long journey, passing through several centuries, a whole series of more or less clearly defined stages can be traced.

1549: creation by Ivan GU of the Ambassadorial order - the first independent state structure in Russia that was in charge of everything

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mi questions of international relations. During this period, no distinction is yet made between the diplomatic and intelligence services. There were no professional diplomats in Rus' yet, just as there were no professional intelligence officers.

Prior to the creation of the Posolsky Prikaz, diplomatic documents were kept together with the royal treasury. Foreign policy assignments were carried out by the treasurer, printer, and other especially trusted persons from the autocrat's entourage. Now these functions are gradually being concentrated in one institution, including the most sensitive, secret intelligence assignments. Diplomacy and intelligence go hand in hand and form a single whole.

1654: Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich creates a special office with him - the Order of Secret Affairs. There is some redistribution of functions in the state apparatus. The embassy order continues to exist, but intelligence activities are increasingly being transferred to the jurisdiction of the Order of Secret Affairs. Thus, for the first time, a structural separation of diplomacy and intelligence is being undertaken, although both the heads of the Posolsky Prikaz and the employees of the diplomatic service, by order of the tsar, continue to carry out separate responsible tasks of an intelligence nature. Ciphers are introduced into the regular practice of secret correspondence.

1716: in the new military regulations of Peter I, intelligence work for the first time acquires a legal basis. It is entrusted to the quartermaster general service. Along with this, the tradition of tacit use of official diplomatic representatives, including ambassadors, continues to carry out reconnaissance missions (A.A. Matveev, P.A. Tolstoy, A.Ya. Khilkov, and others).

1810: Minister of War M.B. Barclay de Tolly sends the first permanent representatives - "military agents" - to the Russian embassies of a number of European countries. The main task is to conduct undercover, intelligence work. For the first time, the extraction of secret military-political information abroad is being put on a regular, professional basis. Foreign intelligence is structurally more and more clearly formalized in the military department and subsequently

years, especially under the Minister of War A.I. Chernyshev. At the same time, issues of foreign intelligence to one degree or another continue to remain under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for example, under K.V. Nesselrod), although here they do not have a clearly defined structural nature and are mainly resolved at the level of one-time, although very responsible, assignments.

1856: Alexander P approved the first instruction in the history of Russian intelligence on the work of military agents. The functions of foreign intelligence are increasingly becoming the prerogative of the military. In this matter, the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War of 1853-1856 had a great influence. The peace treaty was signed on March 18, and

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structure - June 10, 1856 The development of military art and the re-equipment of the Russian army on the basis of the latest Western models are becoming a priority.

1905: the situation repeats itself, again the defeat in the war became a serious impetus for the revision and reorganization of the entire intelligence and counterintelligence work of the empire's special services. For the first time, a covert intelligence course is being introduced at the Academy of the General Staff, and the training of professional intelligence officers is being put on a regular basis.

These are the major milestones in the history of domestic foreign intelligence until October 1917. The reader will learn more about each of these periods and the people who were directly involved in intelligence work from the proposed essays.

' See Leo the Deacon. Story. - M.: "Nauka", 1988. - S. 124. 2 See Russian intelligence and counterintelligence in the war of 1904-1905. - M.: "Progress", "Progress-Academy", 1993. - P. 148.

2

Two Ivan

The history of the formation of foreign intelligence in Russia as a separate public service developed very slowly.

At an early stage, this was due to two reasons. The first of them was that for several centuries Rus' remained in vassal dependence on powerful eastern conquerors. This dependence, almost close to colonial, hindered the independent development of foreign policy ties, and, consequently, those superstructural structures that ensure the implementation of state interests in the international arena, including foreign intelligence.

Exactly one hundred years have passed since the Battle of Kulikovo before Rus' finally freed itself from the Tatar-Mongol yoke. In the summer of 1480, detachments of the Golden Horde approached the banks of the small river Ugra near the southern borders of the Muscovite state, where Russian troops blocked their path. For a long time the opponents stood on both sides of the river without taking military action. Finally, on November 11, the khan retreated. From that day on, the shadow of Moscow's dependence on the Golden Horde disappeared forever.

The second reason was that the rulers of the scattered principalities of Rus' waged an endless struggle for power among themselves. During this period, the "main enemy" often turned out to be his own relative - uncle, nephew, brother. Therefore, the "reconnaissance" efforts of individual princes or pretenders to the princely throne in such cases were directed not to external spheres, but "inside" the family clan. Since the final liberation from the Tatar-Mongol yoke, the desire for unification in Rus' has been noticeably growing, although litigation and intrigue, fratricidal conflicts still flare up here and there.

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1480 - the time of the reign of Grand Duke Ivan III, the time of the gathering of scattered, specific Rus' into a single state. Ivan P was the first of the Moscow princes to take the title of "sovereign of all Rus'", uniting under his possession almost all the lands that were once ruled by his distant ancestors - the Kievan princes. The foundations of Russian statehood laid down under Ivan III were the solid foundation on which its further construction took place.

Under Ivan Sh, Russia, according to the figurative expression of N.M. Karamzin, "came out of the twilight of shadows." The remarkable Russian historian S.M. Solovyov compared him with Peter the Great. Tsar Ivan the Terrible would hardly have been able to so radically eliminate the remnants of feudal fragmentation in Rus' and so firmly establish the principles of autocratic power if he had not relied on his grandfather's achievements.

So, grandfather and grandson, both - Ivan, Ivan Vasilyevich, complex, ambiguous personalities - with great virtues and no less major flaws, a steep, unbridled disposition, people of a tragic fate and great, undeniable greatness. Both are of particular interest from the point of view of creating the foundations of the state apparatus in Rus' and the beginning of the broad development of foreign policy relations - two necessary conditions for the formation of intelligence in its

current understanding.

Ivan III (1440-1505) was born in the midst of bloody feudal turmoil - the struggle of specific princes for the Moscow throne. His father - Vasily Vasilyevich (who later received the nickname Dark) - was the eldest son of the Moscow Tsar Vasily Dmitrievich and the grandson of Dmitry Donskoy. Vasily Dmitrievich, according to a spiritual letter written shortly before his death, intended to transfer the "great reign" not to his brothers, but to his direct heir, son Vasily: "And God will give my son the Great Principality, and I will bless Prince Vasily for the language of my son."

Apparently, Vasily Dmitrievich himself looked anxiously into the future, was afraid of the hostile speech of his brother, Yuri Dmitrievich, who claimed the Moscow throne. Concerned about strengthening the position of his son, Vasily Dmitrievich entrusted him to the care of his mother, the daughter of the Grand Duke of Lithuania Sofya Vitovtovna and Metropolitan Photius.

The heir apparent was only ten years old when his father died. However, the "government" formed under the juvenile Vasily Vasilyevich was a solid support of the grand ducal power. Sofya Vitovtovna was a tough, energetic woman who felt her father's strong support behind her. A native of the distant Peloponnese, the Greek Metropolitan Photius came to Moscow with an ecclesiastical and political worldview that had taken shape in the Byzantine

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chve, part of which was the idea of the sovereign as the "anointed one" of God on earth. The union of Moscow, Lithuania and the church was such a force against which the contender for the throne, Yuri Dmitrievich, did not dare to speak out. In addition, during these years, the Golden Horde, busy with internal strife, did not interfere in the relationship between the Russian princes.

But soon the situation changed. Vitovt and Photius died. The dispute about the great reign of Moscow was transferred to the Golden Horde. In 1431, Yuri Dmitrievich and Vasily Vasilyevich went to Khan Ulu-Mukhammed with the boyar Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhsky. The rivals spent about ten months in the Horde, proving their right to the throne. The Moscow side turned out to be more skillful, and the khan gave the label to the seventeen-year-old Vasily Vasilyevich. Then Yuri Dmitrievich decided to resort to arms, drawing his sons into this struggle - Vasily Kosoy and Dmitry Shemyaka. In 1433, Yuri Dmitrievich occupied Moscow, but was soon forced to leave it. In 1434, he once again captures Moscow, but dies two months later.

His sons remain. In 1436, the son Vasily Yurievich suffered a severe defeat, was captured and blinded (hence the nickname Kosoy). Another son - Dmitry Shemyaka - continues to fight.

In 1446, he managed to capture Vasily Vasilyevich during prayer in the Trinity-Sergius Monastery and blind him. Prince Ivan, the future sovereign of all Rus', who at that time was barely six years old, witnessed the capture of his father, and only people loyal to the prince managed to hide him and save him from captivity, and perhaps from death.

Under such conditions, the character and worldview of Prince Ivan were formed. From early childhood, he was used to seeing himself surrounded by enemies, at the center of bloody intrigues generated by the specific princely system.

Dmitry Shemyaka settled in Moscow as a "Grand Duke", but was soon expelled, although he continued to fight for the throne for a long time. In 1453 he died suddenly in Novgorod. Some chronicles convey a "people's rumor" that Shemyaka died of poison, and the grand-ducal clerk Stefan the Bearded brought it to Novgorod. He allegedly bribed the cook Shemyaki, "in the name of Toadstool", and he gave his master "a potion in the smoke." Thus ends the chain of crimes, secret and overt, in the struggle for the Moscow inheritance.

Prince Ivan becomes first a co-ruler with a blind father, and then a full-fledged grand duke with an already established worldview: he is an implacable enemy of feudal fragmentation, specific separatism, the creator of a new state system.

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The most important events of his reign: the accession to the state of Moscow of the lands of Novgorod, Vyatka, Perm, Tver, Yaroslavl, Ryazan, as well as a number of Western Russian lands previously conquered by Lithuania (Chernigov, Novgorod-Seversky, Bryansk, Gomel, etc.), final liberation from the Tatar-Mongol yoke, marriage to Sophia Paleolog, niece of the last Byzantine emperor, which actually made Moscow the successor to the center of Orthodoxy. This is how the foundations of autocracy, or autocracy, were formed in Rus'. The Moscow principality becomes a Great Russian state. Since Ivan [III], the word "autocrat" was officially introduced into the permanent title of the Moscow sovereign and consecrated by a church rite, the blessing of spiritual authority.

The word "autocrat", as noted by V.O. Klyuchevsky, began to enter the Moscow official language, when, with the arrival of the "princess of Tsaregorodskaya" Sophia, the idea began to break through to the Moscow court that the Moscow sovereign, both by his wife and by Orthodox Christianity, was the only heir to the fallen Tsaregrad emperor, who was considered in Rus', the highest model of state power, completely independent, independent of any third-party force. Autocrat, by definition V.O. Klyuchevsky, is included in the Moscow title at the same time as the tsar, which meant that the Moscow sovereign no longer recognized himself as a tributary of the Tatar Khan. Initially, the word "autocrat" characterized not the internal political relations, but the external position of the Moscow sovereign, this word meant a ruler who was not dependent on outside, alien power, independent; the autocrat was opposed to what we would call a vassal, and not what in modern political language is called a constitutional sovereign. This is how the contemporaries of Ivan PP looked at the Moscow sovereign: they saw in him the "sovereign of the Russian lands", the independent head of Orthodox Russian Christianity!

The principle of autocracy formed the basis for the development of international relations of the Russian state. Already under Ivan III, diplomatic relations were established with the papal curia, Germany, Hungary, Moldavia, Turkey, Iran, and the Crimean Khanate.

However, as V.O. Klyuchevsky, despite the multilateral development of diplomatic relations of the Moscow court since the time of Ivan III, "for a long time there was no noticeable special institution in charge of them: they were led directly by the sovereign himself with the Duma" -.

A separate state institution in charge of foreign policy issues was created only under Ivan IV the Terrible. In the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia,

a document indicating exactly when diplomatic affairs, which were at first under the office of the treasurer, were separated and entrusted to a special case

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to the manufacturer, which served as the basis for the Ambassadorial order: "In 1549, the ambassadorial business was ordered to Ivan Viskovaty."

Viskovaty had already participated in diplomatic affairs before that time, in 1542 he wrote a "truce letter" with Poland. Now he plays a leading role in relations with foreign representatives, whose arrival in Muscovy noticeably increased in the second half of XV | century.

Particularly interesting are the unusual circumstances of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and England. In the spring of 1553, three ships set out from the mouth of the Thames, equipped by the British Society of Wandering Merchants, in search of a northern sea route to China and India. After a six-month voyage, the ships, battered by storms, ended up off the northern shores of the Russian land, which at that time was uninhabited for many hundreds of miles. Two ships were lost in the ice. The third of them, "Edward Bonavencher", under the command of Richard Chancellor, reached the mouth of the Northern Dvina, where the first Russian port of Arkhangelsk, famous for its trade, was later built, and then a small poor fishing pier was sheltered near the ancient monastery of Michael the Archangel.

Despite the obvious "proximity to God", nothing in this tiny village spoke of the proximity of the authorities. And, nevertheless, the "alert system" worked extremely flawlessly: the arrival of foreigners immediately became known in the nearest administrative center, and the local governor cordially received the uninvited guests. And soon Chancellor was invited to Moscow to the Tsar himself. At the same time, the Dvina chronicler enters into his "annals" in some detail the story of the arrival in Kholmogory on "small ships" of the ambassador of the "Knight" (Richard Chancellor) from the "Aglin King Edward" with guests?

A written testimony of Richard Chancellor himself about his arrival in Moscow and meeting with Ivan the Terrible has been preserved: "I turn to the story of my introduction to the tsar. After 12 days had passed since my arrival, the secretary in charge of the affairs of foreigners sent for me and informed me that the Grand Duke wanted me to appear before his Majesty with the letters of the king, my sovereign. I was very pleased with this and carefully prepared for the reception. When the Grand Duke took his place, the interpreter followed me into the outer chambers, where 100 or more nobles were sitting, all in a luxurious golden dress; from there I went to the council hall, where the Grand Duke himself was sitting with his nobility ... Chancellor Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovaty and the secretary stood in front of the Grand Duke. When I bowed and submitted my letters, he turned to me with a greeting and asked me about the health of the king ... My offering was presented by the chancellor to his lordship with his head uncovered (before that they were all in hats). When his grace

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received my diplomas, I was asked to leave; I was told that I myself could not address the Grand Duke, but only answer him when he spoke to me.

Apparently, the audience went well. Returning to his homeland, Chancellor in the spring of 1555 again went to Moscow to help establish permanent English trade with Russia. This visit also gave positive results. Inspired by success, Chancellor returns home with a rich cargo on a ship and with the first Russian ambassador on board - Osip Nepeya. On a stormy night off the Scottish coast, the ship crashed against the rocks. Trying to save the Moscow ambassador, Chancellor died along with his son and most of the crew. Nepeya escaped and was solemnly received in London, where local merchants held a real feast in his honor. The news of this event is preserved in the English chronicles. Russian chronicles of that time also tell that Osip Nepeya was honorably received by the English king "in a big

his city in Lunskey "(London)" let go with Nepey many craftsmen, hunters and gold and silver seekers and workers, and many other craftsmen, and came with Nepey together.

There are many other examples of the expansion of Russia's international contacts during this period. Thomas Herner, who arrived in Moscow in December 1557 as part of the embassy of the master of the Livonian Order, recalled in his notes: "Fritz Gross and Melchior Grothausen went to the castle (apparently, the Kremlin is meant) to ask the chancellor (Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovaty) so that he would grant us an audience with the Grand Duke ... "

As can be seen from the examples, with the creation of the Posolsky Prikaz, Moscow is establishing fairly broad diplomatic ties. The same Chancellor recalls: "While I was in Moscow, the Grand Duke sent two ambassadors to the King of Poland with at least five hundred horsemen; they were dressed and equipped with splendor beyond all measure - not only on themselves, but also on the horses were velvet, gold and silver brocade, studded with pearls ... "

All this was done, of course, with a certain intent: to demonstrate abroad the wealth and power of the Russian state, to raise its international prestige.

But not only this goal was pursued by Ivan the Terrible. He also wanted to know about what was happening in foreign countries. Moreover, he was interested in information not only official, but also, so to speak, "latent", secret.

A curious written testimony of a certain Michalon Litvin about the affairs of that time has been preserved. Here is what he writes:

"We [in Lithuania] have a large number of Moscow defectors who, having found out our deeds, means and customs, freely return

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while they are with us, they secretly convey our plans to theirs... and other papers secretly obtained in the royal office, copies ... This cunning man [Ivan [U] appointed a reward for returning defectors, even empty and useless: a slave - freedom, a commoner - nobility, a debtor - forgiveness of debts, a villain - release - forgiveness of guilt...»°.

Evidently, Grozny listened attentively to defectors, greatly valued intelligence information that helped him navigate correctly in matters of foreign policy, even favored those who returned "empty and useless" (just in case, for the future), not to mention those who brought real secret information from abroad. Complained generously, royally. Ivan looked far away, dreamed of establishing himself in the Baltic, moving further to the West, even intermarrying with the English Queen Elizabeth [or at least with her niece Mary Hastings.

In 1565, a separate institution was built on the territory of the Kremlin, which in various documents of that time is called the Ambassadorial Chamber, the Ambassadorial Hut or the Ambassadorial Order. "But it remains an institution very close to the sovereign," notes V.O. Klyuchevsky, - as if his own office for foreign affairs: leaving Moscow, the tsar takes with him his or, rather, his department, along with the clerk who manages it. From the inventory of the tsar's archives from the time of Ivan the Terrible and from the embassy books of his father and grandfather, it can be seen that at the Moscow court, even before Ivan III, a significant stock of diplomatic papers had accumulated, which then increased more and more; these papers were kept in boxes, which, according to the type of business, were called "German", "Voloshsky", or were designated by the names of the clerks under whom the business was conducted. Already under Grozny's grandfather, at the end of the 15th century, diplomatic documents were handed over to the treasurer for storage by his order, along with any household treasury of the sovereign. In connection with this, it must be added that at the end of the 10th century and throughout almost the entire 17th century, diplomatic missions were very often entrusted to treasurers... Another important businessman in diplomatic affairs is in the 19th century

keeper of the royal seal). This explains the close administrative connection between two such different institutions as the Treasury and the Department of Foreign Affairs”.

So, the process of creating and establishing centralized state structures, begun under Ivan II, remained still in its infancy even a hundred years later, under his grandson Ivan the Terrible. Under him, the Ambassadorial order took shape, but there were no professional diplomats yet. Diplomatic and intelligence missions

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taken by the same people, there was no difference. And call them treasurers, printers - it doesn't matter. Most often, these were versatile people, great personalities, outstanding figures of their time, which we will talk about in subsequent essays.

See Klyuchevsky V. Boyar Duma of ancient Rus'. - M., 1909. - S. 248. Ibid. - S. 163.

See Chronicle Dvinskaya. - M., 1889. - S. 10-13.

PSRL. - T. HSH. - St. Petersburg, 1904. - S. 286.

Foreigners about ancient Moscow. - M., 1991. - S. 94.

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5

The fate of the royal favorite

The fate of many Russian intelligence officers was not easy. Despite their great services to the Fatherland, many of them were subjected to unreasonable repressions, familiar to the modern reader from the 30s and even later years of our century. Even under Ivan the Terrible, an ominous scheme was set in motion: sweeping accusations of high treason - execution - belated rehabilitation. The list of victims opens with the name of Ivan Mikhailovich Visko wool.

On July 25, 1570, the tsarist guardsmen brought about a hundred condemned to death to the Moscow market square, nicknamed by the people “The Filthy Puddle”. All of them were dignitaries - senior clerks, clerks and clerks. Grozny suspected all of them of treason and conspiracy against the throne. The executioners kindled a huge fire, hung a vat of water over the fire, and built crucifixes. Grozny appeared at the place of execution, surrounded by archers, gave the order to drive to the square everyone who came to hand on the streets of the city. The "foul puddle" quickly filled with people. The execution ceremony began. The first was Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovaty. They tried to force him to confess publicly to a “criminal conspiracy” against the tsar and to ask for pardon. But the proud and firm Viskovaty shook his head negatively, uttering the last phrase through his teeth: “Damn you, bloodsuckers, together with your king!” Grozny waved his hand, and Ivan Mikhailovich was crucified on a log cross, dismembered alive in front of everyone. Thus ended his earthly journey the first clerk of the Ambassadorial Department, the first head of the tsar's diplomatic service. According to historians, Ivan the Terrible loved him "like himself."

What happened, what black shadow lay between them? Why did the king send to the chopping block, according to the Polish historian A. Gvagnini,

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"an excellent husband, outstanding in mind and many virtues of the chancellor"?

The answer to this question is not simple. Clever, literate, eloquent, executive - these qualities, perhaps, attracted the young tsar, who instructed the ordinary, few

to the famous clerk "in charge of the embassy business". Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovaty, like no one else at court, knew how to delve into the texts of messages to the tsar of foreign sovereigns and rulers, find interlinear meaning in them, and interpret the content to the benefit of the tsar. And therefore, even before the creation of the Ambassadorial Order, Grozny sent Ivan Mikhailovich all overseas papers with his instructions.

And Viskovaty prepared draft answers, assessed the emerging situation, planned further actions, and did it very professionally, with great knowledge of the matter and broad erudition. Having become the head of the Ambassadorial Department, Ivan Mikhailovich, as befits a wise statesman, first of all directed his zeal to the creation of a single Tsar's archive, which included handwritten codes and state papers of Moscow great and specific princes, all foreign policy documentation and various investigative materials that were previously stored in the "caskets of current documentation" that belonged to individual grand ducal clerks. Communicating on duty with foreign ambassadors, Viskovaty constantly looked into the materials of the documentary repository he created, made inquiries, made extracts, determined the nature and content of the operational information that should have been obtained during conversations in the "priest's hut" from the Lithuanian envoy, a Nogai representative or, say, an envoy of the Danish king.

The range of interests and duties of Ivan Mikhailovich as the first head of the Ambassadorial Order was very diverse. He was in charge of the correspondence of the tsar and the Boyar Duma with foreign ambassadors, resolved issues related to the introduction of newly arrived diplomats to Ivan GU, was engaged in the selection of candidates for the diplomatic service and the formation of Russian embassies abroad. The archives have preserved separate copies of census documents with notes made personally by Viskovaty, whom foreign contemporaries considered "a Muscovite who had not studied anything, who had no equal at that time in Moscow."

His natural talents were fully experienced by the English envoy Richard Chancellor. After a solemn reception at the Tsar, Chancellor negotiated the development of political and economic ties between England and Russia exclusively with Viskovaty, who perfectly understood the significance of such ties and in many ways contributed to the British obtaining a "privileged charter" with various trade privileges. In gratitude for this, the English

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The authorities also allowed Russian subjects to trade duty-free and freely in England. In addition, an agreement was reached on the free entry into Russia of English artists, artisans, physicians, "miners", etc., which at that time played a significant role in rapprochement between the two countries.

THEM. Viskovaty tried in every possible way to consolidate the results achieved in the development of Russian-British relations by sending the first Russian ambassador, Osip Nepeya, to London.

THEM. Viskovaty was a supporter of Russia's exit to the West and therefore used all his diplomatic zeal to reach the expanses of the Baltic. And this meant a conflict with Poland, Sweden, Livonia, Denmark, who considered this region their traditional sphere of influence. Realizing this, Ivan Mikhailovich carefully studied the military-political situation in the Baltics with the help of specially sent people, tried to weaken the union of the states opposing Russia, and personally went to Denmark in August 1562 to conduct interstate negotiations. Viskovaty brought to Moscow an alliance treaty with Denmark and a 20-year truce with Sweden, which greatly encouraged Grozny in his Livonian military campaign, which was held with varying success.

It was not easy for Viskovaty to fulfill the mission assigned to him in the Kingdom of Denmark. The king did not want to hear about the agreement with Muscovy. Ivan Mikhailovich realized that success would not be achieved by ordinary diplomatic means. And then he resorted to other methods - to

to what is now in the professional language of intelligence officers is called the acquisition of "influence agencies". It took money and remarkable strength of persuasion to secretly win over the Danish nobles, who at the right time had an advantageous influence on the king for Ivan Mikhailovich. In the "Danish diplomatic campaign" I.M. Viskovaty put personal prestige and the special position of the royal favorite at stake. And he achieved his goal by methods that only a few centuries later would be called "reconnaissance".

In 1566, a great Polish embassy arrived in Moscow to Tsar Ivan [U] to negotiate the conditions for ending the Livonian War. By this time, the military successes of the Russian army in the Baltics had noticeably decreased, and the Poles perked up. They demanded from Russia the return of Smolensk and Polotsk, not wanting to cede the seaport of Riga to the Russians. Negotiations stalled at a dead point. I.M. took over the matter. Viscous. He saw the danger for Russia in the continuation of the bloody conflict and offered the Poles a compromise: he agreed to a truce on the condition of the withdrawal of Polish troops from the Baltic states and did not insist that Poland cede the disputed Livonian cities to Russia...

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It just so happened in Russian history that the wise and treacherous tsars had no shortage of intelligent and knowledgeable assistants. Ivan the Terrible deliberately brought the able, independent-thinking courtiers closer to him, then moved them away from him, pushing their foreheads together, so that he could then "judge wisely" like a king. The reverse side of such political cunning was the inevitable enmity of applicants for royal favors. The tsar made okolnichy A.F. such a political rival and enemy of Viskovaty. Adashev, who inspired the tsar with the idea of ending the almost won war with Livonia and transferring military operations against the Crimean Khanate and Turkey. Undoubtedly, there was logic in these military-political changes. The Russian state had to fight on two fronts, and constant clashes in the east and especially in the south, with the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire, greatly annoyed Tsar Ivan the Terrible. Russian society was split: the court nobility supported Viskovaty's line, counting on obtaining estates in the west and expanding trade with England, Germany, Holland and other countries. Group A.F. Adashev was assisted by the service nobility, especially the governors, who had suffered enough from the constant raids from the Turks and Tatars.

Only the tsar could resolve the dispute between Viskovaty and Adashev. But did he intend to do so? Doubtful. And then "His Majesty the case" intervened. Ivan Mikhailovich, reputed to be an expert in the wisdom of church teaching, was drawn into a purely theological, ecclesiastical dispute connected with the case of the so-called "Bashkin's heresy." The essence of the conflict was that one of the prominent religious thinkers of that time, Matvey Bashkin, contrary to the canons of the Orthodox Church, began to deny the divine origin of Christ, the need for a church hierarchy, and declared the holy books, with the exception of the New Testament, to be "fables". THEM. Viskovaty, in the presence of the tsar and the boyars, spoke out against the religious views of Matvey Bashkin, but, having proved to the judges that he was right, he clearly failed to convince Ivan the Terrible of this, who, with his Jesuit mind, suspected cunning on the part of Ivan Mikhailovich. Indeed, do not be afraid of the court, but be afraid of the judge, especially if the judge is the king himself. By the will of Ivan the Terrible, Ivan Mikhailovich was excommunicated from the church for three years. In the first year, he had to stand near the temple and ask those who came in to pray for him; in the second - to enter the church only to listen to the divine scripture; in the third - to be in the church, but without the right to communicate. Further more. Viskovaty is gradually removed from the ongoing daily work in the Posolsky Prikaz, and then formally deprived of his post. And when Ivan the Terrible returned to Moscow after "restoring order" in rebellious Novgorod, the position of the former first head of the Ambassadorial Order became critical. He was included in the group of so-called

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"Moscow conspirators" and charged with a "conspiracy" to surrender Novgorod and Pskov to the Poles; accused of secret treasonous relations with the Turkish Sultan and the Crimean Khan, to whom Viskovaty allegedly "offered" Kazan and Astrakhan.

Ivan the Terrible quickly "dealt with" the conspirators and sent them all to the scaffold.

Thirteen long bloody years have passed since the death of Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovaty. It is difficult to say with what spiritual experiences and remorse the Terrible was tormented, but, obviously, foreseeing the inevitable meeting with God, the tsar decided to repent. Since 1583, "commemoration of the disgraced" began to be regularly held in all monasteries. And Ivan Mikhailovich Viskovaty was one of the first to be included in the tragic list of those who were commemorated. Moreover, it is known for certain that Ivan the Terrible personally sent 223 rubles and 23 rubles worth of candles to the Trinity-Sergius Monastery for "commemoration of the soul of Viskovaty". It was not in vain that historians claimed that the tsar loved Ivan Mikhailovich "as he loved himself"...

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Order of secret affairs

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, nicknamed the Quietest for his generally good-natured character, was the second of the Romanov dynasty. Taking care of his own safety, fearing the intrigues of the boyar elite, he began to draw closer young people from among the "thin-born", identifying them for service in his personal office. Secretly from the boyars, he began to give them secret instructions. In 1654, the office was transformed into the Order of Secret Affairs.

The well-known historian K. Valishevsky in his book "The First Romanovs" defined it as follows: "It was something like the secret office of Louis XIV ... Tatishchev looked [at the Order of Secret Affairs] as an inquisition table ... Modern historians discovered in it, like Kostomarov, the embryo of the future secret police... He [the Order] was included in the diplomatic, military, police, financial area and performed many other functions that defied any classification"...

Historian M.N. Pokrovsky gave him the following definition: "Almost at the head of the entire state was placed under the Romanovs" Order of Secret Affairs ", and with this light hand all sorts of secret" offices "and" expeditions "escort us through the entire 18th century. In the 19th century, all these secret institutions were handed over to the gendarme corps and the police department. From the very beginning, under the first Romanovs, the secret order was endowed with enormous powers. Even members of the Boyar Duma, i.e. State Council, using a later expression, did not go to this order and did not know the affairs there. He was, therefore, outside the control of this Moscow State Council. He was directly subordinate to the tsar himself, and his officials actually had more power than the members of the Boyar Duma.

History is not always generous with documentary sources, especially when it comes to secret deeds. Conspiracy and all

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integrity is the basis of intelligence activities. Therefore, researchers of the history of intelligence inevitably face great difficulties when trying to reconstruct the structure, goals and objectives of intelligence agencies, as well as identifying their personnel at a particular historical stage. As a rule, we get very scarce, fragmentary, very scattered evidence, the reliability of which sometimes has to be questioned. At the same time, especially important reconnaissance assignments were so delicate that, as a rule, they were given orally.

We can judge about the Order of Secret Affairs, this distant predecessor of the Russian special services - intelligence, counterintelligence, security of the "August persons", encryption, we can judge both by the surviving rather significant part of the secret archive, and by the information received at that time from defector. Under Alexei Mikhailovich, one of the employees of the diplomatic service of the tsar, the Posolsky Prikaz, fled abroad. Apparently, he had some tacit relation to the affairs of the Secret Order, and was well aware of the secrets of the palace. In addition, he carried out the secret orders of the king.

As befits a defector, he lived abroad by selling his sensational "revelations". About the Order of Secret Affairs, in particular, he reported: "there is a clerk and clerks with ten people in it, and they know and do all sorts of royal affairs, secret and obvious, but boyars and дума people do not go to that order and do not know the affairs, except for the tsar himself, but those orders are sent with ambassadors to the states and to embassy congresses and to the war with the governors ... And those clerks over the ambassadors and over the governors peep and tell the tsar when they arrive. And that order was arranged under the current tsar so that his royal thought and deeds would be fulfilled according to his desire, and the boyars and thoughtful people knew nothing about it. Authentic documents of the Secret Order, found one and a half hundred years after the defector's revelations, generally confirmed his characterization of this "mysterious" institution.

The order was directly subordinate to the tsar himself and exercised control over the activities of all state institutions, ambassadors, townsmen and governors, conducted investigations on important political cases, was engaged in intelligence, which then included not only political issues, but also, for example, the search for useful minerals. Since 1663, part of the functions of the Order of the Grand Palace for the management of the royal economy, protection and maintenance of the royal family passed to him.

During the entire existence of the order, the position of the clerk, that is, the head, was occupied by four people: Gomila Perfilyev, Dementy Bashmakov, Fedor Mikhailov and Ivan (aka Danilo) Po

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lyansky. All of them were of humble origin, but according to their rank they were invited to the royal table along with the most well-born boyars. The clerk of the Secret Order was always to be in the vicinity of the tsar in case it was needed for some hasty, secret assignment. His duties included organizing a secret guard, accompanying the king during campaigns and hunting trips and pilgrimages. The clerk was one of the first to meet foreign ambassadors when they visited the Kremlin Palace and one of the last to see them off.

In many charters, he was called a clerk "in the sovereign's name", as he had the right to sign decrees that came "from his, great sovereign, royal chambers behind his sovereign's three red seals".

For work in the Order of Secret Affairs, the most proven and capable, well literate, quick-witted clerks from other orders were selected. They went through a special training school created at the Spassky Monastery. For example, Semyon Medvedev studied there, who later became a monk under the name of Sylvester and became famous for his literary works.

The clerks of the Order of Secret Affairs, who carried out complex and delicate assignments, received much more salaries than employees of other state institutions. They were fed in the palace and received significant amounts for travel and all other expenses related to the execution of state orders. They were given twice as much money for sewing ceremonial clothes than, for example, clerks of the Order of the Grand Palace. On holidays they were generously awarded.

Work in this "special institution" and diligence in carrying out the personal assignments of the tsar contributed to the successful promotion through the ranks. The clerks of the Secret Order were appointed clerks to other orders, and the clerks became дума clerks, but even then they continued to be especially trusted tsarist officials and were involved in the performance of all the same secret tasks.

Given the delicacy of secret orders, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and the clerk in the "sovereign name" preferred to give them orally. But if the decree was given in writing, then only the one to whom it was directly addressed had the right to read it. After reading the secret order, the addressee immediately had to return it to the messenger. And if the messenger for some reason

For some reason, he could not hand it over to the addressee, he had to return it to the tsar or his highest official in an unopened form. "Prochetchi, come back with the same, having sealed this sheet," the tsar wrote in one of his instructions.

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Having fulfilled a secret assignment, the clerks of the Secret Order were obliged to immediately report this personally to the tsar. If the report was put in writing, then it was forbidden to state the essence of the assignment on paper. They wrote as follows: "Whatever, according to your, great sovereign, the decree is given to me, your serf, to do, and that, sovereign, is done."

When it was necessary to deliver a particularly important, secret letter to a foreign ruler, his own ambassador or governor, the tsar sent a sealed package not with an ordinary messenger, but with one of the clerks of the Order of Secret Affairs. At the same time, the clerk was given additional tasks of a reconnaissance nature: to find out from the outside what was of interest to the tsar personally, to collect information about the mood of the population, to conduct confidential conversations with some people in private not on issues listed in the secret order drawn up personally by the tsar. Often clerks were ordered to hide their true place of service and impersonate another, that is, resorting to the current professional terminology, to act "under cover".

The clerks of the Order of Secret Affairs and the embassy clerks, who were in charge of maintaining contact with the royal representatives in foreign countries, often resorted to encrypted correspondence. The key to deciphering these messages was not written down, it was learned by heart. There were various versions of the secret letter, and, as it should be according to the rules of conspiracy, none of the clerks had to know all the variants of the secret writing.

As a rule, it was compiled according to one of the most primitive encryption methods, which was called the "gibberish letter". Sometimes it was also called "litorea" (i.e. "letter", from the Latin "Shega"). The secret of this method is that some letters were replaced by others. Secret writing was sometimes referred to as "fancy writing". Quite often scribes resorted to writing phrases in the reverse order, composing original cryptograms, sometimes they left letters unfinished - such a font was called a "half-word".

Back in 1633, the father of the first tsar from the Romanov dynasty, Patriarch Filaret, being the de facto ruler of Russia, wrote "for his sovereign and embassy secret affairs" a special alphabet and "warehouse in an intricate letter". The order to the Russian diplomatic representative in Sweden, Dmitry Andreevich Frantsbekov, has been preserved, from which it is clear that he had to use cryptography when compiling reports to Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich. The order ended with these words: "Why, Dmitry, being in Svei, according to this secret order about this or that about our secret affairs and our secret news, he will also visit him about everything to write to the Sovereign Tsar and Grand Duke Mikhail Fedorovich of all Rus' to Moscow according to this sovereign's secret order in a closed letter.

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A draft of this mandate has also come down to us, in which the word "intricate" is crossed out and replaced by "closed." Secret writing in Russia has ceased to be an idea and has become one of the means of preserving state secrets.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich in his personal correspondence often resorted to "gibberish letters". Instructions were usually written in cipher to clerks of the Order of Secret Affairs who traveled abroad. For example, clerk Grigory Nikiforov was instructed to hand over to the head of the Russian delegation at the negotiations with Poland, A.L. To Ordin-Nashchokin, the order of the tsar written in cipher. From the instruction to Nikiforov, also executed in a "secret letter", it is clear that the tsar was preoccupied with the question of how to fortify himself in Livonia and the Baltic. The tsar demands: "Truly check how many military people and what kind in Riga and in other cities around this country ...". Is this already real? breathing task.

In 1673, a permanent Moscow representative (a resident, as this position was then called) Colonel Vasily Tyapkin was appointed to the Polish court. He was on his way when news came to Moscow about the death of the Polish king Mikhail Kornbut Vishnevetsky. Since the king had no heirs, the Sejm was to meet in Warsaw to discuss the issue of succession to the throne. The question was of great interest to Alexei Mikhailovich, since the diet had already once spoken in favor of electing one of his sons as king. The royal messenger caught up with Tyapkin on the road to Vilna and handed him a secret script compiled by the sovereign himself. The tsar's expectations were not justified; the voivode Jan Sobieski was elected king. Tyapkin, on the other hand, continued to remain at the Polish court and for five years sent reports compiled by a "closed letter" to Moscow. More than six hundred sheets of reports from the first Russian permanent envoy in Poland to the "protector of embassy affairs" boyar Artamon Sergeevich Matveev have been preserved.

It is noteworthy that this correspondence aroused Jan Sobieski's suspicion that Tyapkin was inciting the Moscow authorities against him. When Alexei Mikhailovich died and Tyapkin and his retinue appeared at the royal castle in a black "plaintive" dress, Sobieski angrily expressed his displeasure to him, reproaching him for writing "quarrelsome and intricate letters to the late tsar, from which until now our troops did not unite and mutual friendship between us could not be established.

It can be assumed that the Polish secret services managed to peruse (i.e. secretly open) and read the secret letters of the Russian resident. It cannot be ruled out that information about the content of Tyapkin's letters reached the Poles through undercover channels - after all, among the Russian elite nobility there were supporters of rapprochement

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with Poland, representing a certain "nutrient environment" for the Polish intelligence officers.

Alexei Mikhailovich ascended the throne when the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) was coming to an end in Europe, dividing the countries of the continent into two opposing camps. Each of the states involved in this conflict sought to develop friendly relations with Russia in one way or another, while pursuing its own specific goals: securing rear from the east, redistributing spheres of influence and conquering new lands, and expanding favorable terms of trade. Russia, for its part, was interested in the growth of its international prestige. Increasingly, foreign representatives came to Moscow, and Russian ambassadors and merchants, in turn, went to various foreign countries.

The first steps were clumsy, full of curiosities. One of the reasons for this is the lack of reliable information about events abroad. For this purpose, in Moscow (already from 1621), the Chimes (German "cogap̃ep" - "current news") were published - a handwritten bulletin of the Ambassadorial order in the amount of twenty issues per year. The purpose of the publication is to inform the government about events abroad. The source was mainly Polish, German and Dutch newspapers, other publications, letters from Russian people from abroad. The promptness of the information received by the Posolsky Prikaz can be judged at least by such an occasion. In 1656, the steward I.I. Chemodanov was sent to Italy. Arriving at the place, he suddenly discovered with surprise that Duke Francis, to whom his credentials were addressed, already had ... a third successor. One can imagine the state of Ambassador Potemkin, who expected to meet with the Spanish King Philip TU, but he could not accept him, because ... he died two years

back.

These first envoys were for the most part newcomers who did not know at all the customs or traditions of the countries they visited, but who tried to introduce a purely "Kremlin ritual" there. In Florence, the steward Chemodanov and his assistant, deacon Postnikov, prostrate before the sovereign, kiss his feet, after which they consider themselves offended when, when pronouncing the name of the king, the duke does not respond with any gesture that would indicate respect for to the Russian sovereign.

Taking with them, as a rule, a magnificent retinue, many ambassadors then found themselves in a difficult situation, not knowing how to support them. The fact is that in Rus' at that time it was customary to provide foreign embassies with food ("feed"), and the tsarist emissaries, going abroad, counted on reciprocity, but they were often mistaken. True, they took goods with them and spent a share of the proceeds from their sale on the maintenance of the embassy. This worked, although not always. "In Livorno," writes K. Valishevsky, "You

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spun, selling profitably sixty hams! But then the buyers became stubborn, as the Florentines did not like the works of "uegatesche bgÿÿÿÿÿÿte" (Italian "terribly rude") of a foreign sausage maker, as a result of which Chemodanov had to beg from the duke for alms of 100 ducats, which were given to him with the obligation to refrain from further begging on Italian territory."

And, nevertheless, despite the incidents, it was under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich that Russian diplomacy was gaining sense, gradually acquiring a worthy tone and correct style. The Great Encyclopedia describes this period as follows: "Under Aleksei, Russia entered into diplomatic relations with the entire West. In 1656 Chemodanov was sent to Venice from Arkhangelsk; others were sent simply for reconnaissance to France, Spain, Florence and Rome ... Trade goals were concentrated in England and especially in Holland, where our permanent resident or "commissar" sat, and politics led to Vienna, Venice, Sweden and Denmark. This is an Eastern question or a struggle with the Turks and a connection with the Slavs. The Russians suddenly wanted to show themselves everywhere, find their own advantage and not depend on others. They were even going to "go by ships for spicy potions and vegetables", i.e. to India. Alexei asked the Duke of Courland to sell him his ships for this?

Often, the people of the Secret Order had to fulfill simply the whims of the autocrat. Among the surviving royal letters in the archives there is one ordering the Astrakhan voivode, Prince Odoevsky, to call to Moscow "Indian artisans" who can make and dye "kindyaks", that is, any light fabric. The governor reported that there were no such people in Astrakhan, that in the spring they should be sent across the sea. But one was still found. It was a "resident of the Bukhara court", a dye master named Kudaberdeyka.

The department of the Secret Prikaz had two glass factories, which, under the supervision of craftsmen sent from Venice, made vials - "Venetseiki", including amusing glasses "a quarter of a bucket and more" and a "king-glass" a fathom in size.

In the then suburban village of Izmailovo, the tsar set up an exemplary nursery, where he grew Russian grapes, Bukhara and Trukhmen melons, watermelons, Caucasian dogwood, Hungarian pears, and even tried to plant date palms. The ambassadors who traveled to England were ordered to bring "all sorts of seeds" from there.

No matter how curious it may seem at first glance, but, in essence, these tasks can be considered a very distant prototype of the current scientific and technical line of intelligence.

The king loved every novelty, curiosity. The secret order strictly ensured that merchants - purveyors of all kinds of food - ensured an abundance of dishes on the royal table. It turns out that this included

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within the mandate of the order. The king was a great lover of life. On the occasion of the birth of Tsarevich Peter, for example, one hundred and twenty sweet dishes alone were served on the royal table: "sugar gingerbread, large - the coat of arms of the Moscow state; the second gingerbread is sugar, cinnamon; a large head of sugar, painted with color, weighing two pounds twenty pounds; eagle sugar, large, cast, white, another eagle, sugar same; large, red, with orbs, weighing one and a half pounds in them; sugar duck, molded w, weighing twenty pounds; pigeon sugar, cast,

weighing eight pounds; the city of sugar - the Kremlin with people on horseback and on foot; a large tower with an eagle; middle tower with an eagle; a quadrangular city with cannons ... "

In total, at least three thousand dishes were required daily for the royal court. They were prepared by fifty-nine cooks and put on the table at ceremonial receptions by one hundred and eighty-three stolniks and solicitors.

But for some, this abundance was also torment: before getting into the royal mouth, all this had to be checked and tested by representatives of the royal security service, that is, people from the Secret Order. And, God forbid, if something did not work out!

The Pharmaceutical Yard was also under the jurisdiction of the Secret Order. Here, under the supervision of clerks, medicines for the royal family and various drinks for the royal table were prepared: home brew and mead, "good" beer, fruit and berry fruit drinks. The production of cinnamon, anise and caraway vodka and various tinctures was also established there. Grape wines - "Romanea", "Malmazya", "kinarea" - were purchased abroad. And since the functions of the Order of the Grand Palace were transferred to the ubiquitous special services, it is not difficult to guess that they also took part in these purchases.

The whims of the king are connected with assignments that were given to one of the agents of the Secret Order from among foreigners. His name is Ivan Gebdon. An Englishman by origin, at first he performed the duties of an interpreter for English merchants, and then he remained in Russia for permanent residence. Personally, on behalf of Alexei Mikhailovich, Gebdon traveled several times to Venice and Holland for various overseas curiosities. In the surviving, unfortunately not completely, list of instructions to Gebdon, compiled in the Secret Order, it is mentioned, among other things, the invitation to Russia of craftsmen who would be able to make "the birds sing on the trees, the same way people played pipes", and besides them two more masters of "comedy making".

Another foreigner, Colonel Nikolai von Staden, who went to Riga to see the "Prince of Courland Yakubus", was also ordered to bring two people from abroad "who would be able to build all sorts of comedies". He also had to "recruit" a whole troupe of actors there. Thus, by the will of the Tsar, the Secret Order unwittingly found itself at the origins of the creation of the Russian theater.

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After the death of Alexei Mikhailovich in 1676, the Secret Order was abolished. For obvious reasons, there were many people among the boyars who were in a hurry to liquidate his archive as well. Now it is difficult to restore what exactly was destroyed. Part of the archival files was sent to various departments, "to which it is decent." Only a small oak box with Alexei Mikhailovich's personal correspondence was "carried up" to the royal chambers by one of the former leaders of the order, clerk Dementy Bashmakov. After some time, he brought "upstairs" a bag with "secret alphabets" - ciphers.

When Peter became Tsar, he remembered his father's archive and ordered his "Privy Councilor and close office, General" Nikita Zotov, the Tsar's educator, who taught him to read and write as a child, immediately rewrite all the papers left from the Secret Order and keep them in his office. Subsequently, these documents ended up in the cellars of the house of the Twelve Colleges on Vasilyevsky Island, which were flooded more than once during the frequent floods in St. Petersburg. Only in 1835, a special commission was appointed by the ruling Senate to analyze the archive. It turned out that more than two million files had accumulated in the cellars, many of which "due to the flood and from longevity" had become so dilapidated that "it is hardly possible to recognize their contents." Of course, it was not possible to find among them all the cases of the Secret Order. Many disappeared irrevocably, others so decayed that at the first touch they turned into dust.

Valishevsky K. The first Romanovs. - M., 1911. - S. 160, 162.

2 Pokrovsky M.N. Fav. prod. - T. 3. - M.: "Thought", 1967. - S. 76.

3 See Big Encyclopedia / Ed. S.N. Yuzhakov. - SPb., 1902. - T.1.- S. 353.

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"Russian Richelieu"

On February 21, 1672, in the Krypetsky Monastery of John the Theologian, which is 60 kilometers from Pskov, the local hegumen Tarasy tonsured a monk under the name of monk Anthony Afanasy Lavrentievich Ordin-Nashchokin. Thus, somewhat unexpectedly, ended the extraordinary service career of one of the most talented and skillful leaders of the "royal and state embassy affairs," the boyar, whom the historian V.O. Klyuchevsky called "Russian Richelieu".

Afanasy Lavrentievich Ordin-Nashchokin was born in 1605 into a noble family in the provincial town of OPOCHKA. Thanks to his remarkable natural talents, he quickly mastered foreign languages, mathematics and mechanics, was distinguished by great erudition not only among the provincial service people, but also among the capital's noble nobility. With the Poles, he easily spoke Polish, with the Lithuanians - in their native language. He could also speak German, having learned this language from a visiting foreigner in OPOCHKA.

Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich rather quickly drew attention to a bright personality, having familiarized himself with several of his "analytical works" on history and military affairs. One of them - about the military-political situation of the Russian state - was especially to the liking of the autocrat, since it was the first time that it clearly formulated the idea that Russia should go to international recognition on its own way, using, first of all, its wisdom and their historical experience.

When, in the context of the impending war with the Ottoman Porte and constant conflicts with the Commonwealth, a real threat arose of a joint offensive of Warsaw and Istanbul against the Muscovite state, the tsar needed a person who would be able to objectively assess the current situation and give his opinion.

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recommendations for preventing external threats. And for this it was necessary to be closer to the theater of operations and to have reliable friends in the border countries who could warn Moscow in advance of the impending danger. Mikhail Fedorovich's choice fell on Ordin-Nashchokin.

October 24, 1642 Afanasy Lavrentievich set off on his first trip abroad to the Moldavian city of Iasi. This city was not chosen by chance. It crossed many paths from East to West: from the Ottoman Empire to Ukraine, to Poland, to the countries of Western Europe. But the main advantage of Iasi, the then capital of Moldavia, which was languishing under the Turkish yoke, was the pro-Russian, benevolent atmosphere, which the Moldavian ruler Vasile Lupu strove to support in every possible way. It was he who let the tsar know that he would accept and comfortably arrange at his court the unspoken envoy of Muscovy, assigning him a place in his retinue.

So, having taken with him gifts - silver, skins of sables and black-brown foxes - Afanasy Lavrentievich set off. The road was not easy. He drove through a deserted, deserted area, avoiding large settlements and cities, so as not to draw undue attention to himself and expensive luggage. Vasily Lupu warmly welcomed the guest. He gave him a comfortable residence, sent him a wardrobe of national Moldavian clothes, and appointed a good "salary". Indeed, according to a secret agreement between the Russian tsar and the Moldavian ruler, it was agreed that Afanasy Ordin-Nashchokin enters the service of Vasily Lupu and will carry out his personal instructions and orders. In general, speaking in the modern professional language of intelligence officers, the Moldavian ruler kindly provided the Moscow guest with a reliable "roof", which he wisely used.

Ordin-Nashchokin began by studying the situation. First of all, the Moscow sovereign needed information about the plans of the Polish and Turkish governments and their military preparations against Russia. Where to get it? People were needed who would know what the rulers of Istanbul, Warsaw and the states allied with them were thinking about and what they intended to do. In those distant times, spiritual shepherds - Greek monks - and wandering Russian and Moldavian merchants had such intelligence information to some extent. And Ordin-Nashchokin found the right approach to them: gold and Orthodoxy. The result met expectations. Frequent reports and observations about the situation on the Russian border began to leave for Moscow. In one of them, in particular, the content of anti-Russian speeches in the Sejm of Poland in 1642 was described in detail, in the other - about the intention of the Crimean khans to make a campaign against Moscow, in the third - about the perfidy of the Lithuanian princes and their conspiracy against the Moscow Tsar.

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Afanasy Lavrentievich was well aware that in the person of Vasily Lupu he had not only a good patron and personal friend, but also a reliable ally of Russia, a conductor of her policy, a defender of her international interests. Therefore, he always helped Lupu in strengthening his authority and expanding his influence, stressing in his reports to the new tsar, Alexei Mikhailovich, the importance for Moscow of Lupu's personality and his devotion to Orthodoxy.

Finishing his mission in Moldova, Ordin-Nashchokin took with him not only pleasant memories of Moldova, but also a personal message from V. Lupu to the Moscow Tsar. The message, in particular, said: "Wherever I hear something bad for His Royal Majesty, or whatever His Royal Majesty tells me, and I am ready to serve him, the sovereign, with my head."

Meanwhile, the clouds of a great war were gathering over Russia. It was about the possibility of a surprise attack by the combined Polish-Danish armed detachments, grouped for an attack in the western border areas. And Afanasy Lavrentievich was hastily called on to help find out about the intentions of the "adversaries". Ordin-Nashchokin did not lose his head. "If spiritual hierarchs helped me in Moldova, why not turn to them for help this time too?" he reasoned. So, Ordin-Nashchokin established contact with the archimandrite of the Dukhov Monastery in Vilna Nikodim and persuaded him to find out about the plans of Poland and Denmark. The secret report to the tsar was optimistic: "Denmark does not intend to quarrel with Russia because of the failed courtship of Prince Voldemar to the Russian princess Irina Mikhailovna, the sister of Alexei Mikhailovich. The Poles alone will not attack Russia," Afanasy Lavrentievich reported to Moscow.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich could breathe freely for a while. But only for a short time. Another enemy of Russia - Sweden - was intensively preparing for the eastern campaign. Now Ordin Nashchokin fate has prepared the role of a kind of military intelligence officer. He had to describe in detail to the tsar the theater of possible military operations in the Baltic. In secret messages to Moscow, Afanasy Lavrentievich named the size of the Swedish armed forces, gave a detailed description of the state of roads and military fortifications, and recommended the most convenient routes for the movement of Russian troops. As a sensible politician and perspicacious diplomat, he at the same time advised the tsar to apply more widely the practice of hiring Latvian soldiers for paid military service in the Russian army, which, in his opinion, would contribute to the growth of Russophile sentiments among the Baltic population.

From 1650 to 1666, Ordin-Nashchokin acted at the direction of the king in various guises. He was an intermediary on the Russian-Swedish

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negotiations on the mutual exchange of prisoners: 607 people were handed over to the Swedes and 462 Russians returned to their homeland. But at the same time, he also had to deal with matters not related to foreign policy, the largest of which was the suppression of the "bread" uprising that broke out in Pskov. The essence of its occurrence is as follows. In Moscow, they decided to make a kind of "barter deal" with the Swedes for the ransom of captured Russians. To us - prisoners, to them -

bread. The Pskov grain merchants, having heard about such a combination, immediately raised grain prices, and the population began to suffer from this, which took up arms. Ordin-Nashchokin, through his personal friends, tried to cool the passions, but to no avail: the rebellion grew into an uprising. And yet the dodgy mind found a way out. In order to gain time, Afanasy Lavrentievich, who arrived in Pskov, suggested that the rebels write a petition to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, which he promised to immediately deliver to the addressee. No sooner said than done. Afanasy Lavrentievich took the message of the rebels to Moscow, and the people of Pskov began to wait for an answer to their complaints. In the meantime, Ordin-Nashchokin, in conversations with the tsar, recommended that he act according to the "carrot and stick" method in order to split the ranks of the rebels and gain time. Naturally, the Pskovites did not wait for the gingerbread, but they tried the whip to their heart's content. The rebellion was quickly suppressed by the approaching troops, but Ordin-Nashchokin turned out to be a big winner: he was treated kindly by the tsar himself for his cunning recommendations.

But still, the soul of Afanasy Lavrentievich gravitated more towards foreign policy. It is not for nothing that historians consider the signing of the Andrusov Treaty of 1667 between Russia and Poland, according to which its ancestral territories, Smolensk and Chernigov Voivodeships, Seversk land, returned to Russia as the finest hour of his diplomatic and intelligence art. Thanks to this treaty, Russia received thirteen and a half years of truce with Poland and the right to govern Kiev. All of Zaporozhye was declared a joint possession of Russia and the Commonwealth "for their common service from the advancing Basurman forces." But Ordin-Nashchokin saw his main success not even in land acquisitions, but in the fact that he managed to drive a wedge for a long time between the eternal enemies of Russia - the Commonwealth and the Crimean Khanate. The unflattering definition of "infidels" was, as it were, accidentally inserted into the text of the Andrusov Treaty precisely "at the suggestion" of Afanasy Lavrentievich.

Moscow enthusiastically greeted the embassy cortege of Ordin-Nashchokin. According to historians, the entire royal court gathered in Dorogomilovskaya Sloboda to honor the victor. This happened on February 1, 1667, and a day after his arrival in Moscow and the report to the sovereign, Ordin-Nashchokin "was granted to the boyars." He also received 500 peasant households in the Kostroma district,

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well, in the Poretsk volost near Smolensk with a pier on the Kasyl River, a 500-ruble boyar salary and a satin fur coat on sables. By special decree of the tsar, Afanasy Lavrentievich headed the Ambassadorial Order, which immediately began to diligently expand. The personnel apparatus of the order under Ordin-Nashchokin almost doubled. Moreover, he personally selected reliable people, capable and charming, who knew how to put questions in personal conversations with foreigners in such a way that on the basis of the answers it was possible to compile information to the sovereign ahead of time, before the foreign ambassador was received in the Kremlin by the Russian monarch.

The head of the Ambassadorial Department, however, did not bathe in the rays of glory and royal mercy for long. He personally experienced the validity of the old Russian proverb: "Away from the kings - the head of goals!" One of the envious courtiers managed to convince the Russian sovereign that Ordin-Nashchokin was "painfully zealously and suspiciously" trying to make peace with the Commonwealth to the detriment of relations with other states. And just then a "memorandum" came to the name of the tsar, executed by the hand of Afanasy Lavrentievich himself. In his message to the tsar, the head of the Ambassadorial Department stubbornly repeated the idea of the need to conclude a Russian-Polish alliance and even the possible return of Kyiv to the Poles. This note decided the further fate of the "Russian Richelieu". His proposed trip to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was canceled and he was stripped of the title of "Guardian of the Ambassadorial Order". And at the end of 1671, the tsar formally accepted the resignation of his first diplomat. In the presence of all his close associates, the tsar read out a decree, which stated that he accepted the resignation of A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin and "clearly frees him from all worldly fuss."

Ordin-Nashchokin was a foreign policy figure of great magnitude - "the most cunning fox", in the words of the foreign representatives who entered into negotiations with him. "It was

a master of peculiar and unexpected political constructions, - wrote V.O. Klyuchevsky. – Thoughtful and resourceful, he sometimes pissed off the foreign diplomats with whom he negotiated, and they blamed him for the difficulty of dealing with him: he would not miss the slightest mistake, no inconsistency in diplomatic dialectics, now he would hook and confuse careless or short-sighted adversary."

Ordin-Nashchokin had his own cherished dream, which he tried to realize with great perseverance and consistency. He considered it paramount to direct all the efforts of the Russian state to the acquisition of "marinas" in the Baltic. But fate decreed otherwise: I had to "drop anchor" in the Pskov region. Peter's time had not yet come, although it was not far off.

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Thief Grishka

On January 26, 1664, the Swedish representative in Moscow (or, as they called it then, commissar) Adolf Ebers wrote in an encrypted report to his king: "My secret correspondent, from whom I always receive valuable information, was sent from here to Prince Yakov Cherkassky and will probably be away for some time. It was very regrettable for me, because it will be very difficult for me to find an equivalent person soon.

In one of the reports addressed to the king, Adolf Ebers explained: "This subject, although Russian, but ... in his sympathies, a good Swede ... promised to continue to inform me about everything that the Russian ambassadors would write and what decision His Royal Majesty would make ..."

From these reports, it is clear even to the most inexperienced in the affairs of the secret services that Adolf Ebers had a valuable Russian agent in Moscow who had access to the secret correspondence of the tsar's words and, apparently, from the tsar's close circle. Such a person could only be from the Order of Secret Affairs or from the Ambassadorial Order.

If in Moscow they knew about these reports of Ebers, then it would not be difficult to figure out the traitor, knowing where Prince Cherkassky was at that moment. And he, along with another royal governor, Prince Prozorovsky, at that time held back the Polish troops standing on the banks of the Dnieper. There, near Smolensk, the especially trusted tsarist governor Ordin-Nashchokin, together with his relative Bogdan Nashchokin and clerk Grigory Kotoshikhin, came to them to negotiate peace with Poland. A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin - one of the most trusted people of the tsar - was beyond all suspicion, his relative too. It remains G.K. Shihin cat?

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Among the authorities and colleagues, not without reason, he was considered a very capable young man with a clear prospect of occupying a high post at court. The king himself favored him, although once in his hearts he ordered him to be severely punished. Either due to his youth, or just in a moment of absent-mindedness, he made a terrible mistake: when writing a letter, instead of "great sovereign", he simply wrote "great", skipping the highest name! Alexey Mikhailovich did not tolerate such mistakes. The clerk of the Ambassadorial Order, Ordin-Nashchokin, where the offender served, was given the following written instruction: "... The clerk Grishka Kotoshikhin, who wrote that reply, was ordered to inflict punishment for this - to beat the batogs."

Grishka's soul, of course, was filled with resentment. But the king was not vindictive and soon changed his anger to mercy. Literally the following year, Kotoshikhin was included in the important embassy sent by Alexei Mikhailovich to Estonia for negotiations with the Swedes.

A letter sent by A.L. Ordin-Nashchokin from Derpt, occupied by Russian troops, in which he reported that he sent Kotoshikhin to Revel to hurry the Swedish embassy to Moscow as soon as possible. The Swedes replied that they would leave without delay as soon as Ambassador Bengt Horn, who had been recalled there for instructions, returned from Stockholm. Known

also that later Kotoshikhin talked with the Swedish ambassador, who complained to him about the "carelessness" of the Russians (in the letter addressed to the Swedish king, one of the titles "King of Livland" was omitted), and expressed the hope that the upcoming negotiations would end with the writing peace treaty for all eternity. Kotoshikhin kept silent about the fact that the "misprint" was deliberate, since the Russians did not consider Livonia to be Swedish land.

On June 21, 1661, in the Estonian village of Kardis, located between Derpt and Reval, an armistice agreement was finally signed with the Swedes. Kotoshikhin took part in the conclusion of this agreement.

In August 1661, the tsar sent Kotoshikhin to Stekoln (as the Russians then called Stockholm) with a letter to the Swedish king Charles XI. Alexei Mikhailovich asked the king to send his envoys to exchange instruments of ratification confirming the approval of the Treaty of Cardis by the highest state authorities. The Swedes greeted Kotoshikhin with honor and released him with expensive gifts.

The agreement was soon approved, and the parties proceeded to the issue of settling mutual monetary claims. Negotiations on this delicate topic in Moscow from the tsarist side were conducted by a devious

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Vasily Semenovitch Volynsky, and from Swedish - already known to the reader Adolf Ebers.

What prompted Kotoshikhin to betray? Maybe an insult to the king? Among the archival papers of the Posolsky Prikaz for that period, statements were preserved for the payment of salaries to clerks and clerks. In one of the statements, against the amount of "13 rubles", there is Kotoshikhin's signature and the following explanation: "Grigory Kotoshikhin of the great sovereign's salary for the current year is 169 (that is, for 7169 according to the old or 1661 according to the new chronology)".

Thirteen rubles for a year of service is not very fat. At the same time, Ebers, in one of his messages to the king, reported that he had paid his source for valuable information as much as one hundred chervonets! Was it not the material basis that contained the secret selfish intent of betrayal?

May be so. Moreover, upon his return from Kardis, Kotoshikhin was in trouble in Moscow: he learned that his father, the monastic treasurer, had been accused of embezzlement. This story is rather dark. It is known, in particular, that for the debts of his father, Kotoshikhin's house was taken away with all the good things. And then, after the investigation, it turned out that there seemed to be no waste: the monastery treasury lacked five altyns, only fifteen kopecks. But the property taken to the treasury was never returned to Kotoshikhin.

It is likely that the injustice committed could cause anger in him, although all these troubles did not affect Kotoshikhin's service career. He continued to be trusted and promoted. In 1663, he was already receiving thirty rubles, and Ebers, as it turned out later from the words of Kotoshikhin himself, paid him not a hundred chervonets, but only forty, deftly pocketing the rest ...

The last entry, made in 1665 in the payroll for the clerks and clerks of the Posolsky Prikaz, reads: "Last year, in 172, Grishka stole, cheated, and left for Poland. And he was in the regiments of the boyars and the governor of Prince Yakov Kudenetovich Cherkassky with his comrades. What exactly Grishka "stole" and whether he really stole - it is not possible to establish now, no specific documents or evidence in this regard have been found. However, the petition of Kotoshikhin himself addressed to the Swedish king Charles XI with a request to provide him with asylum and work in Sweden has been preserved.

Kotoshikhin explained the reason for his action as follows. He really was with Ordin-Nashchokin at Prince Cherkassky, preparing to hold peace negotiations with the Poles. The Poles turned out to be

unyielding. Then Prince Cherkassky decided to influence them by force and went on the offensive, but was driven back with heavy losses and

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recalled to Moscow. Instead, the tsar sent his favorite, Prince Yuri Alekseevich Dolgoruky. However, he did not succeed either. Then Dolgoruky decided to resort to intrigues: trying to lay all the blame for the failure of the negotiations on his predecessor, he allegedly turned to Kotoshikhin with a demand to compose a denunciation to the tsar accusing Prince Cherkassky of having "destroyed the tsar's army." For this, he promised, in the manner of a clerk, a promotion and the return of property confiscated to the treasury in connection with his father's case. As Kotoshikhin admitted in a letter to the Swedish king, he preferred to flee to Poland, fearing his refusal incur the wrath of the new governor.

Kotoshikhin offered his "services" to the Polish king Jan-Kazimir, and he appointed him a salary - one hundred rubles a year - three times more than he received in Moscow, and ordered him "to be with his grace the Lithuanian Chancellor." Kotoshikhin was clearly inflating his worth and begging Jan-Kazimir to leave him with his person. He expressed his readiness to give the king "useful" advice, from which even "the way in the war will be fit." At the same time, he set the condition that the Poles inform him about what is being done on the borders and "what is being done in Moscow and between Moscow and the Swedes, also in Ukraine and between the Tatars." Kotoshikhin boasted that, being in Moscow in the Solsk order, he had firmly inquired into those "news cases".

The defector also offered the Polish king his "inventions" in military affairs: the manufacture of such slingshots!, which would be "better and lighter than Moscow ones", as well as a way to "break Moscow slingshots". At the end of the petition, he lamented that he was not allowed to "go to the Royal Majesty of the worshiper", and asked for permission to freely access the king.

Jan-Kazimir reacted coolly to the requests and suggestions of the defector. Either the perseverance and excessive obsequiousness of the traitor aroused natural suspicion in the king, or Kotoshikhin's desire to break through personally to the king seemed too impudent, but something caused a backlash, and Jan-Kazimir did not allow him to his own person.

Kotoshikhin got offended and waved to Prussia, and from there to the free German port city of Lübeck. There he accidentally met a foreigner who was in Moscow, Johann von Horn, a secret agent of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. Kotoshikhin was familiar to von Horn as a clerk of the Ambassadorial Department. Knowing nothing about his betrayal, von Horn trusted the traitor and asked to send the tsar a secret message that he was going to send a colonel to Moscow, allegedly well aware of the military plans of the Swedish king.

Taking advantage of von Horn's carelessness, the traitor, of course, hastily undertook attempts to contact the Swedish authorities

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in order to sell the valuable information that unexpectedly fell into his hands personally to Charles XI as profitably as possible, and at the same time to achieve his location. On the very first passing ship, he went to Narva, where at that time was the residence of Jacob Taube, the Swedish governor-general of Ingermanland (a region along the banks of the Neva and the Gulf of Finland, which in 1583-1595 and Swedish authorities).

The further fate of Kotoshikhin is traced in detail according to the documents of the Swedish archives. It turns out that in Narva he met another defector, the merchant Kuzma Ovchinnikov, whose personal qualities are quite eloquently evidenced by the following entry preserved in the Swedish archives: a penny, disappeared. Through this swindler, Kotoshikhin gave Yakov Tauba his petition addressed to the Swedish king.

In the petition, flatteringly calling the young Charles "a mighty glorious sovereign", the defector reports that the desire to serve his royal majesty arose during his trip to Stockholm with the royal letter. Therefore, returning to Moscow, he entered into a secret relationship with Ebers and gave him the text of the tsar's instruction to the Russian ambassadors. "For this, the commissar gave me forty rubles," he admits, not knowing, of course, the details of Ebers' correspondence with the king.

Taube, who met with Kotoshikhin in Stockholm, knew who he was dealing with, and immediately forwarded his petition to the king, adding that the Russian clerk had allegedly been captured by the Poles and escaped from captivity. There is no doubt that this version was invented by Kotoshikhin himself.

While the question of the future fate of the defector was being considered in Stockholm, information was received in Moscow about his stay in Narva. A personal representative of the new city voivode, Prince V.G., was sent to Yakov Taube. Romodanovsky, the archer captain Ivan Reprnin with a demand to extradite Kotoshikhin to the tsarist authorities, "who committed treason and was transferred to the Polish king." The governor in his message referred to the 21st clause of the Treaty of Cardis, well known to Kotoshikhin, which obliges both sides to extradite fugitives and prisoners. The prince demanded "to send the aforementioned traitor and scribe Grishka to me with an escort to Veliky Novgorod."

From the message of Prince Romodanovsky, the Swedish governor-general realized that Russian intelligence had managed to obtain sufficiently strong evidence of Kotoshikhin's presence in Narva, so it was simply pointless to deny this fact. Then Taube decided to resort to another move: in a reply message, he assured that the fugitive "arrived

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here, in Narva, naked and naked, so that both of his legs were swollen from the cold and were chilled, and announced that he wanted to go back to his sovereign, but because of his misery and nakedness he could not go anywhere. Taube reported that he allegedly ordered to give Kotoshikhin clothes and five riksdaler? "to continue the way back to the Royal Majesty." In response to Romodanovsky's message, the governor-general assured the governor that he had personally ordered the immediate search for the fugitive, and invited Reprnin to allocate one of his archers to participate in the s

Searches, of course, did not yield results. The owner of the house where Kotoshikhin stayed testified that he allegedly went to Pskov a few days ago to the local governor and his former boss Ordin-Nashchokin.

Alarmed Kotoshikhin, meanwhile, continued to beg the Swedes to send him "away from the Fatherland." Just in case, he also provided a way out: he asked to keep secret all the vicissitudes of his harassment of Swedish citizenship in case he could "go to Moscow safely."

But the escape option did not come in handy: "Familiar with the secrets of the Moscow state," the obsequious clerk came to court this time. The State Council of Sweden, which actually ruled the country until the king came of age, heard Kotoshikhin's petition and "recognized it as a blessing" to bring him to Stockholm in order to make sure "what he really is" on the spot. On November 24, 1665, Charles XI signed a special decree of the Chamber College "on a certain Russian Gregory Kotosikni", which read: "Because it has come to our attention that this person knows the Russian state well, served in the office of the Grand Duke and expressed his readiness to to send us various useful messages, we decided to graciously grant this Russian two hundred riksdalers in silver." At the same time, an order was sent to Tauba to accept Kotoshikhin into the royal service.

Judging by the documents stored in the Stockholm archive, the defector arrived in the Swedish capital under the name of Johann Alexander Seletsky. He again, as in Poland, wants to see the king himself. In a petition filed with the State Council, he declares: "I have been living for the fourth week, but I have not seen His Royal Majesty with my eyes ..." He reminds me that he lives in Stekoln without

business, asks him "what service was performed," and at the same time asks for a state-owned apartment and grub. On March 28, the king granted "one hundred and fifty silver dalers to the former Russian scribe Johann Alexander Seletsky, who entered the Swedish service and pledged to be our loyal subject, for food and maintenance, as well as for furnishing in this region." In the autumn of the same year it was signed

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another royal decree appointing him a salary in the amount of three hundred silver dalers a year, "because we need him for the sake of our information about the Russian state."

The beneficiated fugitive, in an effort to earn the trust of his new masters as soon as possible, addresses a letter of thanks "to the most powerful and high-born sovereign Karlus", not forgetting to call him the Lord of Livonia, knowing how the Swedish nobles zealously reacted to the absence of this title in royal letters. The letter ended with an oath to serve the king "until his death without treason", and if something goes wrong, then "he is worthy of the death penalty without any mercy." The letter is signed with the Russian initials "G.K.K." and in Latin letters "Johann Alexander Seletsky".

Could the hypocritical fugitive suspect that the death penalty really awaits him soon?

So far, nothing foretold such a tragic turn of fate. He was hired as an archive official and settled in the southern suburbs of Stockholm with Daniil Anastasius, a translator of the Russian language who worked in the same archive. It was here that he wrote his essay "On Russia in the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich".

... On September 10, 1667, a young agitated woman appeared in the lower court of the southern suburbs of Stockholm, calling herself Maria da Fallentina. She said, sobbing, that her tenant named Johann Alexander Seletsky two weeks ago, having come home drunk, threw himself with a knife at her husband, the royal interpreter Daniel Anastasius, and inflicted several wounds on him, from which the husband died two weeks later. She herself was not at home. The sister-in-law, who came running to the cry, tried to calm down Seletsky, but he also hit her with a dagger in the chest. "It is not known whether she will survive," the woman added.

In addition to the testimony about the murder committed by Kotoshikhin, another document has been preserved - the widow's petition for compensation for the damage caused. She appealed to the court with a request to help her get payment from the killer for the table, room and bed linen, which he used for more than eight months, since she had nothing to bury her husband. "All my savings went to the maintenance of this tenant, who demanded that there was plenty of everything," she said.

The court of the southern suburbs transferred the case to the city court, where it was heard on September 11 and 12, 1667. The court pronounced a verdict: "Because the Russian clerk Ivan Alexander Seletsky, who also calls himself Grigory Karpovich Kotoshikhin, confessed that on August 25 he stabbed with several blows from the dagger of his master Daniel Anastasius, as a result of which Anastasius died two weeks later, the court cannot spare him, and on the basis of God

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The laws of the sects and swedes condemn him to death. At the same time, the court submits this decision to the discretion of the highest royal court.

The decision of the royal court in the case of Kotoshikhin could not be found - it burned down during a fire. However, the minutes of the meeting of the Council of State dated October 21, 1667 show that the verdict was approved. At this meeting, one of those present asked when the Russian clerk would be executed. He was told: on Wednesday. State Chancellor Count de la Gardie was interested: where will the body of the executed person be dissected - in Stockholm or Uppsala? Someone suggested that this should be done in

Stockholm, the famous Swedish surgeon Olaf Rudbek, who arrived from Uppsala. Member of the State Council Petr Brahe objected, fearing that the whole story would cause discontent in Russia. He referred to conversations that had already taken place with the Russian ambassador Ivan Leontiev, who had just arrived in Stockholm, who had found out where Kotoshikhin was and insistently demanded his extradition. The ambassador was told that Kotoshikhin had committed his last crime in Sweden, and therefore he should be punished there. The next day, during a second discussion of the issue, Mr. Brahe declared: if the Russian ambassador wishes, he will be given the opportunity to make sure that the sentence has been carried out.

The last evidence of the fate of the fugitive clerk was preserved in the income and expenditure book of the Stockholm Chancery Board for 1667. It notes that in connection with the execution of Seletsky, the salary due to him came to the treasury. On November 8, 1667, the collegium issued a decision to award the widow of the murdered translator Anastasius an annual allowance in the amount of eighty-four and a half silver riksdaler from Seletsky's salary.

Curious details about the fate of the remains of the executed Kotoshikhin have been preserved. There is a story about this. In 1837, the Russian scientist Sergei Vasilievich Solovyov, while on vacation in Sweden, decided to look for ancient Russian manuscripts in local libraries and archives. Among other interesting materials, his attention was drawn to an old manuscript in Swedish "On Some Russian Customs". It was a work by Grigory Kotoshikhin, translated into Swedish by Olaf Borghusen. In the preface to the translation, Borghusen gives a brief biographical sketch of Kotoshikhine, in particular, he says that after the execution his body was transported to Uppsala and dissected there by Olaf Rudbeck. "They say," writes Borghusen, "that his bones are still kept in Uppsala, like a kind of monument, strung on copper and steel WIRES."

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Or maybe this skeleton is used as a visual aid for students of the medical faculty of the oldest Swedish university in Uppsala today?

Slingshots, or spears, at that time were widely used by the troops to repel the onslaught of the enemy in hand-to-hand combat, later they were replaced by a bayonet.

Riksdaler is an old Swedish silver coin, equal (according to 1704) to three silver dalers, or 9 copper dalers, or 96 øre. The Riksdaler was issued until 1873 and then was replaced by the kroon as the main unit of currency in Sweden.

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Near boyar Artamon Matveev

At the age of thirteen, Artamon, the son of the clerk Sergei Matveev, who had been promoted in the diplomatic service under Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich, was taken to the palace. Being four years older than the heir to the throne, Tsarevich Alexei Mikhailovich, he grew up and was brought up with him. Later they were even related to some extent. The fact is that Artamon Matveev was married to Evdokia Grigorievna Hamilton, who came from a noble Scottish family that settled in Russia under Ivan the Terrible, and the uncle of Tsarina Natalya Kirillovna Naryshkina, the second wife of Alexei Mikhailovich, was married to his niece Evdokia Grigorievna is also from the Hamilton family.

In 1653, Artamon Matveev, a special trustee, was sent by Alexei Mikhailovich to Ukraine to bring Little Russians, as it was then customary to say, into Russian citizenship. In the war with the Poles that followed, he contributed to the liberation of Smolensk, commanded the battle against the Poles at Kamenets-Podolsky, besieged Lvov, and, together with Prince Romodanovsky, retook Chernigov. Subsequently, he twice went to Lithuania and Poland for confidential talks with Hetman Gonsesky on the election of Tsar Alexei as King of Poland. In 1669, he was sent by the tsar to the Glukhov Rada, where he successfully

defends the non-return of Kyiv to the Poles. Later, Alexei Mikhailovich appoints him head of two of the most important tsarist orders - Little Russia and Posolsky, from the Duma nobles he is promoted to okolnichi, and then to the near boyars.

Contemporaries noted his special ability to get along with people, not to offend the pride of obstinate court boyars, to avoid conflict, his loyalty and devotion to Alexei Mikhailovich. But not only this made him the royal favorite.

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Artamon Matveev was one of the most prominent leaders of the emerging new Russia. A prominent statesman, an outstanding diplomat, military leader, intelligence agent, writer, historian, founder of the Russian court theater - this is just an incomplete list of the many-sided incarnations of this man. Along with such well-known figures as Ordin-Nashchokin, he was a member of the "chosen thought" formed around the tsar of reformers, "Westerners", new people, mostly "thin-born", who served at the court as a kind of counterbalance to the well-born representatives of antiquity. Through the work of reformers, the state system was strengthened, a diplomatic service was created, contacts with foreign countries were significantly expanded, the army was reformed according to the Western model, and more and more people began to talk about the need to go to the sea and create their own fleet.

But what did Artamon Matveev have to do with the affairs of the state's secret services? The most direct. Throughout his life, for example, he was associated with the archers: first the head of the archers, the head of the Moscow archers, and then the entire Streltsy order. The duties of the archers included the protection of the royal palace and the diplomatic corps. What did it look like in practice?

With the person of the sovereign as bodyguards, there were constantly 200 people who came from noble families. At night, near the royal bedroom, the main sleeping man was on duty with one or two close courtiers. There were six bodyguards in the next room, and 40 more in the next room. In addition, selected young men stood at every gate and door of the palace. The constant palace guard also included 2,000 stirrup archers, who alternately stood day and night with loaded squeakers and lit wicks - 250 each at the palace, in the very courtyard and at the treasury.

As for the foreign missions, they were surrounded by the closest "attention" in Moscow. At the door of a foreign mission, "guards" were placed; special "guardians" (that is, employees of the surveillance service) accompanied foreigners if they went out into the city, which, however, was not allowed without a good reason. No one was also allowed, without incurring dangerous suspicion, to come to the ambassador and talk with him on private matters. If one of the embassy employees fell ill, then court doctors from among foreigners were not allowed or rarely allowed to see him (there were no other doctors in Moscow then).

In the middle of the 17th century, a special Embassy courtyard was built near the Kremlin with a spacious vestibule, gold-woven wallpaper and furniture covered with red cloth. Now, as the envoy of the Schleswig-Holstein court Olearius noted, repeatedly

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visiting Moscow, the ambassadors were received with greater courtesy. After the first audience, the ambassadors with their retinue could easily leave the apartment and inspect the city, even without an escort. "That is why," Olearius noted, "European sovereigns are now not afraid to send ambassadors to Moscow, and some even have permanent residents there!" Under Olearius, Swedish and English residents lived in Moscow; in the second half of the 17th century, in addition to them, Danish, Polish and Persian residents are mentioned.

But until the first audience, the ambassadors were still kept in the strictest confinement. The same Olearius testifies that, as soon as the Holstein embassy was located in his apartment,

the bailiff brought him a daily allowance and, moving away, locked the gate and assigned 12 archers to them, strictly ordering not to let anyone in either from the yard or into the yard!

Only bailiffs came to the ambassadors every day to entertain them and inquire if they needed anything.

Apparently, they did not experience any particular need, at least in terms of food supplies. The Holstein embassy, whose retinue consisted of 34 people, in Moscow was given daily 62 loaves of bread, a quarter of an ox, 4 rams, 12 chickens, 2 geese, one hare or black grouse, 50 eggs, 10 kopecks each for candles and 5 each for petty expenses in the kitchen, a quarter of a bucket of Spanish wine, two buckets of honey, three-quarters of a bucket of beer and a little less vodka; in addition, the embassy servants were given a barrel of beer, a barrel of honey, and a barrel of vodka. On top of all this, they gave out a pood of butter and the same amount of salt for a week, three buckets of vinegar, and on Sundays they added 2 rams and one goose each. On the days of the arrival of the embassy in Moscow, as well as on the days of great holidays and court celebrations, the content of the embassy doubled ...

As for entertainment, on this account there is a lot of evidence that the bailiffs were great masters of arranging feasts. This was called "to drink the ambassador", and "drink it as much as possible". They drank to the health of the great sovereigns, then their brothers, sons and other relatives and important persons of both states. The famous Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevsky wrote about this:

"The bailiffs often quite achieved their goal - to get the ambassador drunk, and the matter often did not go without sad stories. But at the same time, other important goals were sometimes achieved: the drunken ambassador let slip more than once that he was ordered to keep only on his mind "?,

In fairness, it must be said that by the end of the 17th century, some barbaric customs in dealing with foreign ambassadors gradually began to take on more civilized forms. Suspicion was no longer revealed so sharply, although it did not completely disappear. As before, vigilantly watched that the staff of the embassy

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did not enter into too short relations with the inhabitants of Moscow, especially with foreigners. The ambassadors were told that they could be visited by anyone who wanted to, but in fact they arranged it so that few managed to maintain such contact on an official basis. The guard subjected to strict interrogation all who wished to see the ambassador, and by their impudence discouraged many from such visits. If a foreigner who served in the Russian army asked his superior for permission to see the embassy people, they did not refuse him, but they told him to leave his intention, so as not to arouse suspicion at court.

Women were not allowed to have contact with foreigners at all. For example, the English representative in Moscow, Carlisle, could not obtain permission for his wife to see English merchants in the German Quarter. From the detachment of archers who daily guarded the Embassy Compound, several people were placed in hidden corners in order to prevent and suppress unwanted visits. There is evidence that these good fellows of the archers not only hid in dark corners, but also openly "served" right under the windows of the courtyard.

IN. Klyuchevsky, referring to the testimonies of foreigners, reports that letters sent from abroad to ambassadors in Moscow were allegedly opened, read and then destroyed. Apparently, it cannot be ruled out that such cases took place in "diplomatic" practice. And if they had, then only with the knowledge of the head of the Ambassadorial and Streltsy orders of the close boyar Artamon Sergeevich Matveev.

The Streltsy Prikaz also had other functions: participation in the detective work and torture interrogations. For the convenience of the tsar, the order for secret affairs was placed next to his chambers, that is, in the upper Kremlin chambers - "at the top", as it was customary to say then. Therefore, all sorts of detectives and

investigations on suspicion of a threat to the sovereign's security were called the "sovereign's top case." Those who fell under suspicion were often tortured: they dragged them to the dungeon, did a "shake" - they beat them with a whip or burned them with fire, or even put them on a rack so that "the tongue would come loose". All this "black and dirty" work was no longer done in the neighborhood of the royal chambers, but in the Streltsy order.

The methods of the investigation were so cruel that many, "without enduring the torture", slandered themselves, preferring a speedy death penalty to unbearable torments. Suspected of a crime, trying to avoid investigation, often committed suicide. Therefore, the prescriptions of the Secret Order were often accompanied by an inscription: "take care of those taken into custody so that they do not do any harm to themselves." The protection of the detainees in the "sovereign's upper business" was entrusted to the archers.

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The personal involvement of Artamon Matveev in the most important state affairs is confirmed by many examples. In particular, he proved his devotion to the tsar in the "case" of Patriarch Nikon, who tried to put himself above the tsar. It is known, in particular, that on October 12, 1667, A.S. Matveev, on the personal instructions of the tsar, left to meet the patriarchs of the Councils of Alexandria and Antioch, who had arrived in Russia on Nikon's case. Matveev's task was to convince the patriarchs of Nikon's guilt.

With such an assignment, the tsar could send only a specially trusted person who knew all the background of the case and had the gift of convincing argumentation. Matveev successfully completed this mission. On November 4, the patriarchs were received by the tsar. The audience was attended by the steward, colonel and head of the Moscow archers Artamon Matveev. To analyze the case, a church Great Council was convened, which declared Nikon a simple monk and sent him to the Ferapontov Belozersky Monastery.

Matveev's analytical abilities, his ability to correctly assess the situation and predict its further development were clearly manifested during the uprising of Stepan Razin. In a petition addressed to the tsar in 1669, he warned that the Razintsy should not be allowed out of Astrakhan, otherwise the townspeople, peasants and peoples of the Volga region would join them, and a rear would appear that would supply weapons, food and people for the rebel troops. After the arrest of Razin and his brother in 1671, Matveev informed the tsar: "And in that case, my worker, your serf, was."

In the activities of Artamon Matveev, events related to Ukraine stand out in particular. It was here that his abilities as a scout and diplomat were most clearly manifested. Ukraine in the middle of the 17th century was a complex interweaving of the most contradictory social forces. Representatives of different nationalities (Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Lithuanians, Jews), different faiths (Orthodox, Catholics, Uniates), different social strata (nobility, petty bourgeoisie, Cossack foremen and "golotas") were in constant motion, confrontation. Crimea, Turkey, Moldavia, Poland and even from the northern neighbor looked at Ukrainian riches and lands with a certain degree of lust. The Polish gentry made the greatest claims to the Ukrainian lands.

At this time, a new bright figure appeared in the Cossack environment - Bohdan Khmelnytsky, a man of unknown origin, who declared himself the "hetman" of Ukraine, entered into an armed struggle with the Commonwealth and turned to the Moscow Tsar with a request to accept him with the entire Cossack army under Russian rule. - tribute.

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The tsar responded by sending an embassy to Ukraine headed by Artamon Matveev. The task before the embassy is very difficult. First of all, you need to figure out with whom exactly you have case.

Now everything seems obvious. In Kiev, on a high pedestal, there is a huge bronze monument with a hetman's mace. During the Great Patriotic War, the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was established... But more than three hundred years ago, there were many doubts. And Artamon Matveev was the first to decide: who is he, this newly-born ataman, an adventurer or a major historical figure?

There was information that Khmelnytsky came from small estate nobles. But these rumors were not confirmed. There was other information that the father of the "Hetman of Ukraine" was a Jew, a butcher from the city of Khmilnyk in Podolia named Berko, who was baptized by Mikhail. He settled in the village of Subbotovo and kept a tavern there, then by some unknown means Bogdan was captured by the Crimean Tatars. Did the Krymchaks take advantage of his captivity to convert the future hetman to their "Busurman" faith? Another thing was also known: Bogdan studied with the Jesuits, but, it seems, only in the first grades, even though he seemed to have mastered Latin ... How, after all, to understand the request of Khmelnytsky's envoys expressed in Moscow, "so that the great sovereign would grant them, for the Orthodox Christian faith, he ordered the hetman to take them under his sovereign's high hand with the entire army of Zaporozhye"? Is there any trick here?

Matveev, already on the way, began to fulfill the secret royal order. Driving through towns and villages, Matveev's people and the ambassador himself talked in detail with the locals. They were interested in a wide range of issues. How many troops does the hetman have? Does it have foreign mercenaries? How many troops of the Crimean Khan does the hetman have and how do they behave in Ukraine? Does the Polish king want to make an alliance with Khmelnytsky? Will the Rada agree to this? Will she support Khmelnytsky's desire to reunite with Russia?

Not fully trusting Khmelnytsky, the tsar's emissary wanted to understand the motives driving him, and was especially interested in his connections with the Commonwealth. It is known, in particular, that Matveev had a secret meeting with a certain monk Theophilus, who was sent by Hetman Potocki with a letter to Khmelnytsky. Matveev learned from Theophilus that the Polish magnates were greatly concerned about Russia's military preparations. In the inner circle of Khmelnytsky, Matveev established a trusting relationship with the clerk Ivan Vyhovsky, through whom it became known about Turkey's attempts to annex Ukraine to itself ...

Already from these meager surviving evidence it is quite clear that Matveev's trip to Khmelnytsky and the secret negotiations that took place with him on July 4, 1653, went far beyond the current accepted usual diplomatic practice.

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Matveev's embassy confirmed the desire of the Ukrainian people to reunite with the Russians. Matveev's people collected important strategic material: "how many regiments of military people have been committed by the hetman now and who are their colonels' names." Of great importance was the information obtained about the preparations of the Commonwealth, Turkey, Crimea for military operations against Russia.

On January 8-9, 1654, a Cossack Rada took place in Pereiaslavl, at which the reunification of Ukraine with Russia was solemnly proclaimed. On January 11, Artamon Matveev, who was present at the Pereiaslav Rada, went with a report to the tsar.

After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, a long period of unrest begins in Ukraine, again various social and religious forces and groups enter into internecine confrontation. In 1669, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich appointed Matveev the head of the Little Russian order. Historians note that during the reign of Matveev, information about internal and external events came mainly from numerous agents who were specially sent to Ukraine. They were often employees of the Little Russian order - clerks and

clerks.

In 1673, Matveev closely followed the echoes of the Razin uprising in Zaporozhye, where a certain impostor was operating, posing as Tsarevich Simeon, the son of Alexei Mikhailovich. Matveev managed to bribe the Cossack elite and get the impostor.

Matveev takes a personal part in his interrogations and sends all the materials received to the tsar. September 17, 1675 Matveev announces the tsar's sentence to the impostor: "execution on Red Square, quartered and pierced by stakes ..."

Could the almighty grandee then foresee that in the near future almost the same fate awaited him?

After the death of Alexei Mikhailovich in 1676, Artamon Matveev found himself in disgrace, in exile, and then was deprived of his boyar rank, estates and all property. Only in May 1682, after the death of Fyodor and the appointment of 10-year-old Peter as the new tsar, his mother Natalya Kirillovna Naryshkina, a pupil of Matveev, takes urgent measures for his arrival in Moscow. Ranks, power and wealth return to him again. But just for a few days...

Supporters of the Miloslavskys - relatives of Alexei Mikhailovich's first wife - raise a streltsy revolt in Moscow. On May 15, archers with cannons moved to the Kremlin, demanding the succession to the throne for Tsarevich Ivan and the appointment of Princess Sophia as ruler until he came of age. A rumor spread among the archers that Tsarevich Ivan had allegedly been killed. Then they demanded the immediate execution of all the Naryshkins. Matveev, who came out to the crowd, to some extent managed to calm the passions. But Sophia's supporters again began to provoke the archers, frightening them with reprisals in the event that

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they will succumb to persuasion. A detachment of archers broke into the palace. Artamon Matveev was seized by an angry mob, taken to the Red Porch and thrown onto the peaks.

Thus, the last point was put on the period of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich the Quietest with his concerns about strengthening the authority and power of the Russian state, with his deeds, open and secret, without which the great transformations of his son Peter would hardly have been possible.

! At that time, permanent representatives of a foreign state were called residents, who followed the ambassador and envoy in rank. See *Foreigners about ancient Moscow*. - M., 1991.

2 Klyuchevsky V. *Tales of foreigners about the Moscow state*. - M., 1916. - S. 63.

8

Hundreds of miles from the battlefield

The reforms initiated by Peter's predecessors took on the character of large-scale reforms under him. As noted by V.O. Klyuchevsky, since the 17th century, Russian society began to experience the impact of foreign culture, rich in experience and knowledge. This influence met with home-grown orders and entered into a struggle with them, agitating the Russian people, confusing their concepts and habits, complicating their life, imparting to it an intensified and uneven movement.

With the advent of Peter, the picture changes radically. Throwing disputes and doubts about whether it is dangerous or not to get closer to Western Europe, Peter, Klyuchevsky writes, "instead of timid borrowing of his predecessors, he began to take with a broad hand the practical fruits of European culture"!

For the first time, the catch-phrase, which later became a winged word, enters political use. In 1713, on board a ship that had just been launched in St. Petersburg, Peter, addressing the boyars, said: "Did you, brothers, dream about all this 30 years ago? Historians say that the sciences born in Greece spread to Italy, France, Germany, which were plunged into the same ignorance in which we remain. Now it's our turn: if you support me, perhaps we will still live to see the time when we catch up with the educated countries."

The old well-born boyars did not support Peter, seeing in his deeds "the intrigues of German hands" or, even worse, the action of evil spirits - the Antichrist. You can count on your fingers those who from the old Moscow nobility remained under Peter in the government circle: the princes Golitsyn and Dolgoruky, prince Reprnin, Sheremetev, Buturlin - that, perhaps, is all. Peter felt the fragility of the social support of power and, following his father Alexei Mikhailovich, began

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to nominate "thin-born" people to the ruling elite, from among the middle and lower nobility, or even of a more modest origin (Apraksin, Bestuzhev, Volynsky, Golovkin, Tolstoy, and even the brightest himself - Menshikov). Peter appointed to the highest state positions not by gender and title, but by abilities and concrete merits. Such were the first Procurator-General of the Senate, Count Yaguzhinsky, the son of an organist of the Lutheran church who had emigrated from Lithuania, and who, as was said, herded pigs as a child; Vice-Chancellor Baron Shafirov, a baptized Jew who was a clerk in a petty shop and even allegedly a yard clerk for someone in Moscow; the chief of police of the new capital, Count Devier, who came to Russia as a cabin boy on a Portuguese ship; Baron Osterman, son of a Westphalian pastor, and many others.

In 1705, a school was opened in Moscow for pastor Gluck, who was taken prisoner by Russian troops during the occupation of the Livonian city of Marienburg (there he had a girl named Martha, the daughter of a Lithuanian peasant Samuil Skavronsky, the future Empress Catherine G), who lived in his service. It is believed that Gluck was a very ordinary person - an ordinary Lutheran parish priest. But he enjoyed great prestige with Peter as an outstanding teacher. With the assistance of the king, he opened an educational institution for young men, mainly from the nobility. The program included teaching foreign languages, the law of God - according to the Lutheran catechism, philosophy, geography, rhetoric and, most remarkable, politics. For the first time in Russia, politics becomes the subject of teaching in an educational institution.

Along with this, young people at Gluck were taught art, knightly horseback riding and "the steps of French and German courtesy." Peter sought to make the young nobility a conductor of Western secular customs and propriety in Russian society. Representatives of the new power stratum were sent in droves to London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Venice to study navigation, philosophy, mathematics, and "pre-Khtur art". Among them are middle-aged people who were over fifty, such as, for example, Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy.

The policy of wide international relations of Peter, his wars and conquests, as V.O. Klyuchevsky, "put Russia in new foreign relations, dragged her into the international turmoil of Western Europe, made her new friends and enemies. Russia has become an organic member of the European people's family and has turned from an indifferent observer of Western European movements into their active, although sometimes involuntary and undesirable participant.

It was necessary to develop a new, multi-purpose and very flexible foreign policy, a new diplomatic strategy. And this, in its

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turn, caused a great constant need for good timely information, including secret.

In the time of Peter the Great, in international practice, the concepts of "diplomat" and "intelligence officer" were synonymous and actually meant the same thing: a spy. In a book published in Paris in 1716 by a certain Callière, it was said: "The ambassador is called an honorary spy; and indeed, one of his main tasks is to reveal the secrets of the court in which he is located"?. Peter needed many ambassadors. Even at the beginning of his reign, Russia maintained permanent diplomatic relations with Holland, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Turkey. Later, under him, permanent representations were opened in France, Prussia, England, Mecklenburg, Hamburg, Venice, Courland, and Bukhara.

It is noteworthy that under Peter, a new form of representation of Russia abroad appears - a double representation, official and secret. In 1717, Peter visited Paris and as a result of the negotiations he held there, the so-called Treaty of Amsterdam was soon signed - an alliance of Russia, France and Prussia. Peter had long sought to improve relations with France, and immediately after the signing of the treaty, he appointed to Paris Minister Plenipotentiary Baron Schleinitz, who until then had been Russia's representative at the Hanoverian court. But Peter, apparently, did not trust the foreigner and soon sent Lieutenant of the Guard Count P.I. Musin-Pushkin, who was ordered to act secretly from Schleinitz. However, it is quite possible that in this case, Peter used the experience of his father, who had a practice of appointing a representative of the Order of Secret Affairs to each embassy.

Peter repeatedly emphasized that he was the successor of his ancestors in the field of foreign policy. But he carried out this policy already in the new conditions, at a higher level. Peter retained the Posolsky Prikaz, which was later transformed into the Collegium of Foreign Affairs in connection with the general reorganization of the government apparatus. He also preserved the succession of personnel (the heads of the order were V.V. Golitsyn, E.I. Ukraintsev and others). Under Peter in 1699, Andrei Artamonovich Matveev (the son of the last head of the Ambassadorial Department under Alexei Mikhailovich) was appointed ambassador to Holland. Andrei Matveev, having barely begun his diplomatic career, was immediately appointed to a responsible position in a country where the foreign policy interests of almost all European states intersected.

Matveev quickly established good personal ties with representatives of a number of foreign states and set things up in such a way that he soon began to receive from them a noteworthy confidential

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information. Not without curiosity, however. Young Matveev showed such extraordinary "agility" that in the same year of 1699 he informed the tsar from Holland about the progress of E.I. Ukraintsev with the Turks faster than Ukrainians from Constantinople did.

In 1701, he received information about a sea expedition secretly prepared by the Swedes under the cover of fishing to Arkhangelsk with the aim of setting fire and destroying this city. The information, which was confirmed by other sources, made it possible to prepare in advance for the proper meeting of the "fishermen" and to defeat the aggressor. Peter enthusiastically commented on this operation: "Very wonderful!"

Later, Matveev informs Peter about the secret decision taken in September 1708 by the Swedish king Charles XII to abandon the direct movement of his troops to Moscow through Smolensk and Mozhaisk and turn south, to Ukraine. "From the secret of the local Swedish minister," Andrei Artamonovich wrote to the Posolsky Prikaz, "it was reported to me from friends that the Swede, seeing the caution of the tsarist troops and the inability to go to Smolensk, also due to a lack of food and feed, decided to go to Ukraine". It is noteworthy that Andrei Artamonovich not only sends the secret information he received, but first he tries to comprehend, analyze it, and give in his report an appropriate justification for its reliability. In particular, he points out that on the territory of Ukraine there are "no regular forts with strong garrisons" that could tie down and delay the movement of Swedish troops. In addition, he suggests that the Swedes intend to enter into an alliance with the Poles and the Crimean Khan, as well as to use part of the Cossacks to oppose Moscow... Peter listened to this information.

There is no need to remind the reader of the results of the historic Battle of Poltava, but the names of the military commanders who ensured the victory ("and the noble Sheremetev, and Bruce, and Bour, and Repnin"), one could rightfully add the name of Andrei Artamonovich Matveev, the tsarist ambassador to Holland, who at that time was hundreds of miles from the battlefield.

Subsequently, A.A. Matveev takes an active part in shaping and implementing the course of Russian foreign policy in Europe. Using the contradictions between the European powers, he managed to keep the governments of Holland and England from helping Sweden in the war against Russia, the so-called Northern War of 1700-1721. This is his generally recognized contribution to the history of Russian diplomacy.

Upon his return to Russia in 1715, he became one of Peter's closest associates, was awarded the title of count,

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the title of senator and is appointed by the country's chief thief in law - the president of the College of Justice. In 1727, having retired at the age of sixty, he again and again returns in his thoughts to the times of the Streltsy rebellion, the history of which, connected with the tragic death of his father, he had long begun to write, but never finished. .

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Molchanov N. Diplomacy of Peter the Great. - M.: "International relations", 1984. - S. 364.

See Patriotic War and Russian Society, 1812-1912. - T. 1. - M.: Ed. Sytina, 1911. - S. 4.

9

Pyotr Tolstoy - "dacha" master

The word "cottage" is now perceived unequivocally: a house in the bosom of nature, "far from the noise of the city." But once, in the 17th-18th centuries, a completely different, worldly meaning was put into this word: a bribe, a handout, a bribe.

In the international practice of those days, "dacha" was by no means a forbidden act and, moreover, was often present in official financial documents as an independent, "full" item of expenditure. Under Peter | "Extraordinary expenses" (i.e. sums for gifts, secret extraditions, bribery of foreign diplomats) in 1710 amounted, according to the Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, to 148 thousand rubles. By the end of the reign of Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, half a century later, this amount had already increased to 360 thousand rubles.

An unsurpassed master of the "country affairs" of his time was the skillful politician and dexterous diplomat of the time of Peter the Great, Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy. As Russia's ambassador to Turkey, he invariably resorted to this kind of "extraordinary expense", obtaining information for his country about the military intentions of the Turks, exerting a direct influence on the representatives of the Ottoman authorities, encouraging them to oppose military conflicts with Russia.

Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy was a bright and original personality. Who else would have shown so much perseverance, resourcefulness and cunning in the defense of Russian national interests in those international conditions? He knew how to be insinuating and stern, sharp and courteous, acted assertively and wisely, avoided unnecessary aggravation of the situation and at the same time achieved optimal results. How much intelligence, endurance and resourcefulness Tolstoy applied to prevent, say, the Turks from attacking Russia in the most difficult initial period of the Northern War (1700-1721) for her,

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when military operations on two fronts could lead to the most severe and unforeseen consequences. How much imagination and political intuition it took for the future holder of the highest award of the empire - the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called, in order to persuade many foreign political and church leaders, who supplied the Peter's government with extremely important secret information, to secret cooperation.

At the beginning of 1707, Tolstoy managed, for example, through trusted people, to get acquainted with the contents of the letters of the French ambassador in Istanbul Ferriol, in which the French diplomat convinced the Turkish authorities of the need to start military operations against Russia. The significance of such an event could hardly be overestimated.

Tolstoy accepted the Frenchman's challenge and promptly "reacted" to his behind-the-scenes intrigues. Among other things, powerful "drugs" were used in the case: money and gifts. At the secret state meeting convened by the Sultan, the party of peace, skillfully supported by P.A., won. Tolstoy. The campaign against Russia did not take place. The Russian ambassador, not without pleasure, noted then in a personal report to the tsar that "the gifts of the French ambassador were in vain, and this operation cost him only a few ermine skins and four pairs of sabres".

Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy was born in 1645. He came from a poor noble family close to the Miloslavskys. Therefore, during the Streltsy rebellion, he was one of those who spread rumors about the death of Tsarevich Ivan and called for reprisals against the Naryshkins, relatives of Peter's mother. After Peter came to power, Tolstoy was removed to a deep province, to Veliky Ustyug, where he became governor, having served there for about twelve years.

It is difficult to say how the life of the disgraced governor would have developed in the future if it were not for the visit of Tsar Peter to this "God-forgotten" place. The thunder of artillery fireworks from the ramparts, organized in such a wilderness, a plentiful dinner and a detailed conversation between Peter and Tolstoy, apparently made a favorable impression on the king, and the 52-year-old governor turned to Peter with a request to allow him to study military marine science. The king sent him to study in Italy.

Tolstoy visited many cities in Italy, learned the Italian language, mastered navigation. Before leaving, the Venetian prince issued him a special certificate, which indicated that he had mastered many maritime professions and, in his personal qualities, was "a brave, diligent and capable husband."

Tolstoy returned home as a man with elegant manners, dressed in European clothes, and, most importantly, having received a good education for those times. But it was not the sea that became Tolstoy's native element. The king found another use for it.

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On April 2, 1702, by decree of Peter I Tolstoy was appointed Russian ambassador to Turkey.

The diplomatic mission of Petr Andreevich began in a very tense international situation. The burden of trials for Russia was determined by two events: the catastrophic defeat near Narva in November 1700 and the exit from the war of Russia's ally, Denmark, which was defeated by the Swedish army. The position of Russia was aggravated by the possibility of an invasion from the south, from the Ottoman Empire, which was very much feared in Moscow. The task of Russian diplomacy was to prevent such an attack.

The tsar personally compiled a special task for the ambassador in Turkey, which, otherwise than intelligence call.

"It is necessary to find out and describe the peoples there; state; what kind of government is there; what government officials; what actions they will have with other states in military and political affairs; what kind of arrangement for multiplying profits or secret preparations for war, against whom by sea or by land; which states are more respected; which the people love more," Peter admonished [the newly elected diplomat. The wise tsar did not forget about purely military intelligence information. "How many troops are kept ready and where, and how much is given to him from the treasury; also, what is the navy like, and is there any special preparation on the Black Sea... After the tsarist war, cavalry and infantry are not being taught European customs... Bombardiers, gunners in the same state, or are they taught again, WHO TEACHES. ..."

In the middle of 1702, the Russian embassy, headed by P.A. Tolstoy solemnly entered the Turkish capital. Already in the first hours of his stay on Turkish soil, Pyotr Andreevich felt the wary attitude of the Porte towards Russia. Instead of the usual festive procession of escort, Tolstoy noticed a large group of armed horsemen who, with obvious hostility, dispersed the crowd of curious people who were watching the procession. And this despite the fact that the Russian embassy announced in advance its peaceful plans and intentions, including the desire to pay significant compensation to Turkey for the robbery of Turkish merchants and merchants of the Zaporozhian freemen.

Tolstoy was not yet well acquainted with the local political situation, he did not have a sufficient number of assistants on whom he could rely, whose information could be completely trusted. Therefore, first of all, it was necessary to acquire reliable friends, in particular, Tolstoy counted on the help of the Patriarch of Jerusalem Dositheus. Jerusalem was then under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and the spiritual power of Dositheus extended to the entire Orthodox population of the empire. Patriarch

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and earlier, as far as possible, he provided assistance to Moscow, related to him in the Orthodox faith. Therefore, simultaneously with the credentials of the ambassador, Tolstoy carried in his personal office the appeal of the Russian leadership to Patriarch Dositheus. It expressed a request "so that to that ambassador of ours you were capable in every deed that happens to him in deed and word, as much as possible." The letter expressed a request to Dositheus to be Ambassador Tolstoy "adviser and sincere assistant"?

Dositheus had many influential and loyal friends not only in individual provinces of the empire, but also in Turkey itself, who, at his request, began to provide Tolstoy with great assistance in collecting secret information. It was through one such informant that Pyotr Andreevich learned that the mother of the ruling sultan was not very sympathetic to one anti-Russian minister at her son's court and that for a well-defined "dacha" she was ready to put in the "right word" before the sultan. Tolstoy counted a dozen ermines and sables, which, by the way, also paid for his personal diplomatic work (due to the lack of "hard currency" even in those days). Then he thought and thought and added to them a diamond feather on his hat and a sash trimmed with precious stones. Painfully needed the help of an elderly sultana. It soon became known that the court intriguer who was hostile to Russia was executed ...

Together with Dositheus, his nephew Spiliot also worked in the interests of Russia. Basically, he delivered the secret correspondence that had developed between the patriarch and Tolstoy. But sometimes, on his own initiative, he informed the Russian ambassador of secret information, gave useful advice on what to do in this or that case during negotiations with the Turkish authorities. Pyotr Andreevich highly appreciated the merits of Dositheus and Spiliot. In his messages to Moscow, he wrote that both the patriarch and his nephew, "forgetting the fear of death, work with a joyful soul for the great sovereign."

Many unspoken assistants to P.A. Tolstoy worked for the good of Russia not for the sake of remuneration or any other personal benefits. As Tolstoy reported to Chancellor Golovkin, "these people work wholeheartedly without fear and demand no payment from me...>°.

And the information that Tolstoy's voluntary assistants obtained was multifaceted and required not so much an observant eye as a penetrating, analytical mind and broad political erudition. On the instructions of Peter Tolstoy, he was supposed to regularly supply detailed information to Moscow on the composition of the Turkish land army and its deployment. Equally detailed data had to come from Tolstoy and his friends about the Turkish fleet, its weapons, types of ships, even about the salaries of officers. A special section provided

clarification of the plans of the Ottoman

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of his guide regarding the modernization of land and sea fortresses: "In the Black Sea channel, do they want to make a fortress and where (as it was heard) and by what masters, or do they want to fall asleep and when (it was about the Kerch Strait. - Auth.), now or during the war.

Among the 16 points of Peter's secret instruction [to the ambassador in Turkey was the following: give characteristics of the Sultan and his entourage; report whether the sultan rules the country himself or through his favorites; whether he has a penchant for wars and military amusements or is more concerned about peace, etc.

Despite the great efforts of the Russian ambassador to keep Porto from attacking Russia, relations between the two countries became increasingly tense. From Moscow followed an instruction to act "so that Porto would not be allowed to start a war (they would not have given permission to the Tatars either), sparing no dependencies, even if they were great." Pyotr Andreevich understood the order unequivocally: "cottage!" And the Russian ambassador did not skimp. The Turkish official, who was specially instructed to follow the Russian ambassador in the performance of his diplomatic mission, reported to his leadership that Tolstoy, in order to prolong peace, distributed in various places and to various people about three thousand purses with one and a half million thalers.

Each new diplomatic step of P.A. Tolstoy in Turkey was given with incredible difficulty. At the end of 1708, unfavorable trends for Russia, which was engaged in a war with the Swedes, prevailed in the country. The Turkish government is embarking on accelerated military preparations, building ships, replenishing the artillery fleet and increasing the amount of ammunition. The Crimean Khan is preparing for war. The Military Council of the Porte discusses the specific plans of the Sultan to conduct offensive operations against the Russian army. And then Peter I himself "added fuel to the fire." In the spring of 1709, the tsar travels to Azov. And in Turkey, a rumor is immediately spreading about the possibility of an attack by Russian ships on the Turkish fleet. The situation is becoming critical. And at that time, a ciphered dispatch from Ambassador Tolstoy was coming from the Turkish capital to Moscow, which says: "with great labor of dependence and with a considerable dacha", the Grand Vizier was convinced that the Russian Tsar arrived in Azov "for nothing else, except for the sake of festivities, "for" royal majesty has such a disposition that it will not always allow to be in one place,

The war did not affect the southern threshold of Russia, and the battle on two fronts, which threatened to ruin the country, did not take place. Peter was pleased. In the spring of 1709, P.A. Tolstoy received a well-deserved award: he was awarded a royal portrait adorned with diamonds. Few of Peter's nobles could boast of such awards!

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The victory of Peter [at Poltava for some time "facilitated the life" of the Russian ambassador in Turkey. The Turks stopped openly saber-rattling and threatening war. In January 1710, Sultan Ahmed III received Tolstoy in Istanbul and solemnly presented him with a letter of ratification of the peace treaty of 1700. It would seem that success is obvious. But it was only at first glance. In his message to the State Chancellor G.I. Tolstoy wrote to Golovkin: "Do not be surprised that before, when the King of Sweden was in great power, I reported on the peacefulness of the Porte, and now, when the Swedes are defeated, I doubt ... The Turks do not believe that His Majesty did not start a war, when it will be free from other wars,

And indeed. From distrust of the Turks to open hostility is only one step. Four times, and this in three years, Turkey declared war on Russia, although only once it undertook extensive offensive operations. At the end of November 1710, Tolstoy received secret information about the upcoming meeting of the Great Divan with the Sultan regarding another break with Russia. He immediately informs the king about this, but the message does not have time to reach the addressee. War has already been declared, and the Russian ambassador himself becomes its first victim. The house and property of Petr Andreevich are plundered, and he himself is put on a decrepit horse and taken through the whole city to Yedikule prison, located on the southern outskirts of Istanbul, on the shores of the Sea of Marmara. From the point of view of the Turkish authorities, such diplomatic "demarches" were not something out of the ordinary. With the outbreak of hostilities, the entire diplomatic

the composition of this or that hostile mission was imprisoned by the Turks, where they were kept in difficult conditions, without any allowance for the position and age of the prisoners.

Here is how Pyotr Andreevich himself described his situation in Turkish captivity: "They brought me to the Seven-Tower Fortress, they first put me under the tower in a deep earthen dungeon, very gloomy and stinking."

The Turks obviously guessed that Pyotr Andreevich was an unsurpassed "summer resident", and they were very interested in the "roster list" of the recipients of bribes from the Turkish side. And there were many. Therefore, the Turks, as Tolstoy wrote from the dungeon, "besides, they threatened with torment and torture all day long, asking whom their ministers were and how much money they gave."

All the correspondence of Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy that has come down to us from the prison casemates deserves to be told about it in more detail, since it is evidence not only of the art and dexterity of the Petrine diplomat, but also of his remarkable intelligence abilities. The fact is that the Turks completely cut off Tolstoy from the outside world, as well as the staff of his embassy. He thought for a long time how to contrive and let Moscow know about his situation.

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None of the ambassadors of the Western countries wanted to visit the prisoner of the Seven-Tower Fortress. And then a good idea came to Peter Andreevich: to invite the ambassador of the Moldavian ruler Cantemir, who sympathized with Russia and secretly swore allegiance to Peter, and pass a note through him to freedom.

The Turks could not refuse the Ambassador of Moldova in his desire to visit a colleague - the Moldavian was admitted to the prison where Tolstoy was kept. The first visit was followed by another, and thus Peter I became informed in sufficient detail about the difficult everyday life of his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

P.A. Tolstoy spent about two years in Turkish captivity. In mid-April 1712, with the assistance of the English and Dutch ambassadors, a Russian-Turkish peace treaty was signed, one of the conditions of which was the release of Tolstoy and his return to Russia. Peter [quickly reacted to this agreement, and already on May 20, 1712, he sent a royal letter addressed to the Grand Vizier Yusuf Pasha. Peter I reported on the ratification of the treaty, which he, the tsar, "deigns to accept and support."

He spent many years in Turkey as the Russian Ambassador P.A. Tolstoy. It was a period of constant conflict situations in relations between the two countries, and Tolstoy, to the best of his ability and ability, tried not to aggravate the situation and promote a peaceful resolution of disputes. Peter [did not lose with an intelligent ambassador in one of the most restless foreign states for Russia at that time. He did not lose with P.A. Tolstoy and in the case of a particularly delicate nature, when he sent an elderly diplomat to return a fugitive from Europe - Tsarevich Alexei. Tolstoy deftly coped with this task.

Years passed, orders, political preferences and guidelines changed. On the royal throne was the son of Tsarevich Alexei - Peter P. And then Peter Andreevich allowed himself a little "weakness". Mindful of the relationship between father and son (Peter Guy Alexei), Tolstoy in his circle of friends inadvertently spoke out against the accession of Peter the Great. This statement quickly reached the ears of the capricious monarch. The verdict was brief: exile to the Solovetsky Monastery. And the 82-year-old elder spent his last days in a cold cell of a prison casemate. The great "dacha resident" died in poverty: "two warm slings, which were in prison with him, Tolstoy, were shabby and rotted. The blanket with him, Tolstoy, rotted.

! Molchanov N.N. Diplomacy of Peter the Great. - M.: "International relations", 1984. - S. 220. 2 Russian archive, 1888, book. 3, p. 367; book. 4, p. 510, 514.

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3 Pavlenko N.I. Chicks of Petrov's nest. - M.: "Thought", 1988. - S. 142. 4 Ibid.

> there. - S. 143.

6 Ibid. - S. 145.

? Molchanov N.N. Decree. op. - S. 221.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. - S. 265-266.

0 TsGADA, State Archive, category UP, d. 159, part 2, ll. 35, 36; part 3, l. 136.

10

The Courage and Fortitude of Prince Khilkov

Among those who deserve to be remembered in the history of Russian foreign intelligence, he stands apart. Too unusual are the conditions in which he conducted, or rather, managed to conduct, for almost two decades, intelligence work, giving it without a trace his entire conscious life, full of hardships and trials. His biography is somewhat similar to the life path of Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy, but only in separate strokes, in an abbreviated form, in an unambiguously tragic version. Peter Tolstoy knew both grief and happiness, he lived to be eighty-four years old. Our hero lived exactly half as long, he passed away early, almost without knowing its joys.

Prince Andrey Yakovlevich Khilkov, by origin, belonged to one of the most ancient and branched families of Russia, originating from the specific princes of Starodub, who in the eighteenth generation were considered descendants of Rurik himself.

The ancestor of the Khilkovs was Prince Ivan Fedorovich, nicknamed Khilkov for his poor health. It is known about him that in 1511 he went on a campaign "to fight Lithuania", and in 1535 he became the first governor in Serpukhov. Apparently, despite physical ailments, Khilok was strong in spirit and passed this quality on to his descendants. Since then, many Khilkovs have been commanders, were in the military, sovereign service.

Andrei, born in 1676, was the third son in the family of Prince Yakov Vasilievich Khilkov, a courtier under Tsars Alexei Mikhailovich and Fyodor Alekseevich, the elder brother of Peter I. As a twelve-year-old boy, Andrei, with the help of his father, began his court career. This was a common occurrence in pre-Petrine Rus'. The prince's duties included serving at reception ceremonies for foreign embassies, and later arranging business correspondence in the Posolsky Prikaz. For the young man, this service became a good practice for communicating with diplomats. It lasted until 1697, when

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Andrey Khilkov, like Peter Tolstoy, was sent to Italy "to study navigation and shipbuilding" on the decision of Peter I.

It was difficult for Andrey, who was barely 21 years old, to part with his young wife Maria and newborn daughter Irina, subsequently they were practically never seen. Khilkov's wife was the daughter of the courtier Vasily Mikhailovich Erokin, whose Moscow estate stood next to the Khilkov family mansion - in the Ostozhenka area, where Khilkov and Erokin lanes are still preserved.

In Italy, Andrei studied not only navigation, shipbuilding and languages, but also the political and economic situation in the Mediterranean, communicating with the Russian ambassadors in Venice and Naples. He returned to Russia in 1700, on the eve of the start of the war with Sweden, and almost immediately went abroad again with a special assignment from the tsar.

Preparing for the war, Peter sought to keep his intentions secret from the Swedes for as long as possible. In order to lull their vigilance, he sent Andrey Khilkov to Sweden in order to confirm the Kardisi peace treaty and at the same time - "detailed intelligence about what business and why the envoys of foreign powers live in Stockholm."

Khilkov arrived in Stockholm on July 18, 1700. Shortly before that, King Karl HP went to Denmark to sign peace with the king there. Therefore, the crown officials offered Khilkov the choice of "sending his case without the king in Stockholm" or following Charles to personally present him with letters. Khilkov preferred to arrange a personal meeting.

Having overcome 570 miles in two weeks, he caught up with the king on the road and on August 13 he was awarded a royal audience. Having studied Latin well in Italy, which was then held in special esteem as the language of science and international communication, Andrei made a whole speech in it, assuring the monarch of the peace-loving nature of his mission, and conveyed Peter's message to him. This made a very favorable impression on Charles and his courtiers, including the Secretary of State of Sweden, Count Pieper. Khilkov's arrival convinced them for a while that Russia did not intend to go to war with Sweden. Andrew received an invitation from the king to go with him and the ambassadors of other powers to Copenhagen. Together they crossed the Sound on the royal yacht, and Andrei was able to inspect in detail the squadrons of the Swedish, Danish, English and Dutch fleets that were in the strait, which arrived at the conclusion of the peace signed on August 19.

On August 30, Khilkov received a second audience with Charles, at which the king accepted his credentials as the diplomatic representative of Russia in Sweden... It so happened that just on August 30, Peter I decided to declare war on Sweden.

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Karl, shocked by the "cunning of the Muscovites", ordered that the property of the envoy Khilkov be sealed, and that he himself be put under arrest in the house that he rented as an embassy, along with three other employees - a translator and two clerks. For the prince, this, of course, was not a surprise, he was preparing for this. Khilkov was under increased surveillance, although he still had some, very limited, freedom of action.

With the outbreak of the war, "trading and working people from Russia, a total of 111 people" who were in Sweden, were interned. Their property was confiscated, and they themselves were collected in Rüssgarden, a Russian merchant's court in the center of Stockholm, from where they were sent to forced labor. The merchants were indignant at such treatment, since they did not consider themselves prisoners of war, and began to seek a meeting with Khilkov, who himself did not yet know anything about his future fate. Khilkov immediately sent Karl a protest against the conditions of the merchants. At the same time, since the merchants were gathered from different places, he was able to find out in a conversation with them the economic situation of those regions of Sweden where he himself had not visited, and sent urgent information to Peter on these issues.

In November 1700, after the defeat of the Russians near Narva, an associate of Peter I, Ya.F., was captured by the Swedes. Dolgoruky, the commander of the artillery of the Russian army, the Georgian prince Alexander Imeretinsky, generals Trubetskoy, Buturlin, Veide, Golovin and others. In Sweden in 1702, 160 important Russian prisoners were kept, most of them were in the Gripsholm prison in Stockholm.

Khilkov remained under house arrest, but received the right to visit Russian prisoners on a regular basis. The regime of his detention was softened, since Karl wanted at that time to exchange him for the Swedish ambassador to Russia, T. Knipper. However, Peter I released Knipper without an exchange. One can only guess about the reasons for such a demarche of the tsar: Andrei Khilkov was needed by him precisely in

Stockholm, after all, Karl did not restrict some of Khilkov's rights and, most importantly, correspondence. Taking advantage of this, the prince sent letters to Moscow written in cipher or cryptography (the paper had to be heated in order for the secret ink to show through the harmless content). Andrei did not complain about his position before the tsar, he did not ask to go home, although, to be sure, he was drawn to his young wife.

Most of the letters went from Khilkov to Copenhagen, to the Russian embassy in Denmark, which remained neutral. There, the information was supplemented by ambassadors Andrei Petrovich Izmailov, and later Vasily Lukich Dolgorukov, and forwarded to Russia along with the embassy mail. In particular, information was received from Khilkov about the impending attack of the Swedish squadron of Admiral Sheblad on Arkhangelsk in 1701. Warships of Sweden went to Arkhangelsk under the guise of a "whaling flotilla", but their movement

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was in the field of view of Russian intelligence - in addition to Khilkov's information from Sweden itself, similar reports came from the tsarist representatives in neutral Holland and Denmark, where the squadron was preparing equipment.

Further events developed as follows: on the outskirts of Arkhangelsk, the squadron took on board three Russian pilots, led by helmsman Dmitry Ryabov, who specially waited for the Swedes. They ran two Swedish ships aground right in front of a battery of coastal artillery hastily and secretly placed in the harbor of Arkhangelsk. The squadron hurried to surrender, and the pilots managed to escape in the confusion.

In the midst of the New Year holidays in the following year, 1702, on the night of January 2-3, several Russian prisoners escaped from the Stockholm prison. Among them were generals Weide, Buturlin and Trubetskoy. However, only one fugitive managed to return to Russia - Lieutenant Colonel Andrei Gordon, son of P.I. Gordon - one of the founders of the Russian regular army. The rest were waiting for a punishment cell in the basement of the City Hall in Stockholm, then they were taken to different prisons in Sweden in order to avoid new group escapes.

And here is what A. Khilkov wrote in one of his secret reports on this subject: "It is better to be a prisoner of the Turks than the Swedes: here the Russians are put to nothing, scolded and dishonored; guards for me and for the generals inside; our merchants were tortured with hard work ... "

Khilkov himself remained in Stockholm, continuing to send reports to Russia, including ciphers, which are now stored in the funds of the Central State Archive of Ancient Acts. From 1704, officer Aleksey Ilyich Mankiev, taken prisoner near Narva, who knew Swedish, Latin and Polish well, helped him in preparing messages. Diplomatic ("explicit") letters ended up in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, and "secret", including ciphers, in the Imperial Majesty's own Cabinet.

Khilkov courageously continued to work actively in Sweden, remaining under house arrest. He managed to sue from the Swedes part of the merchant's capital, arrested in 1700. With this money, he bribed informants and liaisons, including among the prison guards. He sent the information he received to Russia in two large "blocks" in 1706 and 1708, together with Peter Lefort and Alexander Gordon, who were released on exchange.

The defeat of the Swedes at Poltava caused a tightening of Khilkov's detention regime. By this time, the Crown Prosecutor Axel Sparre had found a channel for leaking information. At first, they tried to recruit Khilkov: when Karl KhP moved troops through Poland and Ukraine to Moscow, he was offered to accept Lutheranism and take the post of "adviser on Muscovy" to the king. When he answered with a sharp refusal, in 1709 one of his translators died suddenly, and the senior clerk of the embassy who helped Khilkov

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drowned under mysterious circumstances. Then Khilkov, on his own initiative, enrolled Mankiev on the staff of the embassy and continued to work steadfastly.

The defeat at Poltava changed the mood of the Swedes. Khilkov, who had been in captivity for ten years already, wrote to Peter [in 1710: <... here the general inclination towards peace, one king interferes - he will rather transfer to the last person, but will not reconcile until he returns everything ... But although peace was not concluded, in 1710-1711 a large exchange of prisoners took place, when Buturlin, Veide, Dolgoruky and 42 other officers were released and sent to Revel. At this time, Khilkov was allowed to visit, under the supervision of the Swedish General Nirot, who was guarding him, the captured Russian military leaders Avtonom Golovin and Ivan Trubetskoy in a prison near Abo. Together they decided not to agree to an exchange and remain in captivity with the Swedes until the end of hostilities, giving up their turn to junior officers. This noble act encouraged many young captives who were still in captivity and could hardly endure the hardships of prison life.

In 1713, Khilkov was transferred from Stockholm to imprisonment in the fortress of Västerås. He was followed by Mankiev, who brought with him the manuscript of the work he had started in Stockholm, *The Core of Russian History*, which describes the events "from Adam" to 1712. The work itself was written by Mankiev, but Khilkov, who was well acquainted with ancient Russian manuscripts, also took part in it. (At the beginning of Khilkov's service at the Posolsky Prikaz, his mentor was the famous Russian archaeographer and historiographer of the late 17th century, Rodion Kirillovich Poluektov.)

When Khilkov was still in Stockholm, at his request, the Swedish historian Petreus helped him in his work, from whom he learned many details of the political and economic state of Sweden, which he regularly informed Peter about. In Västerås he also communicated with the guards called in from different parts of Sweden, and learned from them important news about the state of affairs in the country. So, in a letter of 1714, Khilkov informed Peter about the expansion of staff in the Swedish colleges of foreign affairs, trade, justice, military affairs and the large treasury, about the introduction of new positions of auditors there and about the sale of patents for these positions. Work on the manuscript on Russian history was completed in 1715.

Three years later, at the beginning of 1718, Khilkov died in Westeros from tuberculosis, which had worsened over the long years of imprisonment. He did not live only six months before the Åland truce, according to which the last prisoners were returned to Russia, including Trubetskoy, Golovin and Mankiev. Alexander. Ilyich Mankiev accompanied on a galley to the Åland Islands a lead coffin with the body of Khilkov, brought there on October 18, 1718. From there Khilkov's ashes were transported to the new capital of Russia, St.

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officer honors at the cemetery of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra. Unfortunately, the grave has not been preserved.

Returning to Russia, Mankiev reported on his stay in Sweden to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, which approved his admission to the state in 1709. Then, as a specialist in Sweden, who had many valuable contacts there, Mankiev was again sent there to prepare the peace treaty of Nystadt together with Adjutant General A.I. Rumyantsev. He stayed in Sweden until 1720, and then worked on delimiting the borders between Russia and Sweden together with Count Shuvalov in 1722-1723. He soon fell ill and, weakened by 18 years of imprisonment, died in 1723. Before his death, he managed to hand over a copy of *The Core of Russian History* with a cover letter to Khilkov's only daughter, Irina.

The Kernel of Russian History was first published in 1770. The book was a huge success, going through three editions in ten years. The well-known educator Nikolai Ivanovich Novikov responded to her appearance with enthusiastic verses:

"The most brilliant fruit of shining fathers, Khilkov, a reasonable prince! Describing to us You are glorious feats of the Russian people, Snatched from the darkness of the Heroes of the Russian race, Stretched their glory far away to alien skies. Let the whole world and all nature know about them, let it be known even to later times,

Yes, ancient Russia will be honored everywhere,

Yes, the new one blooms redder than Athens and Rome: But, glorifying them, you yourself became famous, And then your glory will thunder here, As long as the Russian State stands!

eleven

Patkul - scout by the will of fate

He was born in a prison, in a Stockholm dungeon, where his parents were kept on charges of treason. The exact date of his birth is not known - it is assumed that somewhere around 1660. The son of a noble Baltic nobleman, Johann Reinhold von Patkul, by the will of fate, from the first days of his life, found himself in a whirlpool of events that shook Europe at the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century.

As a result of numerous wars that took place throughout the entire 17th century, Sweden became one of the most powerful states in Europe. Her possessions extended not only throughout Scandinavia, Finland, part of Karelia, the Baltic states and further along the coast of the European continent, where the German principalities were located from ancient times. The Swedes also claimed a part of the original Russian lands.

They felt like masters in Livonia, which from the second half of the 16th century included the territory of present-day southern Estonia and the northern part of Latvia up to the Daugava River.

In 1689, the Swedish king Charles XI seized the lands from the Livonian nobles, and a deputation from the Baltic lands was sent to Stockholm for negotiations, which included Patkul. By this time, despite such an unusual "beginning" of his biography, he managed to rise to the rank of captain in the Swedish army. How it happened remains a mystery. In all likelihood, the Swedes believed that children were not responsible for the actions of their parents, and saw in Patkul a very outstanding personality.

The deputation raised the question of the return of the lands taken by him before the king. Johann Patkul took a particularly sharp position. His audacity and categorical presentation of his rights aroused the wrath of the king.

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The deputation's demands were not met. In 1692, Patkul again filed a complaint with the king on behalf of the Livonian nobility with threats against the Swedish government. For this, in 1693 he was accused of inciting a riot. In 1694, a Swedish court sentenced Patkul to cut off first his right hand, and then his HEAD.

Patkul's rich property was confiscated, he himself fled to Switzerland, and then to France. He tried to petition for pardon before the new Swedish king, Karl HP. But in vain.

In 1698, having taken refuge in Saxony, Johann Patkul decided to dedicate his life to the fight against the Swedes and made the main bet on the Elector Augustus P, who in 1697 was also elected King of Poland.

Saxony, one of the largest principalities in Germany, was already at that time a hotbed of rapid industrial growth. Mining and the textile industry developed successfully there, and porcelain production soon arose in Meissen. Just at that time, the first Leipzig fairs were organized, which later acquired not only all-German, but also international significance. The Principality was an ancient center of culture and education: in 1409 a university was founded in Leipzig, and in 1502 in another Saxon city - Wittenberg.

Patkul believed that Livonia could benefit from joining the Saxon-Polish alliance. However, he soon came to the conclusion that it was only possible to oppose Sweden with the combined forces of several countries, since the Saxon-Polish alliance of the Swedes would not prevail. Patkul had a natural ability to establish contacts with people, to influence them, and besides, using the fame of a man who dared to make tough demands on the Swedish king, he gained confidence in the elector and began to inspire him with the idea of the need to fight the Swedes .

At that time, Sweden caused concern to many countries of Western Europe. Patkul managed to negotiate with the king of Denmark and received his consent to enter into a coalition to fight Sweden. The same work was done by him in Prussia. Moreover, Patkul acted so subtly and conspiratorially that there was no leakage of information about the secret negotiations he held.

But Patkul's eyes were mainly turned to Russia. He believed that if Russia supported the coalition, then one could seriously count on success in the fight against hated Sweden.

In the meantime, the Russian Tsar Peter [was touring the countries of Europe as part of the Russian embassy. Peter performed under

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named after Pyotr Mikhailov, who was listed as a bombardier of the Preobrazhensky Regiment.

The first point that Peter planned to visit was Riga, which was under the control of the Swedes. They did not want to let the Russians into this city, but Peter was persistent, and the Swedes gave in, establishing, however, tight guardianship. Despite the fact that the Swedes literally breathed down the back of the head of every Russian who was part of Peter's group, the tsar managed with his associates to carefully examine the port and fortress of Riga. The trip around the Baltic was used by Peter to carry out reconnaissance, and he really managed to get an idea of the forces of the Swedes in this region.

Peter I was preparing for a fight with his northern neighbor, who was blocking Russia's access to the Baltic Sea. But Russia could not start a war with Sweden, because there was still a war with Turkey. Russia was not capable of fighting on two fronts.

In 1699, Patkul arrived in Moscow with his secret plan to create a coalition to fight the Swedes. Peter did not have to be persuaded, since he himself had long nurtured the idea of "shortening the arms" of the Swedish king. The Russian tsar saw that Patkul was an intelligent person, he not only did a great job of clarifying the positions of Saxony, Poland, Prussia and Denmark, but also managed to persuade the monarchs of these states to jointly fight with Sweden.

Peter, having learned Patkul's epic, was convinced that he was facing a person whose personal interests objectively coincided with the state interests of Russia, and this circumstance led to a fruitful alliance.

In November 1699, a secret military treaty was signed between Russia, Poland, Prussia and Denmark. Peter promised to go to war with Sweden after the completion of peace negotiations with Turkey.

In July 1700, an agreement was concluded in Constantinople, according to which Russia received Azov with adjacent territories and newly built fortresses (Taganrog, Pavlovsk, Mius), was exempted from paying an annual tribute to the Crimean Khan and received the right to diplomatic representation in Turkey on an equal footing with other powers. In August, Russia declared war on Sweden.

The secret activities of Patkul greatly accelerated the process of creating an alliance of states against Sweden. His bet on Russia as a powerful force that could provide a decisive role in the fight against Sweden turned out to be correct. He was impressed by Peter's determination to firmly defend the interests of his country, the implementation of which was hindered by Sweden. Patkul voluntarily volunteered to serve Russia, and Peter readily accepted him, enrolled him in the Russian service and assigned him to the Privy Councilor, conferring the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and the military rank of Major General.

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By his deeds, Patkul proved that he really had great potential. His extensive connections at the courts of the allied states allowed him to collect important information. The intelligence data that came to Moscow from the Livland nobleman made it possible to significantly supplement the idea of the specific actions of the allies. And Patkul conducted reconnaissance not only in Poland, but in Prussia and Austria.

In 1702, Moscow noted a decline in the flow of information from Austria. There, Russia's interests were represented by the then inexperienced ambassador, Prince Pyotr Alekseevich Golitsyn, who had difficulty establishing the necessary connections at the emperor's court. In particular, he could not improve relations with Kaunitz, who then held the post of chancellor.

Patkul was sent to Vienna to assist Golitsyn. Kaunitz, as a prominent and influential person at the Viennese court, was an arrogant person and, knowing his own worth, did not allow every foreigner to his person. Nevertheless, Patkul quickly established contact with Kaunitz and found a common language with him. Unfortunately, the archives do not contain information about how Patkul "courted" Kaunitz, it is only known that the Austrian chancellor agreed to work in favor of the Russian Tsar for a certain bribe. However, after Patkul's departure from Vienna, Golitsyn never managed to develop a relationship with Kaunitz. In addition, in Moscow, in the Posolsky Prikaz, a bureaucratic approach was shown - they first expected information from Kaunitz, and then they were already going to resolve the issue with money.

And Patkul continued to act actively. Having good informants, in Prussia, for example, he managed to intercept the correspondence channel of the Prussian court with the king of Sweden. Using his opportunities, Patkul collected information about the moods in the highest officials and in the military elite of all allied countries.

Peter, receiving secret information from Patkul, closely watched how his allies in the coalition violated the agreements and were ready to enter into separate negotiations with the common enemy. He took measures to influence them accordingly. Patkul also contributed to the efforts of the Russian tsar. He had the opportunity to influence the Prussian ministers and thereby contributed to the retention of Prussia in the positions of allied obligations.

In 1704, Peter I highly appreciated the work of Patkul and awarded him another rank - lieutenant general.

In his reports to Moscow, Patkul repeatedly noted the inconsistency of the Polish king with regard to the allied treaty. In the summer of 1705, he persistently asked Peter to receive him for a personal report on a very important matter. At the same time, he asked me to point out to him any place where he could arrive with a report. Peter named him three cities - Vilna, Kovno or Grodno. In addition, Peter

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emphasized that if the matter was so urgent, then Patkul could use the cipher and transmit the information in writing. But they were not destined to meet again.

What worried Patkul, why did he persistently want to see the king and personally report important information to him? Most likely, he had secret information that allowed him to assume

to denounce the imminent betrayal of the Saxons and the Polish king.

Something that could cause concern to Patkul happened in August 1705.

Through the agents he had, Patkul established that the Polish king had sent his ministers Imhof and Fingstein to Karl KhP to conduct separate negotiations. Patkul could not hide his indignation and made a sharp protest before Augustus.

Patkul's position alarmed the Saxons and their henchman on the Polish throne. Under the pretext of participating in negotiations, the Saxons lured Patkul to their place and arrested him. Patkul was asked to keep silent about everything that he knew about their treacherous plans, giving a subscription in exchange for release. Refusal threatened with life imprisonment.

Patkul angrily rejected this deal. Then the Saxons betrayed the steadfast Baltic to the Swedes. On October 10, 1707, he was wheeled by the Swedes, and then beheaded and quartered.

Thus died Johann Reinhold Patkul, a nobleman from Livonia, who voluntarily offered his services to the Russian Tsar, serving him faithfully and faithfully in the name of the struggle against the common enemy. He contributed to the elimination of the long-term domination of the Swedes on the Baltic coast. As a result of a hard struggle with Sweden, Peter I finally realized his cherished dream and cut through a "window to Europe".

12,

Florio Beneveni

During the reign of Peter the eyes of Russia were first turned towards the Central Asian lands. Little was known about them at the time. Separate rumors flew about untold riches lurking there. But there was no exact information. Rumors were mixed with various fantastic stories, equipped with oriental exoticism, which, of course, reduced their reliability.

In general terms, it was known that as early as the second half of the 17th century, on the lands that stretched from the coast of the Caspian Sea in the west to the border with China in the east and from the Aral-Irtysh watershed in the north to the borders with Persia and Afghanistan in the south, there were two large feudal states - the Bukhara and Khiva khanates.

The Bukhara Khanate significantly expanded its possessions during the reign of Abdulla Khan Pv 1557-1598. Then it conquered Balkh and Ferghana, Tashkent, Khorasan with Herat, Mashhad and Khorezm. These were the years of his greatest political heyday. Crafts and trade developed in the cities, construction was going on.

The Khiva Khanate was formed in 1512 and included the lands of ancient Khorezm in the lower reaches of the Amu-Darya River, the nomad camps of the Turkmens in Mangyshlak, Dakhistan, along Uzboy, as well as the northern part of Khorasan. At that time, Khorasan included the northeastern part of modern Iran, the Merv oasis and the northwestern parts of modern Afghanistan.

Until the middle of the 18th century, there was a constant internecine struggle in the Khiva Khanate, there were continuous wars with Bukhara, Persia, and nomadic Turkmens. The feudal state was also undermined by acute national strife between Uzbeks and Turkmens.

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The feudal order of Khiva was closely intertwined with patriarchal-clan and slaveholding relations. Khan enjoyed unlimited power. The Muslim clergy played an important role.

The rulers of Bukhara and Khiva were under strong pressure from Persia and the Ottoman Empire, and therefore, in search of allies, with some interest, albeit with apprehension, looked into

side of Russia. The Khan of Khiva even appealed to Peter [3 times] with a request to accept Khiva into Russian citizenship. This was in 1700, 1703 and 1714. But the king was then preoccupied with affairs on the western borders of the empire.

Peter showed interest in Central Asia when he received secret information that large gold deposits were discovered in the Amu Darya valley. Peter's plans for the transformation of Russia required huge expenses, so the news of the gold deposits could not help but interest him. And he personally wrote a decree to the Senate: "Send to Khiva with congratulations on the Khanate, and then go to Bukhara to the Khan, finding out what business is trading, and the real one is to visit the city of Irket." In other words, it was about a specific reconnaissance mission, the implementation of which was planned to be carried out under the cover of a trade and diplomatic mission.

The preparations for an expedition to Khiva and then to Bukhara began, although the main goal was to verify reports of the presence of gold in these khanates. Peter looked further: if the news about gold had not been confirmed, then it was necessary to explore the possibility of obtaining it through trade with India through the Central Asian states.

The expedition was led by Divlet-Kizden-Murza, a native of the North Caucasus, who after baptism became Prince Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky. The Senate gave him an armed detachment of four thousand men to accompany him. Later, another two thousand Cossacks were added to the detachment.

From Astrakhan, the expedition of Prince Cherkassky set off for Guryev, and from there across the Turkmen sands to Khiva. The transition from well to well in the sweltering heat seemed to the prince not the most difficult thing when he faced distrust and hostility, meeting with the Khan's people on the outskirts of Khiva, and then finding himself at the Khan's headquarters.

Prince Cherkassky, suspected of predatory intentions, was captured and executed. People from the embassy and its escorts died or were enslaved. Only a few managed to escape and reach Astrakhan. It was they who told about the death of the expedition.

But Peter did not back down from his plans and decided to send an embassy to Bukhara. At that time, representatives of the

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supporters of the Bukhara Khan. Peter told them that he was going to send a Russian embassy to the Khan and introduced Florio Beneveni, who was to lead this mission.

Florio Beneveni, an Italian, was in the Russian service and not only proved himself to be an intelligent and dexterous person, but also proved in practice his devotion to Peter and Russia. Beneveni knew the East well, its manners and customs, he easily got along with people, established useful contacts. He visited Constantinople, spoke Turkish and Persian.

The main task assigned to him was to covertly verify information about gold. But, in addition, he had to conduct economic and political intelligence. Peter was going to establish trade relations with Bukhara, and Beneveni had to find out what influence Persia and Turkey had on the Bukhara Khan.

In 1719, the Russian embassy went to Bukhara through Persia, together with the Bukhara envoys returning home. Having crossed the Caspian Sea, they landed on the Persian coast. The path was not easy. There were also armed provocations. But the Russians this time were ready to give a due rebuff.

In 1720, the Russian embassy finally arrived in Tehran.

All this time, Beneveni did not sit idle: both on the coast of the Caspian Sea and in Tehran, he collected information of a military-political nature and sent it to St. Petersburg.

The stay in Tehran again dragged on, but in the end the Shah deigned to let Beneveni go. Leaving the capital of Persia, the Russian embassy, accompanied by Bukhara colleagues, arrived in Bukhara at the end of 1721.

Khan outwardly favorably accepted Beneveni, and he worked for three years on the land of Bukhara. Despite close supervision, Beneveni did his job. He managed to find out that the gold-bearing sand is taken out to the Amu-Darya by mountain streams. He concluded that the gold deposit was somewhere in the mountains.

Indeed, as Beneveni himself and his people later made sure, there were deposits of ore containing gold in the mountains of Badakhshan. Elsewhere there were deposits of copper, alum, lead, and iron ores. Deposits of silver ores were also discovered. Beneveni also found out that all these deposits are strictly classified, are under the personal control of the khan and no one is allowed to develop them. A detailed report about this went to Petersburg.

Beneveni analyzed the position of the Khan of Bukhara and came to the conclusion that the ban on the development of rich deposits pursued reasonable goals. After all, if China or Persia found out

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about the deposits of gold, silver, copper and other valuable ore in the bowels of Bukhara, the khan could not have avoided the invasion of foreigners.

Understanding the difficult situation in which Beneveni found himself, who was under the vigilant watch of the Khan's guards, in St. Petersburg they decided to send him a centurion, who acted under the guise of a merchant, to help him. This centurion, whose name, unfortunately, was not preserved in the archives, wandered with his goods across the expanses of the Bukhara land. In Balkh and Badakhshan the centurion discovered English goods and English merchants.

Thus, in those distant years, the interests of Russia and England "met" in the vastness of Central Asia, which subsequently resulted in a long struggle for influence in this region.

But all this was ahead, but for now Florio Beneveni found out that the khan and other influential Bukharians were burdened by dependence on Persia and were gradually drawn to Russia. But these moods, in general, were quite changeable.

In the summer of 1722, when the Russian troops began the Persian campaign and the news of the capture of Derbent, Baku and Rasht reached Bukhara and Khiva, the pro-Persian forces subsided and stopped intriguing the Russian ambassador. These days, a messenger from Khiva arrived at Beneveni, who brought a letter from the khan expressing his "joy" at the victory of the Russian troops and inviting the ambassador to call on Khiva when returning to Russia.

And Beneveni really was about to go back. Yes, the Khan of Bukhara did not let him go. The days dragged on languidly, and one day the Bukhara ambassador came to Beneveni, with whom they made a long journey from St. Petersburg through Tehran to Bukhara. During the journey, full of many events, they developed good relations, which, however, the Bukhara man carefully concealed from others. Beneveni's work with the ambassador was not in vain. And the Bukharian said that soon he would be given permission to leave Bukhara, but on the way an attempt would be made to destroy the embassy.

Soon, having received permission from the khan to leave, the Russian embassy set off. The massacre was avoided. Beneveni himself took the attempt to deal with the embassy as the desire of the eastern rulers not to let the bearers of secrets about them and their lands out of their possessions. In Khiva, which the Russian embassy could not bypass, Beneveni also had to experience both Eastern hospitality and cunning. September 17, 1725 Florio Beneveni and his embassy finally arrived in Astrakhan.

Thus ended the dangerous and lengthy saga of the Russian envoy, intelligence officer Florio Beneveni. The information he collected about the situation in the Bukhara and Khiva khanates, about the customs and habits of the peoples living there, significantly expanded the idea,

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formed in St. Petersburg about the states of Central Asia. Beneveni confirmed the desire of Persia and, to some extent, Turkey to influence these Muslim states. But the main thing that Beneveni managed to establish was the emerging interest of Bukhara and Khiva in Russia and the first, still unstable intentions to establish interstate relations.

As for the further fate of Beneveni, upon his return to St. Petersburg, he was appointed to work in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. His great personal experience and good knowledge of the East allowed him to successfully lead one of the departments of the Collegium - the so-called expedition of "Turkish and other languages".

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First Minister of the Empress

The times of strife and instability in Russia's domestic policy after Peter's death had a noticeable effect on its international relations and authority. Western ambassadors in St. Petersburg, regardless of anything, began to conduct endless, unceremonious intrigues, which sometimes ended in the removal of kings and objectionable government officials from power. Thus, the French ambassador Chétardie, in an effort to weaken the dominance of the Germans at the Russian court (Biron, Munnich, Osterman) and strengthen the influence of France there, actively contributed to the enthronement of Peter's disgraced daughter Elizabeth, who, during the accession, first showed him all sorts of signs of attention. However, soon there was a rapprochement between Russia and Austria, and Chétardie again took up secret intrigues, as a result of which he was expelled from the country.

In this kaleidoscope of frequently changing foreign policy orientations, the Russian government acted indecisively. Only in Sweden, where there was an endless struggle between the aristocracy and the royal power, did the foreign policy service of St. Petersburg actively put "its hand" in those years. Large sums were spent to create a "Russian party" among the Swedish nobility, as opposed to another grouping focused on supporting France. The main role in this political struggle was played by the Russian ambassador in Stockholm, and later the head of Russian foreign policy, Count Nikita Ivanovich Panin.

"He spent his entire life, from his youth until his death, in a courtly atmosphere, and for about 30 years he was in the diplomatic unit. Always affable and amiable with everyone, gentle in manners, polite in address, he easily earned himself the respect of the court spheres, his own and others ... Many years of staying abroad and serving among foreign people, besides diplomats,

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filled him with many knowledge, especially precious for a Russian person of that time..." wrote the ambassador of one of the European countries, describing "the most dignitary of the Russian Empire in the middle of the 18th century"!

The name of Nikita Panin is associated with Russia's success in solving the Montenegrin problem, when, as a result of two wars with Turkey and a diplomatic struggle with the Western powers, Russia increased its influence and authority among the Christian peoples enslaved by the Ottoman Empire, established itself on the Black Sea, acquired the right to conduct its merchant ships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, achieved a weakening of the aggressiveness of the Commonwealth and expanded its positions in the Baltic. Russia's decision to play the role of an organizer of collective actions and an international arbiter in European affairs was a new, purely "Paninian" moment in foreign strategy. In the 1860s, Russian diplomacy initiated

creation of the so-called "Northern Accord" – a union of the states of Northern Europe as a counterbalance to the Franco-Austrian bloc. And the "Declaration of Armed Neutrality" proclaimed by Russia during the struggle of the North American colonies for independence not only demonstrated to the world the increased authority of Russia, but also to a certain extent limited the actions of the British fleet.

In the Collegium of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of N.I. Panin employed 260 employees. He himself selected suitable candidates, whom he trusted and relied on their high professional training. Leading the work of Russian representatives abroad, Panin personally determined the tasks, provided the necessary information and gave advice on how best to influence the "right person" who could benefit the Russian state.

"An employee of a foreign collegium," Count Panin taught his pupils, "should be able to recruit open supporters and secret informants, bribe officials and minor officials, write concisely and clearly his encrypted and open reports to his homeland not in advance established form, but on the basis of considerations of expediency"³.

Looking at the surviving portrait of a high-ranking nobleman in a magnificent powdered wig and a satin caftan embroidered with gold, it is difficult to assume that this seemingly sweetest and most delicate person was a recognized master of official conspiracies and secret interstate intrigues. And that's how it was in life. Count Panin even taught the tsarina the strict rules of maintaining secrecy, inventing for this purpose a very original "courier service". For the transmission of diplomatic and other confidential documents, he suggested using a semi-literate person as a messenger.

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a noble but extremely devoted court stoker named Fyodor Mikhailovich. In his caftan with exorbitantly deep pockets, Catherine loaded urgent papers and sent a messenger to Panin. In the same way, after familiarizing the count with the mail, he returned the documents to the queen.

Nikita Ivanovich began his diplomatic career at the age of thirty immediately from the post of ambassador - first in Denmark, then in Sweden, which was eager for revenge for Poltava and the humiliation of King Karl KhP. By the time Panin arrived in Stockholm, the situation in the capital was explosive due to the intensity of political passions.

Panin began his work in Sweden by creating a network of his secret "friends". At first, they were several influential members of the State Council, some merchants and industrialists interested in relations with Russia. With the help of generous gifts and large cash bribes, N.I. Panin skillfully led his "assistants", whom he often met during specially organized forest hunting in the vicinity of Stockholm. Concerned about their safety, he "numbered" all his connections and sent a copy of the numbering to the Collegium for Foreign Affairs. Therefore, when they received a "ciphered letter" from Stockholm, where it was said about the need "from now on to make payment to M 2, the remaining from M 1, 3,000 rubles per year; To the M 6th, to the previous three thousandth salary, add another thousand, and from now on, instead of the five thousandth salary, give M 5th 3,000, with which he, as an old man and henceforth not strong in business, can be completely satisfied, "then in St. Petersburg, they perfectly understood who, for what and how much to pay.

Count Panin also survived the vicissitudes of fate. After a devastating fire in his personal residence in Stockholm, all his property burned down and there was no money left to pay off creditors. A messenger from St. Petersburg brought salutary news: the count was responding to Northern Palmyra to become a permanent educator of the young heir to the Russian throne, the future Emperor Paul [.

Historians argue that face-to-face contact was extremely unsuccessful. The boy, seeing the tall, plump, extremely imposing "uncle", was very frightened and burst into loud tears, hiding his head in the skirt of one of the nannies. It turns out that the heir was scared all the time: if you don't obey, a stern uncle will come and won't let you play fun games. But, fortunately, everything turned out well for the heir. The "severe uncle" became a great friend for him, as well as a friend of his mother, whom at one time he helped with a group of guards officers to remove her husband from power - Petra Shi proclaimed

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to sit the Grand Duchess as Empress Catherine II. As a reward for loyalty and friendship, Chief Chamberlain Nikita Ivanovich Panin was granted "five thousand rubles annually."

The tsarina discerned in him those qualities that Panin's contemporary, the French diplomat Calberon, later wrote about: "His character has a wonderful subtlety ... combined with a thousand pleasant features. She makes those who talk to him about business forget that he is in front of the first minister of the empress; it can also make you lose sight of the subject of the embassy and the caution that should be observed in this fascinating and dangerous conversation.

The queen's verdict was eloquent:

Decree to our secret real adviser Nikita Panin.

Under the present difficult circumstances, we have reasoned for the good ... to entrust you with the correction and handling of all cases under the foreign board ... and be present in this board as a senior member, insofar as your other positions allow you.

Catherine"

Count Panin headed the Russian Foreign Ministry in a difficult time for the country, which he described in a report to the tsarina in one of his memos as follows:

"What is the present state of our affairs, it does not require any explanation. The war with the Ottoman Port is still raging in full fire, Poland is drowning in the most disastrous internecine strife; the cause of the independence of the Crimea and other Tatar hordes has not reached its perfection to this day, but, on the contrary, the greatest hatred and obvious hostility towards the successes of our weapons.

And all these problems immediately, overnight, fell on the shoulders of the noble Chief Chamberlain. His guiding star was the only true foreign policy position for Russia, the essence of which Nikita Panin formulated at the very beginning of his diplomatic career: Russia should "follow its own system, consistent with its true interests, not being constantly in depending on the desires of the foreign court. Nikita Ivanovich Panin was a great patriot of his country. "Nothing that concerned Russia was alien and indifferent to him," noted the famous Russian writer Prince Pyotr Andreevich Vyazemsky. "Only with such love can one valiantly serve one's country and one's own people."

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14

"Inertia of rest"

If you try to imagine the history of the formation and development of Russian foreign intelligence in the form of a single graphic line, then this line would not be a continuous ascending straight line. The history of intelligence has had its ups and downs, its periods of relative, sometimes quite long, "rest". All this was due to specific historical reasons.

"In Europe of the 15th century, there was no political body more massive and less mobile than the Russian Empire was in its vastness, in its ethnographic composition, and finally, in its political make-up," wrote V.O. Klyuchevsky. - Such massive bodies, both in nature and in history, move or rest more by inertia than by the will of their engines!

The century began with turbulent events during the reign of Peter, a powerful "engine" who set the goal for Russia to catch up with Europe. To achieve this goal, first of all, detailed reliable information about the processes that were taking place abroad at that time was required. Much of this information could only be obtained through reconnaissance. Therefore, it was in the era of Peter the Great that a whole galaxy of outstanding personalities appeared on the Russian foreign policy scene, such as A.A. Matveev, P.A. Tolstoy, A.Ya. Khilkov, I.R. von Patkul, F. Beneveni, whose names occupy a worthy place in the history of domestic intelligence.

Peter attached great importance to the issues of foreign intelligence, although he did not have time to create an appropriate state structure. Many of his undertakings were not further developed. All that remains after Peter in terms of organizing foreign intelligence is just individual names, the beginnings of the quartermaster general service and the military charter, approved by him on March 30, 1716, one of the provisions of which says that "this service is obliged. ... to conduct reconnaissance".

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Under Peter I, the first attempts were also made to have their own representatives in foreign armies. Diplomats acted as military agents, who simultaneously performed reconnaissance missions.

After Peter the Great, a long period of "inertia of rest" sets in in Russia. The general weakness and inconsistency of the foreign policy of this period was also reflected in intelligence.

German influence for a long time and firmly established itself in the highest echelons of power. And only with the accession to the throne of Elizabeth Petrovna, "smart and kind, but disorderly and wayward Russian lady", according to V.O. Klyuchevsky, some return to the traditions of Peter the Great begins in Russia, but the foreign policy of the empire under Elizabeth, according to many historians, is determined not so much by state interests as by the personal likes and dislikes of the empress. Foreign intelligence during this period, as, indeed, always, is naturally dependent on the general foreign policy of the state, and even

With the coming to power of Catherine II, despite the noticeable intensification of Russian foreign policy, relatively little attention is paid to intelligence issues. In the south, the main objects of imperial interests were the Black Sea steppe with the Crimea and the North Caucasus - areas of traditional Turkish domination. Here, issues were resolved mainly by force, by military means. In the West, in Poland, the imperial policy (partition and redistribution of the Commonwealth) was carried out through the confidant of the empress, one of her favorites - Stanislaw Poniatowski, who was put in power there.

The European connections of Catherine II were more idyllic than political. Soon after coming to power, she decided to seriously engage in reform activities - not only to catch up, but also to overtake Europe. To achieve this goal, she created a special commission and compiled for her the "Order", the ideas of which, far ahead of the then forms of government in the most developed European countries, were only a distant ideal of the advanced Western European thinkers of that time. Following Montesquieu, Catherine proclaimed the principle of equality of all citizens before the law. This legal norm did not "fit" in any way into the monarchical form of government and was stuck in another Russian trap of "rest inertia" for more than two hundred years.

At the end of the century, the French Revolution stopped the reformist "engine" in Russia for a long time. Catherine was shocked by the "villainous killing" of the French King Louis XII, recoiled in horror from the good democratic intentions of the Nakaz, directing her efforts to create a coalition of European monarchies against France.

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Assessing the results and consequences of the French Revolution, the Russian ambassador to England Count S.R. Vorontsov, noting that "France seems to have been bitten by a mad dog," predicted in one of his private letters (dated December 2, 1792): "The infection will be widespread. Our remoteness will protect us for a while: we will be the last ones, but we will also be victims of this epidemic."

The first signs of an "epidemic" began to appear at the end of the 18th century. Two princes Golitsyn with guns in their hands participated in the storming of the Bastille. The young Count P. Stroganov, who happened to be in Paris at that time, went to Versailles almost every day to attend meetings of the National Assembly, joined the Jacobin club and enthusiastically wrote: "The best day in my life will be the day when I will see Russia revived by such a revolution." The future great historian N.M. Karamzin with a three-color republican cockade on his hat. Ekaterina's favorite grandson, the future monarch Alexander I, admitted that he "followed the French Revolution with lively participation and that ... wishes success to the republic and rejoices in it."

For Catherine, this was more than enough. Therefore, at the end of her reign, she primarily cared about strengthening her own security, strengthening the department of internal investigation of the "whip fighter" Sheshkovsky.

In this situation, the issues of foreign intelligence were given a far from paramount place. Intelligence activities continued, although they were generally sporadic in nature - individuals, individual assignments. It still involved people who were in the diplomatic or military service, the most reliable, capable, proven. But they were mostly singles. Fulfillment of secret assignments was considered a matter of honor both for representatives of the aristocracy, courtiers, and, moreover, for people from the lower social strata of society.

In this regard, the fate of Timofei Stepanovich Burnashev, the son of a simple Siberian Cossack, a scout of the deep regions of Central Asia, in the direction of which the eye of a double-headed eagle invariably looked even in the troubled times of the "French epidemic", is interesting. After all, not without reason, as V.O. Klyuchevsky, the massiveness of the Russian "political body" served as a sure guarantor against any unnecessary "movements". The increment of this massiveness at the expense of the southern and eastern lands created the desired conditions for inner peace.

In 1794, the governor of the Siberian region, General Gustav-Ernest Shtrandman, received the highest order to send to Central Asia "under the secret guise of an expedition to recognize this region in all respects." Among the candidates for

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For this difficult and unsafe task, the general chose Timofey Burnashev.

Timofei graduated with honors from the Barnaul Mining School in his youth and worked at the mine. He showed ingenuity, created a special laboratory for the study of mined ores. Then - service in one of the detachments of the Siberian Corps. And here he stands out among his peers not only with his mind, but also with good military training, excellent success in shooting, and remarkable physical strength. Timothy was 21 years old when the general decided that he would be the most suitable candidate for the planned reconnaissance mission.

missions.

Preparations for the expedition took place in an atmosphere of strict secrecy. "I was ordered to call myself a Russian merchant, and meanwhile it was forbidden even to be curious about my real title and I should not have any contact or acquaintance with anyone except the chief ruler of affairs," Burnashev recalled. - ... My dispatch will be from the Orenburg line from the city of Troitsk, with a merchant caravan of the Tatars. Firstly to Greater Bukharia, and from there through Samarkand, Khojament, Uratuba, Kokan - to Tashkent. From this place through Turkestan, across the Kirghiz steppe back to Russia." Together with Burnashev, a non-commissioned officer of the Siberian Corps Beznosikov went on a reconnaissance expedition.

Despite the secrecy measures taken and careful preparation, the scouts who arrived in Bukhara under the guise of "Russian merchants" aroused the suspicion of the local authorities and were placed under vigilant surveillance. At that time, similar measures were taken against all foreigners visiting Bukhara. Guards were assigned to the "Russian merchants", they were forbidden to visit the city, for twelve days they were subjected to the strictest interrogation: who are they, where are they going and why?

But the scouts were able to withstand the test and dispel the suspicions they had about them. They even received a favorable audience from the Emir of Bukhara himself.

After the audience, the "merchants" were released and stayed in Bukhara for several months. "At this time," wrote Timofey Burnashev, "we managed to collect a lot of necessary and interesting information. I made all travel notes with signs invented by me back in Russia, so that no one could read them, and even my comrade could not understand this letter of mine.

In May 1795 Burnashev went to Russia. Bukhara security guards take measures to prevent him from returning to his homeland. They organize a raid by a detachment of the Kirghiz of the Small Horde on the caravan, which included Burnashev. At night, near the Syr River, Darya Burnashev manages to escape, and he alone gets to Orenburg.

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His "Remarks on the way through Bukhara" were urgently sent to the manager of the Empress's office, and he himself was generously rewarded for completing a dangerous task.

At the beginning of 1798, the inspector of the Siberian division, nephew A.V. Suvorov Prince A.I. Gorchakov instructs Burnashev to organize a new secret expedition to the little-studied regions of the Kirghiz steppe. Preparation for it took Burnashev about two years. He was supposed to go under the guise of an envoy to one of the Kirghiz sultans and on the way to collect through the Russian prisoners as much information as possible about the "Tashkent lands" and secret passages through the Hungry and Kirghiz steppes.

Burnashev, with ten Cossacks and Sultan Bukei, roamed the waterless steppe expanses for six months, visited Tashkent and handed the message of Pavel G.

Upon his return to his homeland, he again compiled a detailed report, which was highly appreciated in St. Petersburg. His secret expeditions greatly contributed to the expansion of Russia's ties with the countries of Central Asia.

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"Handsome Leander" gets in touch

For some time now, encrypted messages from the Russian ambassador to France, K.V. Nesselrod, in which some strange characters flashed more and more often.

"My cousin Henri told me in a private conversation..." and then followed a list of information about the situation in France and its forthcoming foreign policy steps, which could not possibly be known to some private person who was not privy to state secrets. . A similar situation developed around the information of "handsome Leander", "Anna Ivanovna" or "legal adviser". An outside observer, having accidentally read information messages in the archives of the Russian Empire with references to the above-mentioned persons, even in the most inspired flight of his imagination, could not have imagined that he was getting acquainted with the secret reports of one of the most prominent agents in the entire history of the Russian special services - paid information of His Highness the Most Serene Prince and Sovereign Duke of Benevent, Grand Chamberlain of the Imperial Court, Vice-Elector of the French Empire, Commander of the Order of the Legion of Honor, Prince Talleyrand-Périgord.

In Russia, according to Academician Tarle, they knew well about Talleyrand's spiritual features. And not only spiritual ones. They knew, for example, that at the end of 1804 the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was willingly trading with large and small principalities of Central Europe and was going to sell Holland, asking the buyer for fourteen million francs. They also knew that the former defrocked monk was at odds with morality and was very far from many human virtues. But what Tsar Alexander 1 himself unexpectedly encountered did not fit into any conceivable and inconceivable ideas about Talleyrand.

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One day in September 1808, when, exhausted by conversations with Emperor Napoleon in Erfurt, Alexander was resting in the living room of Princess Thurn-et-Taxis, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs entered the room. After the very first words of greeting, Talleyrand turned to the Russian monarch with an unexpected question: "Sir, why did you come to Erfurt? You must save Europe, and you will succeed only if you resist Napoleon." Alexander was literally stunned. "Isn't this a provocation?" he thought. However, meetings in an informal setting were continued, and the suspicions of the Russian Tsar soon dissipated. And after leaving Erfurt, when the secret correspondence between Galleyrand and Alexander I! became regular, the tsar began to seriously rely on the advice and secret information of "Anna Ivanovna", "handsome Leander", etc., since he did not see any trick or falsification in it. Such a multitude of pseudonyms under which, at the initiative of the tsar himself, the same person was hidden, shows how much Alexander [valued this contact, protected it from accidental disclosure, resorting to the strictest observance of the rules of secrecy. Such encryption of the source of information can serve as an example today.

Talleyrand's messages to the king became more detailed and... more disturbing. In December 1810, he delivered to Alexander a series of information that confirmed the worst fears of Russian diplomacy: Napoleon was indeed preparing to attack Russia. Talleyrand even named a specific date - April 1812, recommended Alexander to strengthen the defense, since the war was already on the threshold of the Russian state. In Talleyrand's messages, one could read his assessments of the state of the French army, advice on strengthening the Russian financial system, and even proposals for a further system of secure communication between secret

correspondents. Among Talleyrand's handwritten letters to Emperor Alexander, the archives have preserved one written on February 10, 1809. This message, according to experts, is more like a cryptogram than an ordinary business letter. But when reading it, the addressee understands the new system that Talleyrand developed to ensure the security of further secret correspondence. At the end of this message, Talleyrand warmly thanked Alexander for his "noble and wise constancy" in his intention to conduct further secret correspondence with him.

The desire to provide the Russian Tsar with "informational support" to some extent, apparently, was explained by the very complicated and sometimes scandalous relations between Napoleon and his foreign minister. As an example, one of Napoleon's attacks on Talleyrand, made by him publicly in the presence of dozens of courtiers and diplomats in the Tuileries on January 28, 1809, can be cited.

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According to eyewitnesses, the emperor of France literally ran up to Talleyrand with clenched fists, throwing unheard-of accusations in his face. "You are a thief, a scoundrel, a dishonorable person! Napoleon shouted furiously throughout the hall. - You do not believe in God, you betrayed your whole life, nothing is sacred for you, you would have sold your own father! I showered you with good deeds, but meanwhile you are capable of anything against me... You deserve to be smashed like glass by me, and I have the power to do it, but I despise you too much to undertake this work. ! Why haven't I hung you on the bars of Carousel Square yet? But there is, there is still enough time for that! You are dirt in silk stockings! Dirt! Dirt!"

In the case of "Cousin Henri", of course, there was not only an element of personal resentment against Napoleon, but also the most vulgar mercenary interest. According to reports from Paris of those days, Ambassador Nesselrode reported to Alexander that he had given "cousin Henri" 3,000 francs for detailed information about the marriage intentions of Emperor Napoleon, and literally a few weeks later informed the tsar that "Anna Ivanovna" asked for another 4,000 francs. for new news reports, this time of a military and political nature. In order not to bother himself and the treasurers with single frequent requests for royalties for Anna Ivanovna, Nesselrode immediately asked Alexander for an amount of 30-40 thousand francs.

The value of Talleyrand's messages to Alexandre increased many times over when the French Foreign Minister began to use his friend, Minister of Police Fouché, "in the dark". From him "Anna Ivanovna" received the most reliable and secret information about the internal political situation in France, the unrest in the provinces, and the alignment of political forces. In the encrypted reports of Nesselrode to St. Petersburg, Fouché was referred to under secret pseudonyms: "Natasha", "president", "Bergien". And the internal situation in France was denoted by the words "English agriculture" or "Butyagin's love affairs" (the surname of the secretary of the Russian embassy in Paris).

And when Napoleon unexpectedly dismissed the Minister of Police, an alarming message from Nesselrode dated June 6, 1810 flew to St. Petersburg:

"The departure of the president bothers me a lot, it was from him that our "legal adviser" got the information that I forwarded to you ... I foresee that this will be reflected in my correspondence."

The relationship between Alexander G and his high-ranking secret "correspondent" was by no means always cloudless.

In a letter to the tsar dated September 15, 1810, "cousin Henri" transparently hinted that he had "a little overspending" of late, and asked for one and a half million francs in gold. Alexander replied that he could not give such a large amount, as he was afraid to subject the prince

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Talleyrand's suspicions and compromise him. And this argument was not without foundation. Such major figures as Talleyrand are constantly in the field of view of rivals, public and political circles, local and foreign press. Their way of life, their circle of close friends and connections, and, of course, their sources of money and money spending attract everyone's attention, including from the security services. Therefore, the appearance of an unreasonably large amount of money can lead to a scandal or exposure.

But in this case, there could be another reason: Alexander, apparently, heard some information from Vienna that by this time the "handsome Leander" was already secretly collaborating with the Austrian authorities, sometimes selling them the same secrets. , as Russian. "The main quality of money is its quantity," the cunning Talleyrand reasoned cynically.

Many years passed, and the 84-year-old Talleyrand, anticipating his imminent death, decided to receive "absolution" from the Pope himself, and at the same time say goodbye to all old and recent friends, whom he deceived with the same ease as his sworn ones. enemies. Therefore, when the news of the forgiveness of the "incorrigible sinner" by the pope reached Paris, the witty French immediately responded with a joke: "Prince Talleyrand deceived God all his life, and before his death he suddenly very cleverly deceived Satan." Well, enviable constancy: and here Talleyrand remained himself.

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"Military agents" Barclay

Alexander I in Russia and Napoleon I in France were the two main characters-antipodes of the military-political drama that played out on the fields of Europe at the very beginning of the 19th century. Both the Russians and the French vigilantly followed each other, knowing full well that a clash and military conflict between the two powers was inevitable. Under these conditions, obtaining timely, reliable and secret information about the plans and actions of a potential adversary has become of paramount importance.

Historians claim that for the first time the idea of the usefulness of acquiring paid "friends" - informants came to the emperor Alexander [after a secret conversation in Erfurt with the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand, who, in defiance of Napoleon, told the Russian tsar about the plans of the French emperor.

One way or another, but after conversations with Talleyrand, Alexander [carried out a number of mobilization measures and ordered to send a young and capable representative to Paris who could double-check the information received from Talleyrand and inform the Russian autocrat about the situation in France and its preparation for military conflict. Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev, a representative of an old noble family, became such a messenger of Alexander [.

He was born on December 30, 1785 in the family of a lieutenant general, senator, ruler of the Kostroma viceroy. According to the then custom, Alexander from childhood was enrolled in military service as a sergeant-major. In 1801, he happened to be present at the coronation of Alexander Guy personally to meet the emperor. The young man made a very favorable impression on the emperor and soon, with the personal assistance of Alexander [, he entered the cavalry guard regiment as a cornet. For the battle of Austerlitz, he received his first military award - the cross of St. Vladimir II degree with a bow. Wau Fried

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In the Battle of the Lands for a perfect feat, he was awarded the St. George Cross [U degree and a golden sword.

In February 1808, combat officer A.I. Chernyshev is sent to Paris with a personal letter from Alexander [to Napoleon. In March 1809, Alexander instructed Chernyshev to be his personal representative at Napoleon's military headquarters during the fighting of the French army.

against Austria and Prussia. Since 1810 A.I. Chernyshev is constantly at the court of the French emperor.

... A violent fire in the house of the Austrian ambassador Prince K. Schwarzenberg in Paris broke out instantly. From one of the candles inserted into a crystal wall lamp, a silk curtain suddenly caught fire, then the fire spread to the antique furniture, dry as gunpowder, and began to devour the luxurious parquet, rubbed to a mirror shine. And nearby, literally a stone's throw away from the fiery nightmare, music rattled outside the door and in a whirlwind of reckless dance, unsuspecting beautiful couples circled - the minions of the fate of the Parisian "light".

Which of the dancers could have imagined that this festive evening would be the last for many of them? In the crowd and panic in a sea of raging fire, dozens of people died. And there would have been a lot more of them, if not for the quickness of one of the guests, a young guardsman, who immediately, on the spot, organized a group of brave rescuers. Over and over again they threw themselves into the fire, snatching another helpless victim from the hell of fire. The hero's name was Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev.

Until the terrible tragic night in the house of the Austrian ambassador, Chernyshev's name was found only in the sections of gossip and local gossip in Parisian newspapers. A tall, handsome man with unruly curly hair, an excellent storyteller and wit, he invariably became the soul of any society, especially one where there were beautiful ladies. In high-society salons, the idea of the envoy of the Russian tsar as a *zhuire* and a successful conqueror of women's hearts invariably existed. He was sympathetic to Napoleon's sister, the Queen of Naples. And the emperor's other sister, the frivolous Polina Borghese, according to rumor, was even "in a love affair" with a curly Russian rake...

But it was only a theatrical mask. The reputation of a frivolous rake served as an excellent cover for the dexterous and intelligent tsar's envoy, who almost always managed to obtain important information about Napoleon's political and military plans on the eve of the Franco-Russian military conflict of 1812. Colonel A.I. Chernyshev was one of the first seven Russian "military agents" who were sent by the then Minister of War Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly to the capitals of a number of European states as employees of the "Special Office" - a special

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branch of Russian foreign intelligence!. In addition to A.I. Chernyshev were sent to Lieutenant G.F. Orlov, colonels F.V. Theil von Seraskerken, a Dutchman, and RE. Rennie, a descendant of a Scottish settler (Vienna, Berlin), Lieutenant P.I. Brozin (Madrid), Lieutenant P.Kh. Grabbe (Munich), Major V.A. Prendel (Dresden). In his youth, Prendel was imprisoned for the revolutionary struggle in France. Like other scout heroes - F. Winzingerode, D. Davydov, A. Figner - V. Prendel commanded a partisan detachment during the Patriotic War of 1812.

The activities of the "Special Office" were carried out in three directions: the organization of strategic intelligence (obtain strategically important secret information abroad), operational tactical intelligence (collect data on enemy troops on the borders of Russia) and counterintelligence (identify and neutralize Napoleonic agents).

The idea of creating such a strictly secret state intelligence agency belonged to Barclay de Tolly.

In the summer of 1810, Barclay de Tolly posed to Alexander [the question of organizing the activities of Russian intelligence abroad and asked permission to send special military agents to Russian embassies in order to collect information "on the number of troops, on the structure, weapons and spirit of their , about the condition of the fortresses of the reserves, the abilities and virtues of the best generals, and also about the welfare, character and spirit of the people, about the locations and products of the land, about the internal sources of powers or means for the continuation of the war and about the different conclusions provided to defensive and offensive actions"? These

military agents were supposed to be at diplomatic missions under the guise of civil officials and employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The staff of the "Special Chancellery" was very small: in addition to the mentioned "seven" foreign agents, it included a director who was personally subordinate to the minister, three forwarders and one translator. Until March 19, 1812, the post of director of the "Special Chancellery" was occupied by the adjutant wing A.V. Voeikov, a man close to Barclay de Tolly, who began his military service many years ago as an orderly with the famous A.V. Suvorov. It was Colonel Voeikov who recommended A.I. Chernyshev to work in Paris and was not mistaken in his choice.

"Secular lion" Chernyshev quickly gained confidence in the emperor of France, was on good terms with many of Napoleon's close associates. In a short time, the Russian colonel managed to create a network of informers in the government and military spheres of Paris, to establish and expand the activities of persons bribed for large, including personal, money. About one of them - collaborators

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ke the Ministry of War of France Michele - became publicly known after the sharp knife of the Napoleonic guillotine took the life of this most valuable secret informant, Colonel Chernyshev.

Michel was part of a group that personally compiled for Napoleon once every two weeks in a single copy a summary of the number and deployment of the French armed forces. "The man of Colonel Chernyshev" secretly made a copy of the document, carefully copying it by hand, and handed the material over to the Russian intelligence officer. He hastily sent a courier with a secret report to St. Petersburg. "Why don't I have more ministers like this young man," Alexander I wrote on the margins of one of the messages from Paris. Colonel A.I. Chernyshev was at that time only twenty-six years old.

To a copy of A.I. Chernyshev often applied his own observations and conclusions, in particular on the personal composition of the leading military figures in France.

Here are excerpts from the surviving "portraits" of the Napoleonic generals, painted by A.I. Chernyshev.

"Oudinot, Duke of Reggio. Marked in the whole French army as having the most brilliant courage and personal courage, most capable of producing impulse and generating enthusiasm in those troops that will be under his command. Of all the marshals of France, he alone can be used with the greatest success in those cases when it is necessary to carry out an assignment that requires precision and fearlessness. Not being a very educated person, Oudinot does not suffer from a lack of knowledge; his distinguishing features are common sense, great frankness, honesty; friends and foes - all unanimously give him his due in this ... "

Lefebvre, Duke of Danzig. Marshal of Spain and Senator. Didn't get any education; being a deeply ignorant person, he has only a lot of experience, a lot of courage and fearlessness behind him. Unable to act independently, he can, however, successfully perform those operations that he will be told. Marshal Lefebvre is between 55 and 60 years old, but he is still very fresh and in very good health."

"Davout, Duke of Auzrstadt, Prince of Ekmul. Marshal of the Empire, commander-in-chief of the troops in northern Germany. A rude and cruel man, hated by all who surround the Emperor Napoleon; a zealous supporter of the Poles, he is a great enemy of Russia ... At present, this is the marshal who has the greatest influence on the Emperor. Napoleon trusts him more than anyone else, and whom he uses most willingly, being sure that, whatever his orders, they will always be executed accurately and literally.

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Not revealing particularly brilliant courage under fire, he is very persistent and stubborn and, moreover, knows how to force everyone to obey him. This marshal has the misfortune of being extremely short-sighted."

"Pears. Count of the Empire, Colonel General of the Horse Rangers. He is of little influence and is still far from the favors that Napoleon has already shown to his other comrades. Morally, this general enjoys universal respect - the result of a spotless reputation and impeccable behavior; an officer of great merit, he has behind him a deep knowledge of military affairs, and especially with regard to cavalry ...>
3.

Thus, Barclay de Tolly could report to Alexander not only the general political situation in France at the beginning of the 20th century, but also provide important information about the state of its armed forces, characterize the largest military leaders.

Business trip of Colonel A.I. Chernyshev in Paris ended quite unexpectedly. The French police put him under close surveillance, not losing sight of any of his suspicious meetings or trips. The police realized that the "careless rake and womanizer" had been fooling them for a long time, and decided to "neutralize the dangerous Russian colonel." But for the report, Napoleon needed strong evidence of Chernyshev's unlawful activities. And such evidence, alas, was found. According to Michel's accidentally lost note, found during a covert search in Chernyshev's house during his departure for St. Petersburg, the French police managed to establish the name of its author, and then everything was very simple. Materials inspired by the police appeared in the Parisian newspapers, from which it was clear that Colonel Chernyshev was engaged in espionage. Alexander Ivanovich did not return from St. Petersburg, he saw Paris already after the victory over Napoleon, being as an aide-de-camp in the retinue of the victorious tsar.

The Emperor of France, of course, expressed his "righteous anger" in connection with the "case of Colonel Chernyshev", although he himself encouraged the espionage activities of the French special services in every possible way, believing that by refusing such a course of action, his government "will have one less chance to success during the war, or buy this success at the cost of great effort and loss. Not without reason, Russian archival documents for 1810-1812 indicated that 39 civilian and military persons involved in foreign special services were detained and rendered harmless on the territory of the Russian Empire. Curious in this regard are the statements of the English envoy to Russia of those years, Sir Robert Moray. He believed that in the 17th and 19th centuries Russia was "the main center of espionage" and admitted that his government gave him up to 100,000 pounds to spy on and bribe Russian officials. Sir Robert Moray at the same time argued that France spent much

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more, which threatened her with "almost financial bankruptcy". History has preserved information about one "French false spy" - a certain captain of the Russian army D. Savona, who, on his own initiative, expressed his readiness to cooperate with Russian intelligence. When Napoleon's special envoy Count L. Narbonne arrived in Russia in May 1812 to reconnoiter the situation on the eve of the entry of French troops into the territory of the Russian Empire, Savon managed to establish "business contact" with Narbonne and secretly hand over specially prepared by the Russian General Staff "information". In particular, they spoke very convincingly about Barclay de Tolly's serious preparations for an immediate rebuff to the Poleon right in the border zone after the Grand Army crossed the Russian border. Historians noted that Napoleon was greatly discouraged when, instead of the expected rebuff and "general battle" with the Russian army, he did not at first meet the offensive of any Russian military units, and even more so the expected counterattack.

Tsar Alexander rewarded Chernyshev and, with the outbreak of war, sent him to the active army. The experience of intelligence work in Paris and professional intelligence flair were very useful to Chernyshev in organizing the partisan movement in the areas occupied by Napoleonic troops. He became one of the active participants in the movement. Having received the title

General of the cavalry, the title of the Most Serene Prince, Alexander Ivanovich was appointed Minister of War in 1832, having served in this post for two decades. There are different opinions regarding the assessment of his activities as a minister, especially in the later period, in the years preceding the Crimean War. But we must pay tribute: a lot of documentary evidence has been preserved that just during this period A.I. Chernyshev paid great attention to the issues of technical re-equipment of the Russian army. On his personal initiative, often signed by the emperor himself, reconnaissance missions were sent to Russian missions abroad to obtain samples of the latest types of weapons. The crowning achievement of a career as a scout was the highest position of Chairman of the State Council.

! See TsGVIA, f. VUA, d. 417, ll. 189 vol. - 202.

2 Ibid.

3 TsGVIA, f. 846, op. 16, d. 3599, ll. 1-5.

4 Kishaga Peasop. And H1\$ogu about Sche Kissian Sesche's Seguise. - Gopdop, 1987. - R. 20.

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Mysterious Daria Khristoforovna

If you happened to be in Brighton, a small resort town in the south of England, on that April day in 1823, then you, too, would probably pay attention to this strange lady. In any case, local residents, busy with their own affairs, usually restrained, stingy with emotions and not very prone to curiosity, stopped at the sight of her, turned around, looked after her with obvious bewilderment, although there was nothing strange in her was not: tall, slender, middle-aged, self-confident, with large gray eyes, a high noble forehead and lush dark brown hair curled at the temples. Her appearance, gait, clothes - everything betrayed in her a lady of high society. Again, this was nothing special. In the spring, with the beginning of the holiday season, here, in Brighton, many representatives of the aristocracy came to rest. The resort was famous for the treatment of nervous and heart diseases. The king himself favored Brighton with his presence. He rested here and this time.

What did seem strange about this lady to the people of Brighton? The reason was very simple: so important - and suddenly walking around on foot, alone, without a carriage, without any escort! By the standards of the day, it looked completely outlandish.

Meanwhile, the lady did not like being in the center of everyone's attention at all. And then, as luck would have it, in one of the narrow shopping streets, an elegant horsewoman gallops towards her. Of course, an acquaintance: Lady Caroline Lam, the wife of a well-born aristocrat, MP William Lam, one of the candidates for Prime Minister of England. It just wasn't enough! Lady Caroline is on everyone's lips, a writer, one of the most eccentric persons of British high society, known for her scandalous love affair with Lord Byron...

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But there is nowhere to retreat and hide. Lady Caroline had already seen and recognized Dorothea Lieven, the wife of the Russian ambassador in London, and was, of course, intrigued by such an unexpected street meeting. "You see, I drive around the city myself, asking prices for cheese and other products, I promised William to cut household expenses," the horsewoman was the first to chatter, clearly hinting that her marital relationship with William was in perfect order, despite to various "gossip" about Byron. "And what are you doing here, dear?"

From the sarcastic question of this little "Amazon" deftly sitting in the saddle, Dorothea was ready to fall through the ground. She answered something indistinct, not very courteous, and immediately hurried away, followed by another bewildered look.

What was she to do? She couldn't have said that she was going to send a secret letter, and what a letter it was: consisting of four envelopes nested one inside the other!

The outer envelope was addressed to Neumann, Secretary of the Austrian Embassy in London; the second, lying inside, was with the same address and a note: "No need to explain the enclosed, my dear friend." The third envelope was addressed to a certain gentleman named Floret, and inside was a fourth, unaddressed, containing the message itself. And the message is nothing more than a record of Dorothea's last confidential conversation with the king himself, containing a lot of valuable political information...

The reader apparently no longer doubts that this "message" was a spy report. But even if it fell into the hands of the British secret services, then it would be necessary to prove that

it is addressed to the main arbiter of the European destinies of that time

me, the all-powerful and omnipresent Austrian Chancellor Metternich. And it was addressed to him, covered by the pseudonym "Floret".

Dorothea finally managed to safely, without witnesses, send a letter, one of dozens of reports to Metternich from a woman whom he, in all likelihood, loved and, without a doubt, considered his valuable agent, women, until now so far not fully understood.

Dasha, Dorothea, Daria Khristoforovna, nee von Benckendorff, sister of the famous gendarme chief of Nikolaev, was born in 1785 in the family of the Riga military governor. Her mother, born Baroness Schilling von Canstadt, was a close friend of Grand Duchess Maria Feodorovna, wife of the future Emperor Paul [.

Dasha was brought up at the Smolny Institute under the direct tutelage of Maria Feodorovna herself, who, upon graduation, granted the fourteen-year-old girl to her ladies-in-waiting. In 1800, with the participation of Maria Feodorovna, Dasha was married to

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Emperor Paul's favorite, twenty-three-year-old Minister of War, Count Christopher Andreevich Lieven (1777-1838).

Minister of War at twenty-three? The case is indeed very unusual, even for those times when twenty-year-old colonels and even generals were not uncommon. Thanks to what talents did Khristofor Andreevich move up the career ladder so "lightning fast"?

He did not have special talents, the ion did not need them, in general. His "early rise" is due to completely different reasons, namely the will of the circumstances.

As is known, hostile relations arose and developed between Empress Catherine II and her son, Tsarevich Pavel, almost from his very birth. Since 1783, the Tsarevich lived in estrangement from his mother, in Gatchina, where he had "his own court" and even his own small "Gatchina" army. From time to time, Catherine recalled that she had a son, as well as grandchildren and granddaughters. The empress understood that they were the future heirs to the throne, and in this sense their upbringing and further fate were, of course, not indifferent to her. By her own choice, Countess Charlotte Ekaterina Karlovna Lieven, whom she personally knew and trusted her, was appointed as an educator for the daughters and sons of Tsarevich Paul.

Later it turned out that the Countess began to be treated with sympathy and trust by Tsarevich Pavel, his six daughters, as well as sons Alexander (future Emperor Alexander G), Konstantin, Nikolai (future Emperor Nicholas G) and Mikhail. They all favored the xyn

Countess - Christopher, who in 1783, by the time of the creation of the "Gatchina court", was only six years old. But since then, he has been potentially "enrolled" in the courtiers.

After the death of Catherine II in 1796, Tsarevich Pavel, having become the emperor of all Russia, first of all decided to change everything that was connected with the memory of his mother, including the court staff, establishing his own rules at the court and placing "his own" in all government positions. of people". So the young Count Khristofor Andreevich received one of the most important posts in the state.

And his mother, Countess Charlotte-Ekaterina Karlovna, who, even under Catherine the Great, managed to gain the respect and trust of the entire royal family, invariably remained in great favor at court for four reigns. In 1826, on the occasion of the coronation of Nicholas I, Charlotte-Catherine Lieven with her descendants (i.e., her children, grandchildren, etc.) was raised to the dignity of a prince with the title of lordship and died in 1828 a deep old woman.

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Thus, from early youth, Daria Khristoforovna was in close relations with the royal family and was aware of all the intrigues and the state of affairs at court. According to contemporaries, she did not differ in classical beauty, she was lean, above average height. And, nevertheless, some special "charm", a sharp mind, observation, the ability to arouse the interest of an interlocutor made her not only attractive to young royal palaces, but also downright the soul of this very narrow, elite society. Her husband didn't like it at all. Somehow it became a common opinion that his personality faded and was suppressed by the talent and inexhaustible energy of his wife.

Count Khristofor Andreevich managed to avoid disgrace after the murder of Paul I. However, he had nothing to do with the murder; enjoyed the confidence of Alexander I, who had ascended the throne, was with him near Austerlitz and in Tilsit, and in 1809 he was appointed ambassador to Berlin.

In 1812, after the resumption of friendly relations with Great Britain, Count Lieven was sent as ambassador to the St. James Court and remained there until 1834, when already under Emperor Nicholas I, having become (by his mother) the Most Serene Prince, he was appointed a member of the Council of State and a trustee heir to the throne, Grand Duke Alexander Nikolayevich.

Having gone through the basics of the diplomatic school in Berlin, the young Countess Lieven in London, in the words of the famous memoirist of the first half of the 19th century F.F. Vigel, "under her husband, she acted as ambassador and adviser and composed dispatches." The countess created a brilliant salon in London, where diplomatic celebrities, prominent political figures of the most diverse views and directions gathered. Darya Khristoforovna from early youth was well acquainted with the intimate side of palace relations. Now, from close contact with major European figures, she learned the subtleties of the then international politics. She was constantly aware of all the most important political news, rumors; from her observant and sharp mind did not escape the slightest nuances of political decisions that had not yet matured to the end. Sometimes an accidentally dropped phrase or hint led her to serious thoughts, which she often shared with her husband. One day, Count Lieven suggested that she independently compose a dispatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nesselrode, and soon the extraordinary talents of the "envoy" in London ceased to be a secret for the Russian court.

Count Nesselrode started an independent correspondence with Dorothea, discussing with her questions of Russian foreign policy. Dorothea unofficially becomes one of the central figures in the implementation of this policy during the period of the so-called "Holy Alliance".

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As you know, this alliance was concluded in 1815 in Paris between the Russian and Austrian emperors and the Prussian king. Later, most of the monarchs joined him.

Europe. It is generally accepted that the leading role in this alliance was played by Alexander I and Austrian Chancellor Metternich. But this did not mean at all that everything was fine and smooth in the relationship between them. Each of them, in his own way, sought to become a hegemon in Europe and outmaneuver his partner by all possible and impossible means.

Metternich, a deft master of political maneuvering and intrigue, never had a particular liking for Russia. Rather, the opposite is true: in March 1812, on the eve of Napoleon's invasion of Russia, Metternich concludes an alliance treaty between Austria and France; after the defeat of the Napoleonic troops, he comes up with proposals for "peace mediation" between Russia and France, trying to extract certain benefits from this for Austria and prevent the strengthening of Russia's positions in Europe.

In 1815, simultaneously with participation in the creation of the "Holy Alliance", Metternich signed a secret treaty against Russia with representatives of Great Britain and France.

In this complex struggle for the redistribution of spheres of influence in Europe after the collapse of the Napoleonic empire, Metternich plays a dual role, striving to strengthen Austria's foreign policy position, but not forgetting his own interests at the same time. It is known, for example, that during this period he amassed a huge fortune by accepting "gifts" from foreign powers, including from Russia: in 1815, the Russian government appointed him a special "pension". This already obliged him to something ... Of course, neither side was interested in disclosing such a "delicate" fact, and even more so the size of the "pension". It was precisely at this time that Countess Lieven met Metternich and the intimacy that arose between them, which lasted a good ten years.

A secret channel of correspondence was established between Dorothea and Metternich, controlled not only by Nesselrode, but also by the tsar himself. Alexander showed gracious attention to the countess, personally talked with her on issues of European politics, and gave her oral instructions. In 1818 and 1822, Alexander personally invited her to attend the Aachen and Verona congresses of the Holy Alliance, where Metternich also participated.

In July 1825, Dorothea, having arrived in St. Petersburg, had an important confidential conversation with the tsar. It was about secret plans for a sharp turn in Russia's foreign policy - a retreat from Austria and rapprochement with England, whose foreign minister at that time was George Canning, a flexible and dexterous politician who became prime minister two years later. Darya Khristoforovna knew well

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strengths and weaknesses of Canning and, most importantly, ways to approach it. The conversation with the king was successful, this can be judged by Alexander's remark made by A.Kh. Benckendorff after the conversation. "When I last saw your sister," the king said, "she was an attractive girl, now she is a statesman."

On the same day, Dorothea had a business conversation with Nesselrode, who, in other, more "official" terms, repeated the task: breaking with Metternich and drawing closer to Canning as his most staunch opponent in European affairs and Russia's most valuable ally in her new politics. Dorothea again had to act as an agent ... in the interests of Russia. And again for almost a good ten years.

In 1834 the Lievens left London. At the same time, Daria Khristoforovna, already a princess, received attention rare for a foreigner in Great Britain: on behalf of the London ladies, she was presented with a precious bracelet "as a token of regret for her departure and in memory of the many years spent in England."

Her further fate was as follows. Upon her return to St. Petersburg, despite all the honors and affectionate reception, she soon felt hypochondria: there was no usual Western European political "hustle" here, without which, like without doping, she could not

yourself. Coolness towards her husband, who soon died, the loss of two sons, the harsh northern climate - all this increased her loneliness, her tendency to depression. She went to Paris, bought the old house of Talleyrand and reopened her salon there, which gained world fame, irresistibly attracting the most brilliant society in terms of talents and political significance: kings, ministers, outstanding statesmen and public figures. Among her closest friends during this period was Francois Guizot (1787-1874) - a famous French historian and statesman, minister of the interior (August-November 1830), public education (1832-1837), Foreign Affairs (1840-1848) and, finally, the Prime Minister of France (1847-1848). From 1840, Guizot was in fact the leader of the entire policy of the so-called July Monarchy. The French Revolution of 1848 ended Guizot's political career. Long-term intimate relationship with him was the "swan song" of Darya Khristoforovna, one of the most prominent "shadow" figures in European politics in the first half of the 20th century.

She died in Paris in the spring of 1857, leaving behind a huge number of letters, fragmentary notes, and memoirs that spread all over the world.

In accordance with the dying wish of Princess Darya Khristoforovna, she was placed in a coffin in the black velvet dress of a lady-in-waiting of the Russian imperial court.

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Secret assignment to A. Griboyedov

Russia spent the first third of the 20th century in bloody wars with Persia (1804-1813 and 1826-1828). As a result, Russia won, and Persia was forced to recognize the annexation of Georgia, Dagestan, Northern Azerbaijan, as well as Erivan and Nakhichevan to Russia.

khanates

In the development of the terms of the Turkmanchay Treaty, which legally formalized the results of two wars and became the basis of relations between the two countries until October 1917, an employee of the diplomatic office under the commander of the Russian army in the Caucasus, I.F. Paskevich Alexander Sergeevich Griboedov. He had already worked at the Russian embassy in Persia between the two wars and had studied the situation in the country well. And when he went to the camp of Abas-Mirza, the son of the Shah, the commander of the Persian army, to resolve political issues, at the same time he studied the state of the army, revealed its low morale, "felt out" the adjutant of Abas-Mirza Gadzhi-Mahmud -Agu on the subject of his possible use in the future as an agent and managed to get from him practically consent to this!.

Griboyedov's success in concluding peace decided his further diplomatic career: he was appointed ambassador to Tehran.

In the instructions for Griboedov, compiled by K.V. Nesselrode and approved by Nicholas I on April 25, 1828, in addition to detailed instructions regarding the political goals in his work in Persia (such as the strengthening of peaceful relations between the two countries, the neutrality of Persia in Russian-Turkish affairs, the development of mutually beneficial trade govli, etc.), a large place was given to such issues as:

- patronage of subjects of Persia, who provided services to the Russian army during the Russo-Persian war and whom

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would have been persecuted after the end of this war (this was specifically mentioned in the Turkmanchay Treaty);

- collection of statistical and political information about Persia, its history, geography, the state of its economy, trade;

- collection of information about the neighbors of Persia and its relations with them, about the way of life and customs of their population, about their trade, about their “friendly and hostile” relations with other countries.

The task of collecting “in the true light of the presented” information about Bukhara, its trade and external relations with Khiva, Persia, Afghanistan and the Ottoman Empire stands out in particular.

An equally important task was to collect information about the ancient and modern caravan routes leading from the Caspian Sea to India and neighboring countries.

“But most of all,” the instructions said, “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meets the need for information gleaned from reliable sources about Persia’s relations with the Turkomans [Turkmen] and Khivans, about the degree of her friendliness with them and the influence of her power on these nomadic tribes. on, and on the other hand, about cases to fear, to their mutual hostile actions and about the ways of Persia to repel their raids.

A large section of the instruction was devoted to the so-called “extraordinary expenses”. “For the successful fulfillment of everything that is destined for you, you need connections in the region where you will have a permanent residence, and the assistance of diligent people. The very nobles and even the sons of the shah sometimes need insignificant assistance in cash, on which their weight is suddenly restored and their salvation often depends. Such a service on your part, rendered in time, can win you the gratitude of useful persons and make them sincere, therefore, decisions on this subject are left to your prudence.

However, many local circumstances in Persia are completely unknown to us, and therefore I confine myself to the above instructions, which, according to the Highest command, are destined for you to guide. But with this duty, I beg to inform you that His Imperial Majesty is in that pleasant assurance that you will always have in mind the honor, benefit and glory of Russia in all cases and in all actions.

The glory of Russia in those days largely depended on the successful counteraction to the expansionist aspirations of England along the entire length of the Russian borders in the south and east of the country. As far back as the first half of the 19th century, two trends emerged in Asia that ruled out the possibility of any compromise: this is the advance of the British to the north from India and the desire of Russia to go south towards the “pearl of the British crown”. England in every possible way protected even the most distant approaches to India and sought to strengthen its presence and influence in the countries bordering on it. For wasp

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To achieve these goals, the British government used a variety of means, ranging from purely propaganda exposure of Russia's “aggressive course” against its southern neighbors and ending with real threats of an open clash with the use of “the combined efforts of countries that feared an attack from their northern neighbor”. These countries primarily included the Ottoman Empire and Persia, which looked with great suspicion at the “war games” of the tsarist army in the immediate vicinity of their borders and tried to increase their own combat capability by mass purchases of modern weapons and invitations to service of qualified English advisers.

These advisers were interested in having their presence there on a permanent basis. And for this, a constant threat or the creation of one was needed.

A.S. Griboyedov, upon his arrival in Tehran, practically did not have time to start fulfilling the tasks assigned to him. In December 1828, a fatal incident took place, which gave grounds for inflating anti-Russian enmity. Heeding the tearful plea of a eunuch from the Shah's harem,

Armenian Mirza Yakub, and two Armenian women captured during the war, fleeing from their pursuers, Griboedov gave them shelter in the mission building. This served as a pretext for the Persian authorities to arouse the religious fanaticism of a certain part of the local population and start an anti-Russian demonstration in Tehran. Many are inclined to believe that this did not happen without help from the British.

On January 30, 1829, a huge crowd of angry Persians broke into the territory of the Russian embassy, killed everyone who was there, and looted all the property. Among the dead were A.S. Griboedov.

Nesselrode's instructions had to be carried out by Griboedov's successors, in particular, Major General Simonich Ivan Osipovich, who took Griboedov's place.

The representative of Nicholas I, Major General Dolgorukov, who arrived in Tehran to settle the incident with the defeat of the Russian mission and stayed in the Persian capital for quite a long time, expressed his remarks to the head of the Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry K.K. Rodofinikin regarding the further organization of intelligence work in Persia. He noted: "In Asia it is not the same as in Europe. Here every day there is a change in thought and quite often in action. In order not to give a bad turn to affairs and in order to sometimes have time to prevent any actions, one must be promptly and correctly notified. Success in business comes from this. In order to reach the intended goal, one must have people, and people cannot be acquired without money and gifts ... I am completely of the opinion that large extraordinary expenses should not be allowed, but it is also necessary to assign an amount in order to find one or two Persian officials,

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who would deliver true news ... on my arrival, I did not find a single person who would even slightly adhere to our mission, when everything is falling down to the British "3.

Not much time will pass, and the persons mentioned by Dolgorukov will appear in the agent network. In the 1970s, when Russian policy in Central Asia became noticeably more active and there was a struggle against the intrigues of the British in this region, the Russian ambassador in Tehran received detailed information about the secret plans and actions of the British not only from his consuls, who had numerous agents. in the Turkmen tribes, which the British constantly tried to incite against Russia, but also directly from the Persian Minister of Foreign affairs.

d See Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, f. "Griboedov A.S.", d. 76.

2 Ibid., 16.

3 Ibid., 21.

19

In distant Rio

A significant impetus that pushed Russia to seek direct contacts with the colonies of European powers in America was the establishment by Emperor Napoleon of the "continental blockade" of England, a major Russian foreign trade partner of that period. The Russian autocracy was forced to join the blockade of the Treaty of Tilsit with France in 1807, and this actually blocked the already thin stream of obtaining such products as sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo, spices, valuable wood species, and also sharply limited the export of Russian bread, iron and iron products (including cannons), timber, tow, hemp, canvas, rope products.

In addition, another circumstance arose. In 1808, after the invasion of Portugal by Napoleon's troops, the Portuguese Prince Regent João fled to Brazil, along with his courtiers and part of the Portuguese army. Brazil became a monarchy with its capital in Rio de Janeiro, the Prince Regent officially became King João I. The move of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro increased Russia's interest in establishing ties with Brazil.

The importance attached by the Russian government to the establishment and development of direct trade with Brazil is evidenced by an excerpt from a letter from Chancellor N.P. Rumyantsev to Emperor Alexander Goth on December 10, 1809, in which he recommended "taking advantage of the difficult circumstances in which Europe is now in order to establish strong and permanent direct trade ties between the Russian Empire and the possessions of Portugal in America, which meant to erect a monument to the current reign."

Alexander [gives instructions on the appointment of F.P. accredited to the US government. Palena by the Russian envoy at the port

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Gali court in Brazil. The emperor instructed Tsalen that in this distant country, the main interest for Russia is trade, "the benefits of which seem undoubted." However, they soon became convinced that it was not expedient to combine the duties of an ambassador to the United States and an envoy to Brazil, and then they came to a decision to send a separate permanent representative with the rank of consul to Rio de Janeiro. N.P. Rumyantsev personally took up the preparation of instructions for the future consul, from which it is clear that the chancellor set before him rather broad tasks that were essentially reconnaissance in nature.

The consul was first of all pointed out the need to "reveal to the Brazilians what advantages trade gives them ... and show the Russian merchants all the benefits that they can derive from trade with Brazil"?. He was also asked to study Brazilian goods, collect information about the terms of trade (especially the privileges enjoyed by England, which occupied a practically monopoly position in the Brazilian market), analyze Brazilian trade legislation, etc. It was recommended not to neglect "not the slightest detail." "Information that would be considered redundant in Europe," the document said, "becomes important in relation to Brazil."

At the same time, the consul was urged to collect data on the political and economic situation, not only in Brazil, but also in Latin America as a whole.

The decisive mood of Chancellor N.P. Rumyantsev on the rapid development of trade relations with Brazil alerted the Anglophile circles of Russia. Powerful forces in England itself and, of course, in the pro-English-minded circles controlled by them, close to the Portuguese court, rendered the strongest opposition to these plans by all available means. They managed to prevent a trip to Rio de Janeiro as a consul for a major Russian businessman of Polish origin, Xavier Ivanovich Labensky, who had previously been the Consul General of Russia in Paris. A false accusation was circulated against him that he was an "agent" of Napoleon. On this basis, the Portuguese court demanded that Russia cancel the appointment of Labensky.

There was an urgent need to find another person, which was not so easy to do, given not only the requirement that the candidate meet the very complex trade, economic and political tasks set before him, but not least the fact that he would have to work in the most remote country from Russia, in conditions that at that time could hardly be called civilized at that time.

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Such a person has been found. It was the German scientist encyclopedist Georg Heinrich (Grigory Ivanovich) von Langsdorf, who had recently been accepted into Russian citizenship.

Having learned about the plans for developing relations with Brazil, Langsdorf himself proposed his candidacy for the post of consul in Rio de Janeiro. Substantiate your request, G.I. Langsdorff wrote that he had spent five years in Portugal and knew its people and language well, as well as French, German, English and Russian.

The official appointment of Langsdorff to the post of Russian consul in Brazil took place in the summer of 1812. At the end of September of the same year, he and his wife, a sailor N.G. Rubtsov and four young men from Russian trading families (F. Dushkin, N. Tannenberg, I. Gorbunkov and P. Kilchen) attached to him as trainees went on passing ships to Rio de Janeiro, where he arrived only in April 1813. Langsdorf's companions were contracted artists - the German M. Rugendas and the French E. Florence and A. Toney, who made many sketches.

By the time G.I. Langsdorf, the situation in the country became more favorable for Russia. Firstly, by that time Russia had resumed allied relations with Portugal and England in the war against Napoleon. Secondly, according to his political views, Langsdorff was a convinced monarchist, which also could not but arouse the sympathy of the Portuguese court. And finally, Langsdorff was one of the fairly well-known doctors of his time, which was of no small importance for the conditions of Brazil, where only in 1811, nine of the twelve highest state councilors died, and two of the remaining three suffered from serious illnesses. Langsdorff's fluency in Portuguese also played an important role.

language.

All this secured him an exceedingly amiable reception in Rio de Janeiro. He quickly established close relations with ministers and prominent dignitaries, as well as with members of the royal house, not to mention representatives of the diplomatic corps.

Its main task, in strict accordance with the instructions received by G.I. Langsdorf saw in a deep and careful study of the Brazilian market. At the beginning of 1813, in connection with the Anglo-American War, certain difficulties arose with the supply of goods to Brazil from both the USA and England. Favorable prospects opened up for the expansion of sales of Russian goods in this country. G.I. In this regard, Langsdorf secretly collected and sent to the Department of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Finance of Russia an almost complete list of foreign ships that visited Rio de Janeiro in January - April 1813, indicating the time of arrival and departure of the ship, its name and class, last name and

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the name of the captain, the nature of the cargo, the port of departure and destination, the time the vessel was in transit, the consignee (in Brazil).

Without limiting himself to these data, Langsdorf, on the basis of information available to him, received from ship captains, Brazilian and foreign merchants, made calculations and made recommendations regarding the most expedient dates for sailing Russian merchant ships from the Baltic ports to the coast of Brazil. , so that they could take advantage of both favorable weather and the escort of British warships (from Portsmouth to Rio de Janeiro), which was important for safe navigation, as well as the timing of departures for the return voyage and routes. The consul simultaneously gave recommendations on the nomenclature, quality and other detailed characteristics of the goods that should be transported to Brazil."

England at the beginning of the development of Russian-Brazilian trade was relatively tolerant of this process, considering these relations as a certain blow to the Napoleonic "continental blockade". But, when the victory over Napoleon was actually won, the British began to make significant efforts to maintain their monopoly position in the Brazilian market. That is why Langsdorff closely followed the activities of the British representatives in Rio de Janeiro and regularly informed

the Russian government on Brazilian-English relations and their impact on Russia's relations with Brazil.

For a more careful study of all the details of Anglo-Brazilian relations, Langsdorf succeeded, overcoming considerable difficulties, in placing the consular apprentices who arrived with him in Rio de Janeiro in leading British firms. The fate of these young people turned out differently, but one of them, Pyotr Petrovich Kilchen, later became a well-known businessman and diplomat. In 1818, he was appointed Russian vice-consul in Brazil, served there until 1831, and brought considerable benefit to Russia with his information about the situation in this and adjacent Latin American countries.

In May 1815, Russian Charge d'Affaires Alexei Vasilievich Sverchkov arrived in Rio de Janeiro, who took over diplomatic duties from Langsdorf, which he performed in the absence of the officially appointed Russian ambassador.

A smart and educated person, A.V. Sverchkov had a calm and balanced character, he easily got along with people and knew how to win them over. These qualities helped him quickly acquire, with the help of G.I. Langsdorf, with the necessary contacts in Brazilian government circles, correctly assess the situation at the Portuguese court and actively engage in the collection of political information.

Sverchkov enjoyed the trust and respect of King Juan himself and his wife, the Spanish princess Carlotta Joaquina, not

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looking at the mortal hatred of the royal spouses for each other. Alexei Vasilievich was often invited to such court ceremonies and receptions, where he was generally the only foreigner. All this allowed him to receive first-hand information about the politics of the royal court and communicate the most important information to the Russian government.

In particular, A.V. Sverchkov informed St. Petersburg in detail about Brazil's preparations for an invasion of the East Coast (now Uruguay). "This expedition, it seems, is being carried out in secret from the Madrid court and from London," he wrote to Nesselrode on May 20 (June 1), 1816. Sverchkov quite accurately predicted the final unsuccessful outcome of this military expedition: "Even assuming that the Portuguese troops will seize all the territory along the Rio de la Plata, between the Eastern Cape and the colony of San Sacramento, which is very likely, it will be very difficult for this government with such a small force to remain master of the lands, where the entire population is militarized, especially if Spain and England oppose it."

At the same time, Sverchkov very thoroughly argued his conclusions by the fact that England, naturally, would not want to lose, as a result of the beginning war, its benefits from trade with Buenos Aires, which was actually in the conflict zone, and Spain hoped to independently suppress the national liberation movement in Uruguay and not give these territories into the wrong hands.

Fate was pleased to dispose so that G.I. Langsdorf again, for the second time, assumed the duties of the Russian official representative in Rio de Janeiro. Here is how he wrote about it to K.V. Nesselrode: "In the country that Mr. Sverchkov is leaving ... I am again faced with the need to fulfill the duties of a chargé d'affaires, and not because the Prime Minister of this court, Mr. Comte de Barca, orally having told me that his majesty does not want the friendship and good agreement that so long and happily existed between our courts to be interrupted, has already recognized me as the representative of our sovereign in the event of Mr. Sverchkov's departure ... I did not hesitate to temporarily accept this position, for which I ask for your permission ... '.

At the beginning of September 1819, Fedor Vasilievich Theil von Seraskerken, one of the first "military agents" of Barclay, arrived in Rio de Janeiro as an envoy of Russia. Before the start of the Patriotic War of 1812, while working in Vienna and Berlin, F.V. Theil successfully carried out reconnaissance missions. Having studied in detail the strategy and tactics of Napoleon's military operations, who always sought to achieve quick success, back in 1811 he recommended that in the event of a French attack on Russia, "wage a long and stubborn war", retreat, "avoid a general battle", act detachments

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Moscow embassy abroad in the 16th] century

Embassy Court in Moscow in the 17th century

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Miniature from the Royal Book of the 11th century with a double image of I.M. Viskovaty: next to the royal bed and
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Miniature from the Royal Book. The scene of the oath to Tsar Ivan GU, with a cross in his hand - I.M. Viskovaty

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that the diverse powers gathered by him. great, and that courage requires it, not a great vigilance against it. For this reason, with all the firm recompense® In OUR brave nomination, we deem it necessary to gather forces in the State, which, inflicting terrible horror on the enemy, would step down the second fence as a gift to Aplenze first, in the protective house, wives and children of each m all.

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Prince Sh.-M. Talleyrand-Périgord. Portrait by F. Gerard

Prince Talleyrand, "Handsome Leander", 1834

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N.M. Potapov, Head of the Department of the Quartermaster General

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s, who was in charge of foreign intelligence

light cavalry behind enemy lines, try to drag out hostilities until winter. G.I. Langsdorf handed matters over to reliable hands.

Thus, Brazil became the first outpost of Russian diplomacy in Latin America. Relations with other countries of the continent developed slowly and sluggishly. Russia, adhering to the principle of "legitimism" generated by the "Holy Alliance", for decades did not want to recognize the Latin American states liberated from colonial dependence, with the exception of monarchic Brazil, although even in the initial period of the struggle for the independence of the Latin American republics (1810- 1812) representatives of Venezuela, Peru, Chile, and Argentina tried to find ways to get closer to Russia, facing at least the wait-and-see position of the royal court.

The development of the American continent by Russians proceeded mainly from the north, despite conflicts with the United States and England. The Russian-American Company was used as a strong point. F.P. Wrangel, who was in 1830-1835 the main ruler of Russian America, and in 1840-1849 - the director of the Russian-American

companies.

In the 20-30s of the 19th century, the Russian-American Company faced the task of strengthening the position of Russian California, making it the base for supplying Russian America with bread. Wrangel proposed in 1834 to enter into negotiations with the Mexican government, so that in exchange for official diplomatic recognition by Russia, Mexico would cede the valley of the Slavyanka River to the Russian-American Company. In a report on the negotiations, Wrangel wrote to St. Petersburg in 1836: "After the conclusion of a trade treaty, it will not be difficult for a diplomatic agent of Russia in Mexico, I think, to approve the colony of Ross for Russia, and by defining the borders from the colony, they can be pushed back tens of miles. to the east, south and north, which will not meet with difficulties. The tsarist government did not dare to officially recognize the republican government of Mexico, and Wrangel's negotiations did not receive further development, although he was instructed in the instructions to find out "to what extent the act of our recognition could induce the Mexican government to formally cede lands."

The situation somewhat changed only towards the end of the nineteenth century. During this period, the figure of the talented Russian diplomat Alexander Semenovitch Ionin stands out. As ambassador to Brazil in 1883-1892, he participates in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Argentina (1885), Uruguay (1887) and Mexico (1890), travels a lot around the countries of the mainland. Ionin's detailed reports on the situation in these countries and the possibilities of intensifying relations with them attracted the attention of Emperor Alexander Sh. However, no specific measures to strengthen Russian influence

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not accepted in this region. Of course, the vast distances separating Russia from Latin America had an effect, and the traditional interests of the empire dictated the need to focus on solving "more immediate" foreign policy tasks.

! Foreign policy of Russia. - THAT. - M., 1967. - S. 324-325.

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There, l. 27.

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20

Knight of the Green Lamp

His biography is so rich in various events, unexpected dramatic twists and turns that it could well serve as the basis for an adventure novel. Perhaps, over time, such a novel will please lovers of the detective genre, but for now we will limit ourselves to a brief summary of the "theses" for the novel.

First of all, it should be noted that from the point of view of modern concepts, the activity of this person in the field of special services does not fit into any strictly defined framework. He served in the General Staff, was a military intelligence officer, then, following the current terminology, he was wanted on suspicion of involvement in treason, then he performed tasks [of the III branch of the Chancellery of His Imperial Majesty, that same gendarmerie

department, which was previously entrusted with investigating his participation in an anti-state conspiracy, and, finally, he performed the functions of what is now called an "agent of influence", conducting over the years a lot of intelligence work for the benefit of the Fatherland in the mass media information abroad. Moreover, it can be said about him that he was one of the first major "agents of influence" of the tsarist intelligence ... But let's start everything in order.

Nikolai Yakovlevich Tolstoy, the eldest of the three sons of a wealthy landowner, marshal of the nobility of the Ostashkovsky district of the Tver province, named Yakov in honor of his grandfather, was born in 1791 in his father's family estate. In 1802, Jacob was enrolled in the Corps of Pages. Although his family was not close to the court and had only 3,000 souls of serfs, which was not too many by the standards of that time, the Tolstoy's were considered representatives of the top of Russian society due to the antiquity and glory of their surname. Tolstoy's ancestor, Chernigov boyar Andrey Kharitonovich,

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moved to the service of the Moscow sovereigns in the second half of the 15th century. Since then, the Tolstoy's, whose senior branch in the person of Peter Andreevich received the title of count under Peter the Great, faithfully served the rulers of Russia, giving her many major military leaders, statesmen, diplomats and talented writers. In the service of the Fatherland, Yakov also had to prove himself, especially since the Corps of Pages provided all the necessary opportunities that allowed the young man to successfully start any military or civilian career.

Jacob left the Corps of Pages in the summer of 1808, at the height of the ongoing wars in Europe waged by Napoleon, who claimed complete dominance on the continent. The Russian army had already fought with his troops in Italy and at Austerlitz, and, despite the truce, in Russia they understood that a big fight with the French was yet to come. Therefore, many young nobles aspired to the army, who considered a military career the best fulfillment of a patriotic duty. Among them was Yakov Tolstoy, enrolled on November 20, 1808 as an ensign of the court life of the grenadier regiment. But life at court, intrigues and monotonous tedious ceremonials quickly bored the young man, who, even on pages, was distinguished by a craving for literary creativity. In December 1810, Yakov Tolstoy resigned. A year later, he passed the exams for the course of science at the Pedagogical Institute, having received the right to the civil rank of collegiate assessor. Perhaps Jacob sought to continue his education, but the war with Napoleon was already very close.

changed his plans.

In April 1812, he applied for the restoration of the army and was assigned to one of the infantry regiments that were hastily advancing to the western border. The regiment took the first battle in Belarus near Kobrin on June 15, 1812, fighting with the vanguard troops of Napoleon's army. Yakov Tolstoy participated in the battles of 1812, in the campaigns of 1813-1814, for which he was awarded military awards, including the Order of St. Vladimir with a bow - a military order for personal bravery, highly valued among officers. At the end of the war, Yakov returned to St. Petersburg, having been appointed adjutant to Lieutenant General L.O. A company in the Pavlovsky Guards Regiment.

In January 1817, Tolstoy was appointed senior adjutant to the duty general of the General Staff A.A. Zakrevsky. Now orders and instructions for the entire Russian army pass through the hands of the young captain.

At the same time, an event takes place in the life of Yakov, thanks to which he basically remained known to posterity: in the same 1817, he entered the circle of young writers - "dashing knights, friends of freedom and wine", called the "Green Lamp" in honor of Abba - zhura, under which the members of the circle gathered in the house of its chairman Nikita Vsevolozhsky. There Tolstoy meets Pushki

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ny, Glinka, Delvig, Chaadaev, Shakhovsky, and many other celebrities of that time generous with talents. In 1819, meetings were transferred from Vsevolozhsky's apartment to Tolstoy. Then Pushkin dedicated Stanzas to him:

An early philosopher, you run away from feasts and the pleasures of life,

You look at the games of youth

With a cold silence of reproach...

Among the brilliant and noisy youth who made up the circle, Tolstoy stood out for his composure, inner seriousness, which Pushkin well noted. If other "Chevaliers of the "Green Lamp"", who liked to talk about freedom and equality, and sometimes about the overthrow of tyranny, divided their time mainly between revels, love stories, cards and the theater, then Yakov strictly performed his service in the General Staff, and his first poetic experiments, rather pompous and ponderous, he kept secret from his friends. This secret was revealed only in 1821, when Yakov Tolstoy nevertheless decided to publish his first book, *My Idle Time*, which included 28 poems. And again, two important events at the same time: in the same 1821, Tolstoy received the high position of senior adjutant of the General Staff. Now he is admitted to matters of special importance and secrecy - mobilization plans, correspondence with Russian military agents abroad, processing of information received from them, including intelligence.

Instead of the collapsed "Green Lamp" in St. Petersburg, the first secret societies began to appear, which included officers and young officials - the forerunners of the Decembrist organizations. Yakov Tolstoy also joined one of them - the Union of Welfare.

Tolstoy continued to serve and attend society meetings until April 1823, when, for health reasons, he asked his superiors for a year's leave to treat his sore leg and left for Paris.

Tolstoy described his first impressions of Parisian life in the articles that appeared in the journal *Son of the Fatherland* since 1823, in which he painted vivid pictures of the political life of France, gave reviews of its culture and art. In Paris itself, Tolstoy began to write a regular column devoted to Russian literature and art in the academic edition of the *Revue Encyclopedia* from 1824. According to the apt expression of P. Vyazemsky, "Tolstoy in the 20s. was Consul General for Russian Literature in France. He was one of the first to translate Pushkin into French, discovered for Europeans the talent of Krylov, whom they had previously considered an imitator of Lafontaine, introduced them to the work of A.S. Griboyedov and A.A. Bestuzhev Marlinsky.

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The events of December 1825 were a heavy blow to Tolstoy, many of whose friends in Russia were on trial. His name got into the investigation papers in the lists of members of secret societies, and in the spring of 1826 he received an order to return to Russia. Tolstoy refused and was dismissed from service at the end of 1826, effectively becoming a "defector" and losing all rights to an army pension and noble privileges. The most difficult period of his life began for him. Deprived of his livelihood, having ceased to receive money from Russia, he lived by literary work - he wrote the truth about Russia for Parisian publications when Europe's attitude towards it was subjected to a sharp cooling.

France could not forgive Russia for the Treaty of Vienna, which deprived her of all the conquests of Napoleon, and was sharply opposed to the foreign policy of Emperor Nicholas I. Since the mid-1820s, anti-Russian pamphlets began to appear in Paris, belittling not only the existing government in Russia, but also its history and national features. Tolstoy came out to defend the prestige of his Fatherland. In 1825, he subjected Rabbe's *Review of Russian History* to reasoned criticism. In 1827, he spoke out against the travel notes of a certain Jacques Anselot "Six

months in Russia", where he wrote in a tendentious form about the barbarity of all Russians without exception, about their inability to rule independently.

One of the loudest scandals associated with publications about Russia was the publication in 1829 in Paris of notes by Victor Magnier, a French officer, a former instructor in the Turkish army, who was captured during the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829. Returning from Russia after a year spent in captivity, Magnier in his Notes attacked the Russian army, attributing to it numerous atrocities that turned out to be fictitious, as well as disorganization, weakness and backwardness, not shunning the most offensive expressions.

Tolstoy responded to Magnier with the pamphlet "Objection to a French Officer", where, according to a contemporary, "he acted as a zealous and skillful defender in foreign lands from attacks of malice and hatred." When Magnier accused Tolstoy of slander, Yakov challenged him to a duel. Magnier did not dare to fight him and did not appear in print again.

This story added prestige to Tolstoy in St. Petersburg, including in high-ranking circles. As early as 1827, he again had the opportunity to publish his articles in the liberal Moscow Telegraph. But Tolstoy's life remained extremely cramped. Changes took place not in income, but in his views: Tolstoy reconsidered his debt to the Fatherland. In a letter to his brother Ivan dated August 13, 1830, he directly wrote: "... if our government wanted to use me here, I could be of great benefit to him, so

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I know Paris very well from its spiritual side and I am in contact with influential people, but it is difficult for me to support them because of extreme poverty. If General Zakrevsky or the head of his office in the General Staff A.S. Menshikov and others would like to restore my honor in the eyes of His Majesty and used me for business here, then I would be very useful.

Three years later, in 1833, Tolstoy's half-starved life changed for the better after 25-year-old Prince Elim Petrovich Meshchersky arrived in Paris for the newly approved post of correspondent of the Ministry of National Education. Despite his young age, the prince by that time had five years of experience in diplomatic service in Dresden and Turin. Having moved from the department of Chancellor Nesselrode to the department of Count Uvarov, he successfully settled into a new field in a short time. In addition to studying the educational system and the general state of the sciences in Europe, his duties included also the analysis of local political life and the press. His reports were sent not only to the Minister of Education, Uvarov, but also to the chief of the III department, Benckendorff. For his work, Meshchersky attracted Tolstoy, who was then probably the best Russian expert on France, comprehending it from the inside for

many years of life there.

In 1835, Tolstoy's brother, Ivan, who held an important position in one of the government institutions, suggested that he write a biography of Field Marshal Paskevich, who commanded the Russian army in the war against Turkey in 1828-1829 and during the suppression of uprisings in Poland in 1831 year. The biography, highly appreciated in St. Petersburg, became the final pretext for Tolstoy's "political rehabilitation" in the eyes of the St. Petersburg authorities. In August 1836, Count Meshchersky conveyed to Tolstoy a summons to Petersburg received from Benckendorff. Delighted Tolstoy immediately informed his brother about this: "Count Benckendorff, through Prince Meshchersky, informed me that I would soon receive an offer to be employed in Paris and that my duties would embrace the literary part and journalism, but for this I would have to make a trip to Russia, to personally get acquainted with Count Benckendorff and agree on the nature of my future occupations.

This invitation was preceded by correspondence at the highest level. In 1836, Benckendorff submitted a report to the Tsar "on the desirability of using Jacob Tolstoy in relations with French journalists." The tsar approved this decision, ordering the Russian ambassador to France

Count Pyotr Petrovich Palen to pay Tolstoy 10 thousand rubles from embassy funds in order to pay off numerous creditors. In a reply letter dated November 8, 1836, Palen openly wrote to Benckendorff about the need to have in Paris "an agent with a harmless political mission, in order to secretly

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work with the local press and establish contacts with it without publicity, under the guise of official duties. Such an agent could be Yakov Tolstoy, who has been defending the political interests of Russia for twelve years now. He will not seem suspicious to the French and will be able to successfully fight the misconceptions and slander spread about us.

Tolstoy himself perfectly understood the true meaning of his forthcoming work. Already halfway to St. Petersburg, stopping in Warsaw, on December 22, 1836, he submitted a memorandum to the governor of Poland, Paskevich, sent to Russia by courier mail. In the note, Tolstoy outlined a plan to bribe the most influential French publications of that time - Gazette de France, Cotidienne, Press, France, Kronique de Paris - to conduct a pro-Russian line in them. In addition, he proposed to establish a publication in Paris for a figurehead, which would be the unspoken mouthpiece of Russian politics. According to his calculations, the cost of its creation in the initial period would not exceed 50 thousand francs, and then it could become self-sustaining, having exclusive materials from Russian life. In addition, Tolstoy suggested sending a correspondent of this publication to Warsaw to carry out operations to promote the policy of the Russian Empire in Poland. Apparently, Tolstoy's ideas met with approval in St. Petersburg, where he arrived after many years of absence in January 1837.

On the eve of Pushkin's duel with Dantes, he was able to visit an old friend from the Green Lamp. They reminisced about their youth, friends, and their first poems... On January 29, when Pushkin was dying in a house on the Moika Embankment, Tolstoy was received by Benckendorff. After a long conversation, on the same day, Benckendorff wrote a letter to Uvarov about accepting Tolstoy instead of Meshchersky as a Paris correspondent for the Ministry of Public Education. It was determined that Tolstoy's salary in Paris would be 3,800 rubles a year, which would be transferred from the 3rd branch through the Ministry of Education.

In October 1837, Tolstoy returned to Paris and began to fulfill his position, which the famous researcher of Pushkin's time B.L. Modzalevsky characterized it as follows: "His position was mysterious and indefinite. The place he occupied did not belong to the service, but he received ranks and orders. His personal file was kept in the Ministry of Education, but he was listed on special assignments in the 2nd department. He himself spoke of his position as "the only place not determined by the states - for the defense of Russia in magazines and the refutation of articles that are contrary to her." Every year he sent dispatches to St. Petersburg, which could not be found in the archives of the Ministry of Education!

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Tolstoy's correspondence from Paris was discovered in the archives of the III branch after 1917?. In addition to regular reviews of the European press and annual reports, it also includes reports and aide-mémoires highlighting his intelligence activities in France.

In particular, Tolstoy worked out a plan to publish in authoritative French publications, whose editors he could bribe, official positive materials specially prepared in Russia about her political and social situation. At the same time, he suggested "working with great caution so that no one suspects the government's direction, showing restraint in polemics, promising and giving rewards to all persons whom we can use on our side." In the development of this plan, in January 1838 Tolstoy sent to St. Petersburg Benckendorff statistical tables on French and English periodicals, which included more than 125 publications indicating their direction, circulation,

the circle of subscribers, the identity of the editors. For this work, Tolstoy was honored with the "highest favor" and began to implement his plan.

In 1838, Yakov Tolstoy began to secretly pay a permanent cash subsidy to a number of editorial offices of the French press. In addition, he managed to attract certain well-known journalists to cooperation, to whom he paid one-time remuneration for specific publications. By the end of the year, Tolstoy acquired such an authoritative agent as the editor of the Press newspaper, Emile de Girardin. In exchange for permission to distribute this newspaper in Russia, which Tolstoy received in St. Petersburg, this publication began an active campaign against the activities in Paris of revolutionary emigrants from Poland, who were conducting directed agitation against the Russian Empire.

The success of Tolstoy's activity was noted by the official on special assignments of the III branch of A.A., who arrived in Paris in December 1838. Sagtynsky, who was in charge of foreign political investigation. Together they compiled a list of French scientists and writers to be rewarded for "activities consonant with the interests of Russia." These persons were awarded with money and valuable gifts. Tolstoy himself received a reward of 1,500 rubles. After Sagtynsky's departure, in addition to promoting and collecting political information about the domestic and foreign policy of France, primarily with respect to England, he began to actively develop political emigrants who had settled in Paris from Russia, Poland, as well as from Germany and Italy, since they had permanent contacts with Russian like-minded people.

Through his connections, Tolstoy managed to prevent the publication in France of a number of works in which Russian reality

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was criticized by people who knew her well from the inside. Thus, in 1839, when essays about Russia by one of the descendants of the Demidov family, who ended up in France, began to appear in the Journal de Deba, Tolstoy had a conversation with the author, after which the publication ceased. In 1842, the Polish Count Władysław Zamoyski intended to publish in Paris his satirical biography of Nicholas I. Tolstoy, through Ambassador Kiselev, obtained an appointment with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guizot, who, by his power, imposed a ban on this publication. In 1843, a book about the Russian nobility, severely condemning the feudal system, was anonymously published in Paris by an embassy official, P.V. Dolgorukov. Through informants in the printing house, Tolstoy identified the author, who was immediately recalled to Russia, arrested and exiled to Vyatka.

Carrying out all these actions, Yakov Tolstoy himself managed to remain in the shadows. Moreover, in the eyes of the majority of Russians who lived in Paris, he was known as a hospitable and hospitable local old-timer, leading the idle life of a gentleman on money sent from his family estate. So, one of his Parisian acquaintances, a certain V.A. Mukhanov noted in his diary in 1842: "Yakov Tolstoy gladly receives Russian travelers who have just arrived in Paris, introduces them to all houses, renders them all sorts of services. You can meet him at embassy dinners, and in the literary salon of the Minister of Public Education of France, Salvendi, and in cafes on the boulevards. When meeting in friendly circles, he prefers to ask rather than tell himself.

Another eyewitness, German journalist Karl Grün, later recalled: "Bakunin and other Russians, of whom I remember some Count Tolstoy, in fact, did nothing but read newspapers. They got up at 12, dined no earlier than 6 o'clock in the afternoon, spent time in cafes until 3-5 o'clock in the morning. The German did not know that Tolstoy, who won Bakunin's trust by knowing his father from the Union of Welfare and having received the most flattering recommendations from Nikolai Turgenev, the patriarch of Russian emigrants in Paris, carefully followed his connections with the Polish and German revolutionaries. nerami, including the young Karl Marx?. Tolstoy came to him according to the information of an employee of the 3rd department of Schweitzer, who worked in Berlin in contact with the Prussian police, including against the émigré newspaper Vorverts, where Marx collaborated.

Tolstoy's acquaintance with Marx began at the end of 1845. Then, before another trip to St. Petersburg, Tolstoy sent a letter to Marx in Germany, enclosing the recommendations of P.V. Annenkov, whom he met back in November 1841, when he took the position of an official of the Ministry of Finance at the Russian Embassy in Paris. In a letter, Tolstoy expressed a desire to help Marx mate

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financially from their meager funds received from Russia, transferring them in support of the revolution. Marx, who after that received a positive review of Tolstoy from Bakunin, was inclined to accept this gift, but at that time Tolstoy's reputation was damaged by a scandal unleashed by another political emigrant from Russia, a certain Golovin.

In 1845, he managed to publish in France the book "Russia of Nicholas 1", to which Tolstoy responded with a critical article in the weekly *Cotidienne*, published under his usual pseudonym "Yakovlev". Offended, Golovin responded with an article in which he directly pointed to Tolstoy's collaboration with the 3rd Division.

The German opposition newspaper *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* also joined the accusations, publishing the following mention of Tolstoy in its issue of July 16, 1846: <... Outside the Russian official embassy, or rather above it, stands a certain Tolstoy . He does not hold a specific position, but is known as a confidant of the court. He lives in grand style, meets with everyone, accepts everyone, deals with everything, knows everything and arranges a lot. It seems that he is the real Russian envoy in Paris. His intercession works miracles – all the Poles who asked for pardon turned to him. In the embassy everyone bows before him, and in St. Petersburg he enjoys great influence. Having moved from the Rue Trofrere to a house belonging to the academician Jouy on the Rue Montagne, he also maintains a representative apartment on the Rue Mathurin, where he receives diplomats.

At the height of the scandal, Tolstoy moved to London. He returned to Paris in 1847, when the fuss around his name subsided, and Bakunin and Annenkov came out in support of him. Annenkov even wrote to Marx in October 1846 that Tolstoy, whom they both knew, might have been confused with one of his many namesakes, and described him as "an honest, simple, and straightforward man," which Marx doubted.

In February 1848, when a revolution began in France, about the approach of which Tolstoy had been writing since 1844, he had to urgently leave Paris and move to Brussels. During a search in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the prefecture of Paris, the new revolutionary government found documents that indirectly testify to the contacts of the French police with the 3rd department, which went through Tolstoy. At the same time, the former Russian envoy to Turinea Stuttgart, Obreskov, inspired by the revolution unfolding in Europe, published in the French press a "joke" about Yakov Tolstoy, divulging information entrusted to him in his service about Tolstoy's true role at the embassy.

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However, when the first wave of revolutionary activity subsided, it turned out that many former friends and assistants of Tolstoy came to the ministries and parliament of France, primarily from educational and newspaper circles. Therefore, in March 1848, Tolstoy returned to Paris and again developed an active activity. He sent information to Russia almost daily - short ciphered messages with embassy mail through Ambassador Kiselev and lengthy reports via Brussels, where he managed to establish a backup communication channel, since his own correspondence from Paris was censored.

From March to December 1848, Tolstoy kept a constant visual observation of the events on the streets of Paris - workers' demonstrations, performances by Polish and German emigrants, military parades, election rallies, about which he sent detailed reports. In addition, he actively involved agents. For example, in a letter to his curator Sagtynsky dated 20

On February 1848, he mentioned a certain Henri Muris, the son of a porter in Tolstoy's house, whom he hired as a copyist, and then attached as a courier to two large editorial offices. For 100 francs (25 rubles at the then rate) a month, he not only informed Tolstoy about the most interesting events, but also gave him drafts from paper baskets, through which Tolstoy received some additional information about the political situation.

Already in March 1848, Tolstoy sent to Russia a detailed list of the members of the new republican government, enclosing lengthy descriptions of their personal qualities and political ambitions. He sent the same materials on the alignment of political forces in parliament. In September 1848, when Russia was planning military operations in Hungary to suppress the revolution that was flaring up there, Tolstoy, through his agents in the War Ministry, managed to get and send to Russia a complete overview of the French army, including its strength and deployment - up to the battalion, including importantly, as well as weapons, materiel, political sentiments and budgetary costs for its financing. The information received from him helped the Minister of War, Count Chernyshev, to clearly plan the upcoming military and political actions in Hungary.

In December 1848, a presidential election was held in France, which was won by Napoleon's great-nephew, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. Two months before the election, Tolstoy, using the parliamentary information he had, predicted Napoleon's victory, sending to St. Petersburg a detailed description of his political program and election strategy.

The victory of Louis Napoleon, which ended the period of the French Revolution, forced Tolstoy to return to routine duties. By

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Since the revelations that took place made it difficult for him to work among emigrants from Russia, he focused on obtaining political information, combining this with the activities of a publicist. In 1849, he published the second part of Paskevich's biography, prefaced by a discourse on the dangers of revolutions in general. Criticizing the events of 1848 in Europe, he glorified the Russian army, "cutting the drama of the Hungarian uprising with the blunt side of the sword."

Beginning in March 1850, Tolstoy began to send alarming reports of the growth of Russophobia in Great Britain, which was concerned about the strengthening of Russian positions in Asia. In a letter dated March 27, 1850, he mentioned for the first time the intentions of the British to "destroy the Russian fleet and burn Sevastopol." However, the new chief of the secret police, Count A.F., who replaced Benckendorff. Orlov was little interested in the analysis of the international situation, coming from Tolstoy.

The authorities showed interest in Tolstoy's reports only in December 1851, on the eve of Louis Napoleon's coup d'état. The day before the dispersal of parliament, on December 2, 1851, a "faithful man" informed Tolstoy about the upcoming events and about the advance of troops to Paris. Tolstoy immediately sent a cipher to St. Petersburg and sent daily reports until December 10, when, in Hugo's words, "Napoleon the Little" established himself on the throne.

Tolstoy continued to supply the Russian authorities with secret information that came to him from the ministries, the Senate and the Parliament of France even after the coronation of Napoleon III. on their side Turkey and France. At the end of 1854, Tolstoy hastened to leave France, convinced of the inevitability of war and the severance of diplomatic relations. He moved to Belgium, where by this time he had a very valuable informant - a government official Walfers, who worked for Russia, against France, trying to achieve greater independence for Belgium at the expense of her weakening.

The pinnacle of Tolstoy's professional career was his intelligence activities in the Sevastopol campaign. Back in the late 1840s, he managed to recruit a certain Pascal,

secretary of the famous military theorist General Jomini, who had been in the Russian service for a long time. After that, Pascal was a military observer for the *Spectateur Militaire* magazine, from where he provided Tolstoy with important information about military doctrine and the armed forces of France. With the coming to power of Napoleon III, the ardent Bonapartist Pascal became his military secretary ... and the most knowledgeable agent of Russia in the entourage of the Emperor of France. All military information went to Sevasto in the Polish campaign through Pascal,

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for which Tolstoy paid often and generously. Through well-established communication channels, copies of papers from Paris got to Brussels, from where they went to the General Staff in St. Petersburg, where Tolstoy himself worked in youth...

After the signing of the peace treaty in 1856, Tolstoy returned to Paris to his former position. He was already 65 years old, and he increasingly moved away from intelligence activities towards literary and historical works. In 1860, he wrote a biography of Count P. Kiselyov, a long-term Russian ambassador to France, in 1861 published essays on the history of Poland, and translated Russian poets into French, primarily Pushkin. Since 1847, he collected old manuscripts and sent them to Russia at the disposal of the Ministry of Education, for which, in addition to numerous orders, he received an award - a diamond ring - as a gift from the monarch himself.

In June 1866, Yakov Nikolaevich asked for his resignation, being in the rank of privy councilor - according to the table of ranks, he was a state general - and received a pension of 2 thousand rubles a year. However, old illnesses and age made themselves felt - Tolstoy died in Paris on February 15, 1867 at the age of 75, all alone, leaving no direct heirs. He was modestly buried in the Montmartre cemetery, near the graves of Berlioz and Heine. His grave has been preserved to this day.

The service papers left by Tolstoy were partially transferred to the archives of the III department, and from there to the police department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and made public after 1917. Tolstoy's personal documents were inherited by his friend Prince P.B. Kozlovsky and ended up in his personal collection at the Paris National Library. For a long time they were considered lost and were discovered only in 1983. The mention of them flashed in the domestic press, "but no serious study of them has yet been done.

The activities of Yakov Tolstoy are perceived ambiguously. Perhaps the most voluminous about her and his personal qualities was said by the famous Russian historian E.V. Tarle:

"In Yakov Tolstoy's correspondence, there are many subtle and penetrating remarks, revealing in places a very distinct and clear understanding of ongoing events and forcing the reader to repeatedly recall that he is not an ordinary spy from the foreign department of the Third Branch, but a man who, at a young age, Pushkin devoted poems to this topic, who had a lot of contact with many prominent contemporaries in Russia and abroad, and whom they considered a person who was suitable for communicating with them according to his mental level.

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Yakov Tolstoy looked at his role as a scout who made his way into the enemy camp and signaled from there to his camp about rising dangers and impending clouds.

1 Modzalevsky B.L. Yakov Nikolaevich Tolstoy. - St. Petersburg, 1899.

See Dispatches of Yakov Tolstoy from Paris to the III Department // Literary Heritage. - T. 31-32. - M., 1937. - S. 563-662 (introductory article and notes by E.V. Tarle).

3 See Karl Marx and the Russian people of the 1840s. - M., 1919.

4 Friedman N. An unexpected find // Novy Mir. - 1983. - No. 11.

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"Correspondents" A.I. Chernysheva

The practice begun by Barclay of sending military personnel on long-term foreign business trips to perform reconnaissance missions was widely developed with the advent of Alexander Ivanovich Chernyshev, the former trusted representative of the Russian emperor in Paris, to the War Ministry. It is noteworthy that not only military personnel were involved in intelligence work, but also employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments who were working abroad. These persons were not professional intelligence officers, but sometimes they managed to acquire very valuable agents through which important intelligence missions were carried out.

In the early 30s of the 19th century, Russia acutely felt the lag in industrial development, including in the technical equipment of the army, in comparison with the countries of Western Europe. Therefore, it was precisely these questions that were of particular concern to the Russian leadership.

In November 1831, on the initiative of A.I. Chernyshev, Nicholas I instructed the Russian embassy in London to "collect the most accurate and correct information" about a new gun just invented in England, which significantly surpassed, according to information available in Russia, that already existed in European armies, and to get it, if one presents himself. opportunity, his samples.

At the same time, all Russian embassies at European courts were ordered to pay special attention without fail to all inventions, discoveries and improvements that appeared in the countries of their residence "both in terms of the military, and in general in terms of manufactories and industry" and immediately "deliver about them details"?

In February 1832, Minister of Foreign Affairs K.V. Nesselrode proposed specific candidates for this work.

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you: the collegiate councilor Meyendorff, who was in France, and the real state councilor Faber, who worked in Germany.

In August 1832, the needs of the War Ministry for intelligence information were reinforced by instructions to all diplomatic missions personally from the Inspector General for the Engineering Department of the Russian Army, Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich: to purchase open and obtain secret literature on engineering art related to long-term and field fortification, attack and defense of fortresses, military construction and pontoon art"?.

And Russian diplomats actively carried out these instructions. The ambassador in Paris, for example, personally bought in 1832 for 600 francs a description with drawings of new carriages for the French field artillery. In 1835, for 6,500 francs, he obtained "drawings and a description of a new kind of incendiary rockets, an impact gun and drawings of fortress, siege, coastal and mountain artillery" - the latest achievements of the French in the military field.

In 1834, a closed textbook was received for the military engineering and artillery school in Metz, dedicated to the new French field artillery, as well as a training program in this school, and the following year - documentation on the production of French guns at factories in Toulouse.

In 1835, one of the employees of the embassy in Paris purchased samples of twisted gun barrels, which were produced at one of the factories in the Vosges.

The ambassador in Vienna reported in 1834 about the invention by the Austrian gunsmith Zeiler of a new percussion mechanism for firearms, as well as a replaceable magazine for cartridges, and sent a brief description and drawing of them. He even tacitly agreed with Zeiler on a trip to Russia to establish the production of new guns there.

In 1835, the Consul General in Hamburg, Roman Ivanovich Baherakht, acquired through his connections in Belgium a copy of Colonel Puydt's report to the Belgian king about the military roads in the Vendée, a model of a cannon with a carriage, models of two guns of the latest design, a model of a telegraph new type.

Nikolai [awarded Bakherakht, on the recommendation of Chernyshev, "for his diligent service and special labors" with the Order of St. Anna, 2nd degree, decorated with the imperial crown.

There are many such facts. And behind all of them was hard, painstaking work. For example, here is how information was obtained about the manufacture of percussion caps for guns in England, where this matter was brought to perfection.

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Russian Ambassador in London H.A. Lieven received the task directly from A.I. Chernyshev. He entrusted this matter to the Consul General in England, Benkhausen. He turned to his connection - the chief inspector of the English arsenal, Charlie Manton. The latter explained that the mere description does not give anything if the machine itself for the production of these caps is not at hand. Then Benkhausen ordered Manton, in addition to describing the machine itself, an additional copy of which still had to be made, several used guns converted to fit these caps, and a series of caps themselves.

Guns of a new brand, adapted for the indicated caps, Manton could not hand over, since they had just begun to enter the arsenal and were all strictly registered. Then Benkhausen turned to his other connection, Lacey Davies, who had a gun shop in London. He was on friendly terms with the director of the state arms factory in Enfield near London, where these new guns were made, and managed to get one copy. Six months later, the task of A.I. Chernyshev was fulfilled.

Here is another "petition" by Chernyshev, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nesselrode, dated December 20, 1843:

"One of the duties of the ministry entrusted to me is to collect, as far as possible, correct information about the military forces and methods of foreign states. This information is delivered, as Your Excellency knows from my previous correspondence, by correspondents of the War Ministry in foreign lands. For some states they are very satisfactory. But there is no complete and correct information about the Austrian Empire at all.

Concerned about the successful fulfillment of all the duties that lie with the ministry entrusted to me, and knowing how important it is in military matters to have correct information about the forces and methods of foreign states, I turn to Your Excellency with the most humble request to honor me with your notification, would it be possible to entrust the delivery of information about Austria to the senior secretary of our embassy in Vienna, chamberlain Ozerov, following the example of how his predecessor, Mr. Kudryavsky, did this.

To this I have the honor to add that Your Excellency would greatly lend me if you would also entrust one of the officials of our missions in London and Constantinople with the delivery of such information about England and Turkey.

In January 1851 A.I. Chernyshev wrote to K.V. Nesselrode that "for the most successful teaching of military statistics at the Imperial Military Academy, it turned out to be necessary to have correct information about the changes that have occurred since 1848 in the structure of the Austrian military forces."

After such an introduction, he conveyed Nikolai's order [to instruct an employee of the Russian mission

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in Vienna, to Acting Councilor of State Fonton "to follow the transformation of Austria in terms of military affairs" and ask him "to provide information about the present organization and the state of the military forces in the Austrian Empire."

At the same time, Chernyshev sent to the capitals of a number of European states and his career intelligence officers. However, there were few of them, and only on their own they could not effectively solve the emerging reconnaissance tasks. Therefore, to a large extent, we had to count on the help of Russian diplomats. The situation before the Crimean War is clearly reflected in the following letter from A.I. Chernyshev in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of May 8, 1852:

"The Sovereign Emperor, wishing that the Ministry of War always had as complete and correct information as possible about the military forces of foreign states, the timely receipt of which is necessary for the considerations of the ministry, deigned to command: to resume communication with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on instructions to our embassies in those states where there are no special war correspondents, to deliver time-based, within a certain period of time, information about the state of the military forces of these states according to a short and easily executable program.

In pursuance of this royal will, and based on my previous correspondence on this subject with the State Chancellor of Foreign Affairs, I most humbly ask Your Excellency to order the following embassies to deliver to the Ministry of War twice a year: to the 1st January and July 1, according to the brief instructions and forms attached to this (the appendix is not published. - Auth.), information about the military forces:

- a) To the embassy in Stuttgart and at the German Confederation - about the forces of the Württemberg kingdom and about the state of the 8th German corps.
- b) Embassy in Munich - about the forces of Bavaria.
- c) To the embassy in Naples - about the forces of the Kingdom of Naples.
- d) Embassy in Rome - about the papal and Tuscan troops.
- e) To the embassy in Dresden - about the forces of Saxony.
- f) Embassy in Lisbon - about the troops of Portugal.
- g) Embassy in Tehran - about the troops of Persia.

Correspondents of the Ministry of War are ordered to deliver the following information:

Correspondent in Berlin - in addition to Prussia, about the troops and the military situation in Northern Germany, namely: about Hanover, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck and Braunschweig.

To a correspondent in Stockholm - except for Sweden, about Denmark.

To a correspondent in Constantinople - except for Turkey, about Egypt.

Correspondent in Paris - in addition to France, about Spain, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands and England.

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As for the military forces of Austria, it is desirable that, until the appointment of a war correspondent to Vienna, our embassy continues to deliver the full and satisfactory information that it has delivered hitherto, assigning him the same date - January 1 and July 1.

The Crimean War reduced the possibilities of intelligence activities. But, nevertheless, on January 16, 1854, when France and England had not yet officially entered the war, the head of the Naval Ministry, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, wrote to the head of the Department of Internal Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where secret correspondence was concentrated, including and on intelligence matters: "Your Excellency knows how important and necessary it is under present circumstances for the Naval Ministry to have constantly up-to-date information about the movement of English and French ships and squadrons, so that this information is also delivered to in the event of a break, when they are especially needed. Therefore, I ask you to take the trouble to figure out how to arrange the timely delivery of them."

Two days later, the head of the department, Privy Councilor, Senator Lev Grigorievich Senyavin informed the Grand Duke that the Russian representatives in London and Paris were instructed to use consuls and other "trusted persons" to obtain the necessary information in case of their departure. The same task was assigned to the Russian missions in Stockholm, Copenhagen, The Hague, Brussels, Lisbon, Naples and Athens.

In December 1854, a Greek named Spiridon Atanaz, who had arrived from Paris, came to the Russian representative in Brussels, Count Khreptovich, and offered his services in supplying construction plans and drawings for new model ships, which at that time were in French shipyards. As a shipbuilding engineer, Atanaz was sent by his government to France for training, was admitted to her naval institutions and therefore was able to collect information of interest to the Russians. Atanaz asked Khreptovich to give him 350 francs a month, of which he would spend 200 francs on his own maintenance, and 150 francs to pay for the people he needed.

Already on his first visit to Khreptovich, Atanaz handed over to him drawings of several military ships, as well as new naval artillery, which was being created both in France and in England. Evaluating these materials, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich, the head of the Naval Ministry, wrote in a letter to the Foreign Ministry dated December 29, 1854: "... I find: 1) that the information received now from Mr. Atanaz is extremely important and useful and proves perfect knowledge of maritime affairs and the ability to extract exactly the data that we may need; 2) that the Naval Ministry has never yet

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the beginning of information so useful, except in those cases when our naval officers themselves had the opportunity to collect it on the ground, and that the message of Mr. Atanaz cannot even be compared with the information that Count Khreptovich received through his other agents; 3) that it is necessary to take advantage of the proposal of Mr. Athanase and not spare the costs, and that the payment required by him is very moderate; and 4) that this matter must be conducted in complete secrecy so as not to lose an agent so useful?"

Subsequently, Atanaz obtained drawings of two gunboats under construction, transmitted information about the construction of warships and the installation of naval artillery on them in the ports of Cherbourg, Orien, Nantes, Le Havre, Brest, Rochefort, provided information about the ships that the French intended to send to the Baltic Sea, repeatedly supplied Khreptovich with drawings of French ships made by him with a detailed description of them.

Atanaz cooperated until July 1856. In total, he received 11,000 francs for his labors, of which 6,000 were his own expenses.

Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich wrote to the Foreign Ministry in March 1856: "I believe that in the event of peace, we will no longer need the services of the Greek Atanaz, but what can I

I would consider it fair to generously reward him for the information delivered to us, which was really very useful!

In June 1856, the new Russian emperor Alexander II personally appointed military representatives to four European capitals, entrusting them with intelligence functions: in Paris - the adjutant wing of Colonel Albedinsky, in London - the adjutant wing of Colonel Ignatiev, in Vienna - Colonel von Thornau, in Constantinople - Captain Franchini. At the same time, it was decided to instruct Major General Count Stackelberg, who was appointed representative of Russia in Turin, to continue to obtain and send to the War Ministry information similar to that which he obtained while in Vienna, but about the Piedmontese army and, if possible, about French, regardless of Albedinsky's reports.

Later, in October 1856, Colonel Gasfort was sent to Naples with similar reconnaissance functions. But due to the political situation in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, he first had to work in Paris, Turin, Rome and even Naples under the guise of a private person undergoing treatment.

June 10, 1856 - a significant day in the history of Russian intelligence - Alexander P approved the first instruction on the work of military agents. Here is her text:

"It is incumbent on every agent to acquire the most accurate and positive information possible on the following subjects:

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1. On the number, composition, structure and disposition of both land and sea forces.
2. About the methods of the government for replenishing and multiplying its armed forces and for supplying the troops and fleet with weapons and other military needs.
3. About the various movements of troops, both already carried out and those planned, trying as far as possible to penetrate into the true purpose of these movements.
4. About the current state of the fortresses, new fortification works being undertaken to strengthen the banks and other points.
5. About the experiments of the government on the inventions and improvements of weapons and other military needs that have an impact on the art of war.
6. About camp gatherings of troops and about maneuvers.
7. On the spirit of the troops and the way of thinking of officers and higher ranks.
8. On the state of various parts of the military administration, such as: artillery, engineering, commissariat, provisions with all their branches.
9. About all the remarkable transformations in the troops and changes in military regulations, weapons and uniforms.
10. On the latest writings relating to the military sciences, as well as on maps-plans, newly published, especially those areas about which information can be useful to us.
11. On the state of military educational institutions, in relation to their organization, methods of teaching sciences and the prevailing spirit in these institutions.
12. On the structure of the General Staff and on the degree of knowledge of the officers, this component.

(This article for an agent sent to Turkey, where the general staff has not yet been established, is replaced by the following paragraph: "On the persons constituting the military administration of Turkey, the degree of their

knowledge, the ability of each and the power of attorney to him of the government and subordinate PERSONS.”)

13. About the means for the movement of troops by rail, with possible details on the number of troops and the time when they completed their movement between these points.

14. On the improvement of the military administration in general for the speedy execution of written cases and the reduction of time in the transmission of orders.

15. Collect all the above information with the strictest care and diligence and carefully avoid everything that could bring the slightest suspicion of the local government to the agent.

16. Each agent is to be completely dependent and subordinate to the head of the mission, with whom he is. Without his permission

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not to do anything special, to ask for instructions and be guided by them exactly. Collected information, in particular, which may be in connection with political relations, before sending them to the Minister of War, report in advance to the head of the mission and, in case of urgently necessary expenses, ask him for grants!?

These detailed royal instructions, like many examples given earlier, testify to how the understanding of the importance of organizing intelligence work abroad was put into practice.

! See Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, f. 155, op. 301, d. 135. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., op. 303, d. 8 (1832). 4 Ibid., 16 (1833).

5 Ibid., 7 (1845).

6 Ibid., op. 305, d. 1 (1851). 7 Ibid., d. 6 (1852).

8 Ibid., 5 (1854).

h Ibid., 124 (1854).

0 Ibid., 124 (1856).

1 Ibid., 25 (1856).

12 Ibid.

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Hussar, scout, minister - rolled into one

We will tell about three hypostases, three stages of the biography of the same person - Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, a man of outstanding abilities, solid military and diplomatic experience, stormy temperament, rare perseverance and fearlessness. He was born in 1832 in an old noble family. His father, Pavel Nikolaevich Ignatiev, held the rank of general and held high positions in the civil service: director of the Corps of Pages, duty general of the General Staff, St. Petersburg governor general, and, finally, in 1872-1879, chairman of the Committee of Ministers. In 1877, the Ignatiev family was awarded the title of count.

Nikolai Ignatiev was brought up in the Corps of Pages by his father, then he graduated from the General Staff Academy and served in the hussars. The service in the regiment was short, but the hussar's dashing and

courage remained in the soul of a young officer for life.

At the age of 24, with the rank of colonel, Nikolai was sent by the tsar to London to study the history of the foreign policy of the "mistress of the seas". And not only stories... The tsar, sending a young military agent to the British Isles, gave him a personal assignment "to study all the latest achievements of artillery and engineering in England and establish the possibility of their application in Russia, as well as to clarify the military-political plans of our enemies in Europe and Asia!

One day, when in London in the British Museum, the hitherto strictly classified newest cartridge model was first put on public display, Nikolai calmly, almost indifferently approached the stand and picked up this one-of-a-kind exhibit. The group of visitors was asked to proceed to another hall. Nikolai, as if by mistake, put the cartridge in his pocket. The hussars could not resist - the temptation was too great, they really wanted to get a cartridge immediately. Museum clerk who oversees

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visitors, asked to put the "object" in its place, but Nikolai made a surprised face, spread his hands and, referring to his diplomatic immunity, flew out of the museum like a bullet and disappeared into the embassy. After such an outburst, he, of course, had to leave London. In St. Petersburg, he was slightly scolded, but generally received favorably.

Soon N.P. Ignatiev led one of the Russian expeditions to Central Asia in order to explore the possibility of establishing diplomatic and trade relations with Bukhara. The Emir of Bukhara treated the Russian envoy cordially, and the parties quickly agreed to establish a Russian trade agency in Bukhara, to reduce duties on Russian goods and to provide Russian ships with free navigation along the Amu Darya. This would be quite enough, but not for Nikolai Pavlovich. On his own initiative, he secured another important concession from the Emir. He begged him to expel from the country a number of agents of the British secret services, whom he knew about while working in London.

After reading Ignatiev's memorandum, Alexander P wrote in the margins: "I read it with great curiosity and pleasure. We must do justice to Major General Ignatiev, that he acted smartly and dexterously and achieved more than we could expect"?

With no less success in the interests of Russia, although again very risky, Nikolai Pavlovich acted in China, where he was sent in 1860 to establish the Russian-Chinese border and to promote the development of border trade. Ignatiev arrived in China at the height of the Anglo-French war, when the Chinese, who were suffering defeat after defeat, had no time for negotiations with Russia. And the Western powers were by no means going to allow the strengthening of Russian influence in China. Therefore, none of the belligerents showed the slightest interest in proposals to start peacekeeping contacts with the Russian representative. Then, taking advantage of the differences in the camp of the Anglo-French allies, Nikolai Pavlovich managed to establish personal "business" contacts with both the French and the British. He supplied them with data on China, which he received from the Russian spiritual mission in Peking, and in many ways skillfully contributed to the intensification of the Anglo-French rivalry. At the same time, Ignatiev helped the Chinese understand the true aspirations of the Western powers and thus earned their full confidence. Therefore, when the Anglo-French troops approached Beijing, the Chinese authorities turned to Ignatiev with a request to mediate in negotiations with them. Thanks to his efforts, Beijing was saved from destruction and plunder, after which the Chinese side signed a Russian-Chinese treaty on November 14, 1860, according to which a joint section of the border in Primorye was determined, in general terms, a border was established in the Central

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Asia, provided significant privileges for the Russian merchants.

After the signing of the Beijing Treaty, about a hundred Siberian merchants sent N.P. Ignatiev with a solemn address with gratitude for promoting the successful development of trade relations with China.

At the age of 28, N.P. Ignatiev becomes the youngest adjutant general in Russia, and a year later - director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responsible for Russia's foreign policy operations in Asia and the Far East.

But Ignatiev, with his temperament bubbling with excess energy, this post, although very honorable, was not to his liking. He, according to his contemporaries, was weary of office work, and when the emperor congratulated Nikolai Pavlovich on his new appointment, he politely but firmly replied that he would not want to remain in this post for a long time? He was looking for active, albeit full of dangers, but exciting work. And when Chancellor A.M. Gorchakov offered him the position of envoy in Constantinople, he accepted without hesitation. He already had a plan ready in his head to solve the age-old Russian problems with the straits: either directly seizing them by force, or establishing control over them. He saw the solution of these issues in the support of the national liberation movements of the Slavic peoples, which shattered and weakened the historical enemy of Russia - the Ottoman Empire. N.P. Ignatiev was sure that the unity of the Orthodox countries would raise the international prestige of Russia and would contribute to the abolition of the burdensome restrictions imposed by the Anglo-French-Turkish coalition after the Crimean War. Nikolai Pavlovich firmly believed that the historical mission of Russia was to collect the Slavic lands and protect them from the aggression of other states. In his memos, he noted: "In terms of protecting the future of Russia, I consider it necessary that the Slavic banner be exclusively the property of the Russian tsar and in no way allow the strengthening of the influence of any other state ..."4.

Nikolai Pavlovich, with rare perseverance and energy, took up the fulfillment of his plan. He was well informed about the state of affairs in the Turkish government and in the country as a whole, received copies of the most important secret documents from the archive of the Turkish Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, and, as his colleagues claimed, it was difficult to surprise him with any secret diplomatic news. . With the help of Christians from Constantinople, Serbian and Greek diplomats, Ignatiev received secret information about the situation of the Ottoman Empire and its foreign policy activities. Among the agents were Turkish officials who informed Ignatiev about government decisions.

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The problem was often not how to get a "secret" or "highly secret" document from the Turkish government, but how to smuggle it to Russia without Turkish counterintelligence knowing about it. Since it was very expensive to send a personal courier to their homeland every time, and sending a document or its contents in special packages with a wax seal is dangerous, since such packages were opened by the Turks in the first place and sealed after reading without the slightest trace of opening, Ignatiev decided to resort to the next venture: he began to send all his correspondence in the most ordinary letters, sealed in penny envelopes, which had lain for some time with herring and soap. He forced his lackey to write the address not in the name of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, but to his janitor or stoker at a private address. And this really saved his correspondence from being perused.

According to contemporaries, Nikolai Pavlovich began to resort to such a trick after a curious incident while still working in London. Once Ignatiev received a letter from St. Petersburg with clear signs of an autopsy. He immediately asked for an emergency meeting with the British Foreign Minister and reproached him for using the "black office" where the British secret services secretly read the personal and official correspondence of members of the Russian mission in London. The Minister gave his "word of honor" that in England there is no such institution that would be called a "black cabinet". But, being convicted of lying and pinned to the wall in the case with the ill-fated envelope, he did not find anything better than to tell the stubborn Russian

diplomat: "What do you think I should have told you? Do you really think that we are not interested in knowing what your minister writes to you and what you report to him about us? .. "

By the way, in Russia at that time there was its own "black cabinet", from which a lot of valuable information was received about the correspondence of foreign ambassadors with their governments. As the author of the book *The Black Cabinet*, the former tsarist censor S. Maisky, argued, foreign diplomatic correspondence fell into the hands of Russian "specialists" almost completely. She got into the "black office" even when she handed herself over to the post office just a few minutes before her departure to the station. The collection of the Russian secret expedition contained a complete set of immaculately copied seals for foreign correspondence of all embassies and consulates located in St. Petersburg, as well as their respective ministries of foreign affairs. The Russian "black office" had copies of many ciphers, with the help of which this correspondence was quickly read and translated, but not in the "black office", but in an institution of the same type under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where texts of all received

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foreign embassies encrypted telegrams. In some cases, there were also very secret documents that were sent by special couriers in leather briefcases with "cunning" locks. In order to receive this kind of correspondence, the former tsarist censor claimed, "despicable metal" was used, and there was no case that gold did not open any lock and did not make it possible to look through the eye of a photographic lens in just a few minutes at the contents of carefully sealed attachments of a secret portfolio. . In these cases, everything boiled down to, S. Maisky noted, how many chervonets all these manipulations would cost the Russian treasury.

But back to N.P. Ignatiev - a great fan of covert operations. He worked for thirteen years in Constantinople and did a lot for the successful implementation of the Russian foreign policy line. His inexhaustible energy and inquisitive mind largely contributed to the fact that soon after his arrival in Turkey, he took a prominent place in the diplomatic corps, eventually becoming his doyen. Ignatiev won the personal sympathy of many Turkish ministers and the Sultan himself. Behind the eyes, Nikolai Pavlovich was called the "all-powerful Moscow Pasha" - the first person after the Sultan in terms of influence in the Turkish capital. Eyewitnesses recalled that when Ignatiev rode a white horse in an embroidered gold general's uniform for worship or for a reception at the Sultan's palace, this made a great impression on the local public. N.P. Ignatiev believed that the representative of a great power should look impressive.

Returning to Russia, Ignatiev began to play a paramount role in the development of a new, dynamic Russian foreign policy. His political recommendations largely contributed to the victories of Russia in the next Russo-Turkish war. And the San Stefano Peace Treaty, concluded on February 19, 1878, according to N.P. Ignatiev, although he did not fully pay tribute to Russia, nevertheless was a great success for Russian diplomacy in the eyes of Europe at that time. The signing of the Treaty of San Stefano was greeted with enthusiasm and jubilation in Bulgaria. The solemn address, signed by more than 230,000 Bulgarians, expressed great gratitude to the Russian people for their help in liberation from the five centuries of Ottoman yoke. This triumph was fully shared by Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev.

Being the Minister of the Interior of Russia at the end of his political career, the count continued to use intelligence methods even to solve domestic political problems. Ignatiev developed an original reconnaissance operation, which Prince Peter Alekseevich Kropotkin described in detail in his book *Notes of a Revolutionary*. According to his testimony, Nikolai Pavlovich, in order to

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To prevent possible regicide, he organized in Geneva a special émigré press organ that spoke out against individual terror and violence. The purpose of the publication is to split the ranks of the conspirators against the tsar and isolate the extremely radical elements. Ignatiev specifically sent his agents to Switzerland so that during personal meetings with potential terrorists they would convince their interlocutors of the need to abandon radical methods of political struggle and conduct it within "legal and acceptable limits." As Kropotkin recalled, Ignatiev even promised that the government would not resort to the execution of terrorists, that Chernyshevsky would be released from prison, and that a state commission would be appointed to review the situation of all those exiled administratively to Siberia if the terror ceased. According to Kropotkin, this "compromise" worked for a while." Soon N.P. Ignatiev retired from active public affairs.

According to his nephew, Alexei Alekseevich Ignatiev, a lieutenant general, a tsarist intelligence agent who defected to the side of Soviet power in 1917, and the author of the well-known memoirs *Fifty Years in the Line*, Nikolai Pavlovich at the end of his life engaged in "fantastic" financial adventures. Owning forty estates scattered throughout Russia, he ended his life as a semi-poor. Count Ignatiev turned out to be the only member of the State Council whose salary was ... arrested.

The count died already in our century - in 1908.

1 TsGAOR USSR, f. 730 ("N.P. Ignatiev"), op. 1, d. 124, l. 2.

? Red archive, 1934, v.2 (63), p. 15, 17, 20, 83.

3 See TsGAOR USSR, f. 730, op. 1, d. 507, l. 14.

4 Ignatiev N.P. Notes // Historical Bulletin. - 1914. - No. 1. - P. 55. 5 Maisky S. "Black Cabinet". - M.: "Past", 1922.

6 Kropotkin P.A. Notes of a revolutionary. - M.: "Thought", 1990. - S. 418.

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Russia-US: Attempts at Rapprochement

In January 1866, representatives of the Moscow merchant class visited the director of the Moscow Conservatory, Nikolai Grigorievich Rubinstein, and asked him to prepare several musical works by American authors for public performance in connection with the upcoming banquet in honor of the American envoy C. Clay. Rubinstein willingly complied with the request of eminent merchants, and the concert that took place went down in history as "the first performance of American music and the first dinner arranged by Moscow merchants in honor of representatives of a foreign state"! As *Moskovskiye Vedomosti* wrote in those days, "there has never been either antipathy or a serious clash of interests between Russians and Americans, and only from Russia did the United States invariably hear words of sympathy and friendship"?

And this was quite natural: the United States for a long time remained too far from Russian political problems, and Russia - from American ones. But one common problem still existed: Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. These territories have long been of interest to the Americans and the British, who would like to take possession of them. The tsarist government paid little attention to their development, and after the defeat in the Crimean War (1853-1856), besides, it did not have the strength to protect them from a possible unexpected attack. In addition, St. Petersburg counted on the support of the Americans in the issue of eliminating the onerous conditions of the Paris Agreements concluded after the Crimean War. Thus was born the idea of selling these territories to the Americans.

In 1867, Alaska and the Aleutian Islands became the subject of bargaining between the two countries. American Secretary of State of those days William C. Seward and Russian Ambassador to the United States

Baron E.A. The glass showed intelligence methods rare for people in their position

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stance, trying to find out behind the scenes about the extreme positions of the parties in this trade transaction.

The Russians used all their connections and contacts in the government and Congress to find out what the final amount for the territories sold could be expected, and the Americans skillfully extorted from the Russian embassy officials how many dollars could eventually satisfy the Russian side in this bargain. Such actions of trading partners, according to modern concepts, can rightfully be ranked among the very first US intelligence operations known to us against Russia and Russia against the USA.

After a long and mutual sounding, the parties agreed to sell Alaska to America. In Washington, it was announced that the cost of the deal was \$7.2 million, and the US Congress allocated the corresponding amount. "This is the most valuable territory acquired by the United States since California," wrote the American Daily Oregonian in those days.

The Russian press was more pessimistic about the deal. The Birzhevy Vedomosti newspaper, an organ of business circles, wrote: "It is true that Russia does not benefit much from its American possessions, and for political reasons it does not really need to retain these possessions, but, in any case, hardly anyone would dare to offer our government for "Russian America" such an insignificant price as 7,000,000 dollars"?

There were people who immediately drew attention to the obvious discrepancy between the value of Alaska in the American and Russian press. Where did the \$200,000 go? Chancellor A.M. had to officially answer this question. Gorchakov, and he sent a request to the Russian embassy in Washington. Explaining this "strange" situation, the first secretary of the embassy V.A. In a ciphered telegram, Bodisko personally replied to the chancellor that some Russian missions abroad "have funds for intelligence" and no one except the heads of state has the right to know what they were used for. It is not difficult to assume that some part of the money received for Alaska ended up in this secret fund. There has been no official clarification on this...

One way or another, but the actions of the Russian diplomats in Washington were graciously approved by Alexander P. Chancellor Gorchakov sent a special letter dated April 28, 1867 to the Russian embassy in Washington, in which he conveyed the royal "thank you" to Stekl and announced that he had been awarded and Mission Secretary V. Bodisko 30,000 silver rubles.

The mutual interest of Russia and America began to grow rapidly as the industrial development of the two countries. And this circumstance, of course

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Obviously, it gave a certain impetus to the constant, sometimes tacit, monitoring of each other's successes in world markets, as well as the achievements in the field of advanced technologies and industrial production. When in the mid-70s of the last century the flow of cheap American oil, obtained using the latest technologies of that time, literally flooded the world market with this valuable energy product and Russia began to suffer huge financial losses, since its oil producing and oil refining enterprises could not withstand competition with American producers of petroleum products, the question arose of transferring American experience to Russian soil. By that time, only four out of a hundred operating oil refineries remained in Russia; the rest closed, unable to withstand the competition. It was then that officials from the Russian government apparatus came up with a reasonable, but several decades late idea to "deal with American innovations" in the field of oil production and oil refining. Candidate for

The "scouts" did not have to search for a long time, he was right at hand. They became a world-famous specialist - the great Russian chemist Dmitry Ivanovich Mendeleev.

In June 1876, when the 100th anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration of Independence was celebrated, he came to the United States for an international exhibition of technical innovations. The "Warrior of Russian Science" was a versatile chemist, a specialist in the development of methods for extracting oil, refining and processing it.

Trip D.I. Mendeleev in the United States was jointly organized by the Ministry of Finance and the Russian Technical Society, which had direct contacts with the military department, which had its own "purely professional interests" in this overseas tour of the scientist.

Dmitri Ivanovich Mendeleev began his work in the United States by getting acquainted with official oil statistics. In Washington technical libraries, scientific institutes, and government departments, Mendeleev studied the "systems approach" to the expansion of oil production and was highly satisfied with the state of record and statistics on oil production.

During his trips around the USA and during the work of the Philadelphia exhibition, the Russian scientist had many personal contacts and meetings with prominent American specialists and scientists. He noted the high professional level and intelligence of the American colleagues. "Which of the scientists or technicians we had to deal with - every one was extremely obligatory. A few first connections were enough to immediately get a large and varied circle of acquaintances.

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From a practical and scientific point of view, the trip of D.I. Mendeleev in the heart of American industrial production of those days - the city of Pittsburgh. The Russian scientist often visited oil wells, pumping stations and oil pipelines. This made it possible to see with my own eyes not only the advantages of the American oil business, but also its negative features. "For all the seeming grandiosity of the oil business in the USA," Dmitry Ivanovich wrote in his report on the trip, "the merger of various small private enterprises and firms is being done not in order to move the oil industry forward, but in order to achieve a monopoly, in which there is no special and an urgent interest to expand production, or perhaps only a desire to maintain a high price or raise it.

D.I. Mendeleev was interested in the USA not only in the issues of oil production. At the request of the Russian military department, he tried to find the secret of making smokeless powder and find out how successful the developments of American chemists in this direction were. His efforts were crowned with success. The information received on this issue allowed Mendeleev not only to reproduce the chemical formulas of the explosive "product" classified by the Americans, but also to develop on their basis a new generation of effective and relatively inexpensive Russian gunpowders.

While in the USA, Dmitry Ivanovich could not but pay attention to the mass production and wide distribution of various types of weapons among the population. In one of the notes made by a Russian scientist in a notebook, it was written: "With its iron, America produces revolvers and guns - I didn't come up with anything better; but says: peace and tranquility.

The cloudless days of Russian-American relations in the second half of the 19th century were coming to an end. And here a significant role was played by the interstate contradictions that had appeared by that time: acute overseas grain competition, rivalry between the two countries in the oil market. Good-neighborly relations were also not helped by the frequent "raids" of American fur trade and businessmen beyond the territories of "Russian America", that is, to the coast of Okhotsk, Chukotka and Kamchatka. The eastward policy pursued by the Russian government, in turn, did not meet with the approval of the Americans. All this is a drop behind

bit by bit increased at first the mutual "concern", "anxiety", and then "alienation" in Russian-American relations, and, consequently, the desire to "surely" know about each other's intentions using covert means. Therefore, the staff of the US embassies in St. Petersburg and Russia in Washington gradually increased -

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not only at the expense of career professional diplomats. But this already happened a little later - in the first decades of the current, twentieth century.

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No.

2A

Officer "for special assignments" - Minister of War in Bulgaria

In the life of a scout, it is a common thing when, having completed the task assigned to him abroad, he returns to his homeland. In this regard, the fate of Russian Army Colonel Pyotr Dmitrievich Parensov is unique: he successfully coped with the secret task assigned to him in Bulgaria and remained in the capital of the liberated country no longer as an illegal intelligence officer, but in the rank of Minister of War of the interim administration, which carried out the transition from the Turkish vassalage to state independence.

In the 1970s, the picturesque landscapes of the long-suffering Balkan Peninsula literally "breathed" with gunpowder. After the defeat in the Crimean War, Russia was hand and foot bound by enslaving obligations. However, later, after the cancellation of the articles of the Paris Treaty on the "neutralization of the Black Sea", she got the opportunity to participate more actively in solving the political issues of this region. The Russian government did not set itself the task of capturing Constantinople and the straits, it was enough for it to strengthen its political and economic influence in the Balkans. That rare case in history arose when the aspirations of the Russian people, who wholeheartedly supported the struggle of the Slavic brothers for independence, coincided with the plans of the ruling circles of St. Petersburg.

The results of the Crimean War could not stop the process of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The national liberation movement of the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula reached an enormous scale.

In 1875, an anti-Turkish uprising broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the flames of which spread to the territory of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bulgaria. In April 1876, the Bulgarians opposed the Turkish dominance. More than 30 thousand people rose to fight, led by a national hero, poet and revolutionary

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Hristo Botev. Untrained, poorly armed people (locals were forbidden to have any weapons) with slogans "Freedom or death!" heroically resisted the units

regular Turkish army.

The Russian government provided moral, material and diplomatic support to the Balkan peoples fighting for their liberation, as this was in the interests of its policy of securing in the region. However, the government was not yet ready for decisive action and entry into the war against Turkey. The military reforms that began after the defeat in the Crimean War remained unfinished, the military industry was poorly functioning, and there were not enough trained reserves. The most lively response in the hearts of the Russian people was caused by reports of uprisings in the Balkans. Fundraising was organized, in which the largest scientists of Russia, D.I. Mendeleev, I.I. Mechnikov and others. Russian volunteers began to go to the Balkans - soldiers and officers, doctors, writers and artists. Among them are those whose names are forever inscribed in golden letters in the history of our Fatherland - doctors S.P. Botkin and N.F. Sklifosovsky, artists V.D. Polenov and K.E. Makovsky, writer G.I. Uspensky.

However, this support could not have a decisive impact, and Alexander P and Chancellor A.M. Gorchakov, understanding the complexity of the economic and military-political situation in Russia, held consultations with the Western European powers. Taking advantage of the passivity of some European governments, Turkey began to "restore order" in the Balkans with exorbitant cruelty. The Turks inflicted a serious defeat on the Serbian army and strangled the national movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Literally in a sea of blood, the April uprising in Bulgaria was sunk - 58 villages were devastated, 12 thousand Bulgarians were killed, without distinction of sex and age. A string of caravans with "human goods" stretched to the slave markets of the vast Ottoman Empire.

This massacre aroused sharp indignation throughout the civilized world. The current situation prompted the diplomats of Russia and a number of other powers to make an appeal to the government of the Sultan to carry out reforms in order to alleviate the unbearable situation of the Christian peoples in the territory of the empire. Porta ignored this appeal. And when, relying on secret support from London, the sultan in December 1876 categorically rejected the project of granting autonomy to certain provinces in Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, worked out by the conference of ambassadors in Constantinople, it became clear that war was inevitable.

In a hurry, Russia began to prepare for it. In January 1877, she entered into an agreement with Austria-Hungary for the preservation

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neutrality, and in March - with Romania on the passage of Russian troops through its territory. The time has come to bring military units to combat readiness.

The main burden of the upcoming battles fell on the powerful grouping of the Russian army concentrated in Bessarabia, commanded by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. The mood in the army was on the rise. The officers and soldiers understood that they had to liberate their Slavic Bulgarian brothers from the centuries-old Turkish yoke. But the command needed additional military and political information that would allow Russia to avoid heavy military losses in the proposed theater of operations. It was necessary to obtain clear information about the state of affairs on the territory of Bulgaria, the deployment of the garrisons of the Turkish army, their numbers and weapons, and the new defensive fortifications of the Turks that were constantly being built.

Call of Colonel P.D. Parensov to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief did not come as a surprise to him: there could be only one reason - a conversation that took place a few days ago with Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. He, an officer "on special assignments", was invited to the commander-in-chief to discuss the problems of obtaining reliable secret information about a potential enemy. At the end of the conversation, being an intelligence specialist, P.D. Parensov proposed to the Grand Duke his candidacy as an unspoken representative of the field headquarters of the Russian army in Bulgaria. Nikolay Nikolayevich said nothing then,

thought. And then, in parting, he only firmly shook hands with the colonel. With that, they parted ways. And here is the challenge again. The anticipation of close work caused a pleasant slight excitement, excited me. No worries P.D. Parensov did not test. Many years of service have already taught me to calmly accept such tasks. Undoubtedly, a certain risk and danger were present in this case, but a combat officer is no stranger to this.

Stay at the rate was short. He was handed documents in the name of Paul Paulson and three thousand rubles for expenses related to the organization of intelligence work abroad.

Soon, a "distant relative" of the Russian consul in Romania, Baron Stewart, who arrived here from Chisinau, showed up in Bucharest. He paid daily visits, made new acquaintances, rode around the city in a varnished carriage, sometimes went on a carouse or played cards. In general, he behaved as was customary, not differing in any way from people of the secular circle, who were not burdened by public service. And only upon returning home, Paul Paulson again became himself, analyzed in detail the conversations held, studied the established

contacts and carefully

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selected assistants, primarily among Bulgarian patriots, who were ready to selflessly and devotedly serve the cause of the liberation of their homeland and provide him with all possible assistance in solving the tasks assigned to him.

He met many representatives of the Bulgarian emigration in Bucharest, who united around the famous Bulgarian writer L. Karavelov, who published the magazine Fatherland and the newspaper Nezavisimost. But he was more interested in the Bulgarians, who lived on the other side of the Danube and could give him the necessary information.

One of these assistants P.D. Parensova was a major grain merchant and banker Evlogii Georgiev. The brothers Christo and Evlogii Georgiev were famous people in Bulgaria. They allocated significant funds to support public education. It was with their money that national schools were created, rural "reading centers" were opened. In memory of them, the Bulgarian people cast bronze statues of the brothers, which still stand at the entrance to Sofia University, one of the founders of which they are.

They are, as they say, in plain sight. But few people guess about the other, secret life of the Georgiev brothers. They were patriots and, in order to liberate their homeland, took a huge risk, supplying Romania with secret information for Russian intelligence along with grain. And they risked a lot. On the other side of the Danube, a single denunciation was enough for both brothers to die a painful death.

P.D. received valuable information. Parensov and from other secret sources. Among them was the merchant Grigory Nachovich, who conducted his business on both sides of the Danube. He reported on the passage of warships and river fortifications of the Turks. The assistant to the head of the Ruschuk-Varna railway freight station regularly informed about the movement of Turkish troops on his section of the railway, about the transportation of artillery, ammunition, and food supplies.

To the field headquarters of the Russian army from P.D. Parensov began to receive regular information about the personnel and movement of the Turkish army in Danube Bulgaria, ships and minefields on the Danube, the state of fortifications and other defensive structures, new weapons and the arrival of Egyptian troops for reinforcements, food supplies and military warehouses. ammunition.

P.D. Parensov himself repeatedly crossed the Danube under the pretext of the need to visit the grave of his "Russian relative", but in fact - to reconnoiter the area and clarify

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of Turkish military positions. The information he transmitted to the field headquarters of the Russian army was reliable, verified and clearly answered the questions of interest to the command, which was preparing for the start of hostilities. His considerable merit lies in the fact that, having crossed the Danube on June 15, 1877, the advance detachment of Russian troops under the command of General I.V. Gurko already on June 25 liberated the city of Tarnovo and took possession of the mountain passes through the Balkan Range.

With the beginning of the war, the need to obtain reliable information about the enemy increased, and P.D. Parensov brilliantly coped with this task. The network of agents he created continued to work. "I understood the need to have a permanent agent and made experiments that brought excellent results," he told his colleagues in the field headquarters.

The intelligence activity of Petr Dmitrievich was assessed according to his merits by his immediate boss - the managing Military Scientific Committee, the future Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army, General N. Obruchev. "Never before," he wrote, "data on the Turkish army have been developed so carefully and in detail as before the last war: to the location of each battalion, each squadron, each battery ..."

The bloody battles on the Shipkinsky Pass died down, forever imprinted in the paintings of the Russian artist V.V. Vereshchagin. Plevna was taken, Bulgaria was liberated, and the Russian troops, stopping 12 kilometers from Constantinople, victoriously ended this war. The San Stefano and then the Berlin treaties were signed. They reduced the results of the victory of Russian weapons to a minimum, but Bulgaria, although greatly reduced in territory, nevertheless gained independence. To assist in the formation of the Bulgarian statehood, a special form of temporary administration was formed - the Russian Civil Administration, headed by the High Commissioner of Russia, Adjutant General Prince A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov. During the war, he commanded the 13th Army Corps, and then the so-called eastern detachment of Russian troops. The military department was proposed to be headed by P.D. Parensov.

How to evaluate the activities of a cabinet that has existed for less than a year? As representatives of Russia, they, of course, acted primarily in the interests of their state, trying to combine them as much as possible with the interests of the newly formed Bulgarian principality. Under the terms of the Berlin Agreement, the Russian military presence in the Balkans was limited to 9 months. Consequently, there was only one way to ensure the interests of Russia in the region - by creating a viable state that would act as a union

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nickname of Russia and could resist Turkish hegemony. And the cabinet has coped with this task.

In a short time, the Russian civil administration managed to reform the tax system, create self-government bodies, prepare elections to the Great National Assembly (Parliament) of Bulgaria. In a country where not a single Bulgarian before the war was admitted to administrative activity, more than three thousand officials of various levels were urgently trained, who gradually replaced Russian officers in leading positions. It may be objected that, they say, all this was done on orders from St. Petersburg, in their own interests. This, of course, is not without reason, but it is doubtful that representatives of one of the most rigid absolutist monarchies were instructed to organize a system of self-government, hold parliamentary elections and assist in the preparation of a draft constitution. All this is explained by the fact that there have always been quite a few progressive-minded people among the Russian officers. Therefore, here, in Bulgaria, they gave a chance to the new country to get what they themselves did not have - the most advanced liberal-democratic constitution at that time, which then entered the history of Bulgaria under the name "Tyrnovskaya".

The Russian civil administration had to solve global problems against the backdrop of everyday current problems - providing housing and food for the refugees who were still part of Turkey, stretching from the southern regions of Bulgaria, and there were about 200 thousand people,

litigation of the claims of some Muslims who wished to return and demanded compensation for their property.

Heading the military department, P.D. Parensov was actively involved in the formation of a new Bulgarian army. Zemstvo troops were deployed on the basis of the militia battalions. Weapons, ammunition, uniforms, military equipment, as well as several warships were donated from the reserves of the Russian army. For the formation of national army personnel in Sofia, a military school was opened, in which Russian officers taught. Many Bulgarians were sent to Russia, to military schools for various branches of the military. As a result, by the beginning of 1879, the zemstvo army numbered 25,000 well-trained soldiers and officers. This required considerable effort from P.D. Parensov and his collaborators, because for many centuries the Bulgarians did not have their own military formations and were severely punished by the Turks for the mere possession of even edged weapons.

The memory of the Russian soldiers-liberators is still alive in the national memory of the Bulgarians. Many monuments related to that war appeared in Sofia and other cities of the country. And now in Bulgarian

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capital, you can sit in cozy small restaurants on Count Ignatiev Street, look at theater posters on General Gurko Street, walk along General Skobelev Boulevard, which crowns the spire of the monument to Russian soldiers who died during the liberation of Bulgaria, hear the chime of Sofia trams on Boulevard Prince Dondukov. But among these names you will not meet Colonel P.D. Parensov, who did so much for the establishment of an independent Bulgaria. Of course, he, as a scout, is no stranger to staying in the shadows.

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Esaul Livkin in India and China

The end of the 19th century in the history of Russia was marked by the growth of contradictions with England in Asia. Having fortified themselves in India, the British made plans to penetrate into Central Asia and the Urals through Afghanistan from the south and through Tibet from the east. In turn, Russia also sought to extend its influence to these regions.

Russia and England jealously followed each other's actions in Afghanistan and Tibet. Russia believed that the British, having strengthened their positions in Afghanistan and conquered Tibet, which would open the way for them to Xinjiang, would find themselves on the southern and eastern borders of Central Asia. Britain, on the other hand, feared that Russia could go beyond the western borders of India through Afghanistan, where her position was very unstable.

Under such conditions, constant monitoring of the situation in Afghanistan, Persia, India, China, Tibet and other parts of Asia where the interests of the empire could be affected became of particular importance for Russia.

These interests were not only geopolitical in nature. At this time, a plague epidemic broke out in India, which caused serious concern for the Russian government. The plague could have spread through Afghanistan to the territory of Russia. By the highest command, a special commission was created, headed by Prince A.P. Oldenburgsky. Under his leadership, along the border with Afghanistan, quarantine detachments were formed, the arrangement of which required significant sums from the state treasury.

The lack of reliable information about the epidemiological situation in India and the border regions of Afghanistan seriously complicated the work. The amount of expenses for anti-plague measures largely depended on the probability of plague penetration into Central Asia.

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In this situation, it was decided to send an experienced intelligence officer to India. The choice fell on the captain of the Ural Cossack army, David Ivanovich Livkin. In 1898, when this operation was being prepared, he was 35 years old. He was born in the city of Guryev, where from childhood he came into contact with immigrants from Central Asia. In the future, most of his service took place in the regions of the East, where he thoroughly studied the manners, customs, psychology, and religious rituals of representatives of many Eastern nationalities.

Livkin graduated from a military school, a three-year Oriental language course for officers at the training department of the Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The courses taught Arabic, Turkish, Persian, French, international and Muslim law. In addition to the knowledge Livkin received in foreign languages during the courses, he spoke Tatar, Kyrgyz and English, which he had previously learned on his own.

Livkin has repeatedly shown himself to be an experienced and courageous officer when performing assignments abroad. At the direction of the head of the Transcaspian region, General Tumanov, he went to Samarkand to meet with the Prince of Oldenburg. The Prince immediately warned that this operation was of an extremely delicate nature due to relations with England and should be carried out with extreme caution.

Livkin's practical preparation for the assignment was carried out under the direct supervision of the prince. First, at the suggestion of Livkin, the option of a trip based on the documents of a foreign merchant was accepted. However, shortly before leaving, the Prince of Oldenburg changed his mind and suggested that Livkin go to India as a lawyer for Colonel Prince Orbeliani, who was supposed to travel under the guise of a rich Russian nobleman seeking inheritance rights after the death of a relative in Madras. This option, according to the prince, made it possible to organize communication more reliably and gave more chances to avoid failure. It was assumed that Livkin, acting under the guise of a lawyer, would be able to collect the necessary information and send it to Russia through the prince.

At the same time, Livkin was given the right, in case of any complications along the route, to act independently according to the first option.

Livkin asked for permission to take his reliable man on the trip, the Persian merchant Mirza Mehdi, who conducted trade in Persia, Egypt and Russia. Mirza Mehdi had great connections among the merchants in these countries, and Livkin counted on his help in establishing the necessary contacts with Persian, Egyptian and other trading firms.

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Much attention was paid to the development of the itinerary of the trip. It was impossible to travel through Afghanistan, as this would immediately attract the attention of the British, especially since the path in this case would run through the northwestern provinces of India, which the Anglo-Indian authorities were heavily guarding against the penetration of foreigners. It was decided to use the route through Europe, the Suez Canal and further to India.

On October 29, with a passport in the name of the merchant Mohammed Hasanov, a native of the Caucasus, Livkin, together with Prince Orbeliani, left for Vienna. There it was necessary to decide how to proceed further - to act as a lawyer for the prince or independently.

Upon arrival in Vienna, Livkin drew attention to the fact that foreigners and local guests of the hotel where they settled already knew that the group was going to India. The behavior of the prince himself, who attached too much importance to external tinsel and had too little idea of the nature of the forthcoming work, was not liked either.

In a conversation with him, it turned out that Orbeliani has no relatives in India, no correspondence on the issue of inheritance has been and is not being conducted, that the legend of the inheritance itself is not supported by anything and at the first check it will burst like a soap bubble. . In addition, Livkin himself

not suitable for the role of a lawyer. It became clear that it was impossible to continue the journey with the prince. Therefore, Livkin decided to use the first option. An agreement was reached with the prince on secret meetings in Port Said and Bombay, where the obtained information would be transmitted.

Egypt was chosen as an intermediate country. David Ivanovich planned to carry out all the preparatory work in Port Said. In particular, he hoped, with the help of Mirza Mehdi, to attract two or three assistants to cooperate and use them in the future in studying the epidemiological situation in India. It was also necessary to acquire a Persian passport and continue to act under the guise of a Persian merchant. He had the information to do so. Outwardly, he looked like a person of eastern nationality, spoke Persian well, knew the customs and customs of this country perfectly - all this gave confidence that he would successfully cope with the role he had chosen.

Port Said in those years was the center of international trade, where there were foreign colonies and merchants from Persia, India, a number of Arab countries, and Europe traded.

Mirza Mehdi proved to be an exceptionally useful companion. He brought Livkin into contact with the right people, through whom he obtained a real Persian passport for a certain fee. Subsequently, he introduced him to a man named Haji Niyaz, who was engaged in the trade in precious stones and had great connections among merchants in India, where he repeatedly visited affairs.

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With Mirza Mehdi and Haji Niyaz, Livkin agreed that they would go to India and help him organize work to study the epidemiological situation. An important role was assigned to Haji Niyaz. He had, through his trusted man in India, to select two agents who could freely explore the northwestern part of India, as well as the eastern regions of Afghanistan.

To consolidate relations with Haji Niyaz and Mirza Mehdi, Livkin not only used material incentives, but also resorted to the help of one major Muslim religious authority. This man treated Russia well. Having learned about what a noble mission Livkin is performing, he obliged Haji Niyaz and Mirza Mehdi to provide him with any help that was needed. Now Haji Niyaz and Mirza Mehdi were connected with him not only by the agreements they had, but also by the responsibility they bore to their spiritual leader.

A lot of work has been done to create an additional communication channel with Russia, through which it would be possible to transfer the obtained information. David Ivanovich had big doubts that Orbeliani would provide a reliable connection. Already upon his arrival in Port Said, he encountered the first violations of the agreements reached. According to the conditions developed, the prince was supposed to be in Port Said until Livkin arrived there, where they were scheduled to meet and finalize the plan of action in India. But, as it turned out, Orbeliani did not linger in Egypt and proceeded directly to India.

Livkin was forced to look for an opportunity that could ensure the transfer of information through Port Said to Odessa. With the help of his assistants, he found a reliable person in one of the foreign consulates, who agreed to receive the correspondence that would come from India and forward it to its destination. This person had diplomatic status and, from the point of view of security, fully met the requirements necessary for the performance of this work.

The created communication channel through Port Said made it possible not only to send the obtained information, but also to receive the necessary instructions, money, etc. from Russia. The use of the communication line through Orbeliani was not excluded. However, in view of the loss of contact with him, it was necessary to find out his whereabouts and make sure that it was possible to maintain regular relations with him.

To this end, Livkin instructed Mirza Mehdi to go to Bombay and try to find out where Orbeliani lives, what the situation is around him, and whether information can be sent through him.

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Having sent Mirza Mehdi to India, Livkin, together with Haji Niyaz, went to work on the issue of selecting agents from among the Indians to survey the given areas. To do this, it was necessary first of all to determine which of Haji Niyaz's acquaintances in India could be used to select the right people.

It was decided to turn to a good friend of Haji Niyaz, an Afghan merchant Khuda Bakhsh, who lived in the city of Lahore in India. The latter traded both in India and Afghanistan and had extensive connections in local trading circles. Haji Niyaz characterized him
as an honest and completely reliable person.

He wrote him a letter asking him to pick up two literate and reliable people who could freely travel in eastern Afghanistan and the western provinces of India and find out the situation with the plague. The request was legended by the commercial interests of the company, which was afraid, along with goods imported from India, to bring the plague to Egypt. The answer of Haji Niyaz asked to be sent to him in the city of Hyderabad in India, where he was going in the next
days to leave.

From Port Said, Livkin, together with Haji Niyaz, did not leave immediately for India, but first arrived in Ceylon. He got acquainted with the market of precious stones there, established contacts with local merchants, purchased a small batch of stones, and only then landed in India. It was a small place called Totcorin, where there was no special control over the entrants, and from there he went through Madras to Hyderabad.

Livkin posed as a dealer in precious stones and other rare colonial goods. This was the reason for his visit to Ceylon, one of the largest stone markets. In the event of verification, which could not be ruled out, the facts of Livkin's "trading activities" both in Port Said and in Colombo would have found appropriate confirmation.

In Hyderabad, Haji Niyaz received a letter from Hud Bakhsh, who said that he was continuing to look for the right people and, as soon as this work was completed, he would send them to him. A few days later Khuda Bakhsh himself arrived in Hyderabad along with two assistants. Khuda Bakhsh made a very favorable impression on Livkin. He was pleased with the assistants, one of whom was a native of Kashmir named Shamseddin, the other - Abdullah Khan - was an Afghan living in India. Both turned out to be literate, which was a rarity in those days, they traveled a lot and were well acquainted with the areas where they had to work.

However, before the issue was finally resolved and the agents set off on their routes, Livkin spent several days, following Eastern customs, in friendly conversations with them and at the same time

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but together with Haji Niyaz he studied them in terms of reliability and suitability for use. As Livkin writes in his report, only "after long friendly conversations about a wide variety of subjects, exchanges of visits and plentiful treats, Haji Niyaz finally expressed confidence that these persons can be relied upon."

Shamseddin and Abdullah Khan took Livkin's order with all seriousness. Was agreed price for the task - 500 rupees. Khuda Bakhsh was given a gift - a ring with diamonds - as a sign of friendship and respect, and, in addition, a special reward of 500 rupees was promised if the agents did a good job.

At the same time, Livkin planned to visit Bombay, since it was not far in distance, and try to establish contact with Orbeliani. However, this trip had to be canceled, as a message was received from Mirza Mehdi that after a long search, he managed to locate the prince and meet with his servant. He said that they were under surveillance and that they were completely under the control of the police. After meeting with a servant, Mirza Mehdi was detained by the police and interrogated. Further attempts to establish contact with the prince were considered inappropriate.

After analyzing the reports received from his assistants, Livkin came to the conclusion that the situation was safe in the areas assigned for inspection, and that there was no plague in Afghanistan and the adjacent regions of India. The first message about this was sent to St. Petersburg. However, work continued.

The most dangerous places from where the plague could penetrate into Russia, Livkin considered the regions of India and Kashmir bordering Afghanistan. Therefore, he personally checked the information regarding the situation in these areas with special care. His stay in Amritsar and Lahore gave him the opportunity to talk with people coming from places of interest to him.

The work was nearing completion. Several messages have already been sent to St. Petersburg. Livkin gave the command to return the agents. At the same time, he did not leave the thought that the disease could spread to the northern and northwestern part of India. Although it began to decline, but this did not remove the threat to the territory of Russia.

To control the situation, he decided to select a reliable person who would have to regularly send messages to him in Russia. Such a person was the merchant Ibrahim Bey, whom Livkin studied well and tested on specific cases.

After detailed conversations with his assistants about their work and the impressions received, he thanked them, gave them the amounts due, and, accompanied by Haji Niyaz, departed

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in Karachi, where the most dangerous focus of the epidemic was located. At this time, the death rate in the city reached 34 cases per day. After Karachi, Livkin visited Bombay, where there was also a major focus of the epidemic.

Based on the study of the data obtained about the plague, Livkin concluded that the Anglo-Indian authorities organized the work to combat the plague with sufficient energy and skill, and their efforts were yielding positive results. However, the intelligence officer believed that until the epidemic was completely eliminated, there was a danger of it being carried to other areas, including Russia. He witnessed the emergence of a small outbreak of disease near Delhi. He visited this place and as a result of conversations with doctors, he established that the disease was brought from Karachi, from where two people came to their relatives. This kind of introduction of the epidemic was not ruled out in any territory, including Afghanistan and further to Central Asia through traders or

pilgrims.

In this regard, he took additional measures to study the population flows from India to Afghanistan, Persia and Central Asia, as well as the causes that influence the revival and decrease of THESE FLOWS.

As a result, interesting data were obtained. After the opening of the Suez Canal, the export of Indian goods to Central Asia was completely stopped, as it became unprofitable. Therefore, the flow of people also stopped. Due to suspicion, or even simply hostility towards foreigners on the part of the Afghans, India's relations with Persia through Afghanistan practically ceased. Religious fanaticism and complete arbitrariness towards non-Christians, including

to Shiite Muslims - Persian subjects, the circle of persons using the passage through Afghanistan was extremely limited.

On the basis of the information received, Livkin concluded that under the existing conditions, it is possible to penetrate from India to Central Asia and, consequently, bring the plague there only through Kashmir and the upper Indus Valley, where there is a passage to its territory. However, in connection with the strengthening of border control on the Russian side, this theoretical option was no longer valid.

Livkin's proposals to the Commission of the Prince of Oldenburg boiled down to the following:

1. Suspend the formation of quarantine detachments along the Afghan border due to the absence of a real danger of the spread of the plague to the territory of Central Asia.
2. Strengthen control over persons arriving from India and goods of Indian origin.
3. Completely close the border in the event of plague in Afghanistan or neighboring countries, since the losses from tor

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as a result of this action, the cost of quarantine measures will be much less.

The proposals were reported by Livkin to the commission after his safe return to St. Petersburg in June 1899. The task given to the scout was completed. Such a seemingly "non-intelligence" issue as the study of the epidemiological situation required the implementation of a whole range of complex operational measures.

At the same time, Livkin carried out work to collect political information. The absence of Russia's permanent representatives in India often led to a distorted view of the real situation in that country. Therefore, the intelligence officer sought to understand not only how strong the position of the British in India was, but also in the deep internal processes taking place in Indian society.

Based on personal observations and conversations with various categories of the population, including merchants, civil servants, intellectuals, Livkin came to the conclusion that dissatisfaction with the domination of the British among the people is intensifying. A particularly explosive situation developed in the Ganges Valley and Punjab, where outbreaks of a general popular uprising could not be ruled out.

At the same time, in his report, he noted: "We must recognize the dominance of the British as very strong, since their organization, in the sense of maintaining their power, is exemplary. Should a partial uprising or mutiny arise somewhere, immediately, thanks to the expedient redeployment of troops and railroad tracks, the number of troops necessary to suppress the mutiny will be concentrated in the given area. Despite the fact that the presence of the British in India is little noticeable, their supervision is strongly felt everywhere.

Taking into account the large role of India in Asia and the interests of Russia in this region, Livkin, in his recommendations, pointed out the need to have his own secret agents in this country in order to receive reliable information about the domestic political situation and foreign policy. actions of the British.

He recommended paying special attention to such issues as:

1. The study of the political views, sentiments and ideals of both the Hindu and Muslim populations. Great importance must be given to the internal processes taking place in the upper strata of Indian society, especially among the intelligentsia.

2. Obtaining information about the brewing of political upheavals in the country, about the methods of fighting against the British, the availability of opportunities to set up armed formations from the local population against the British, the quality and quantity of such formations.

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3. Finding out the requirements of various segments of the population in the social and agrarian areas, which of these requirements are the most acute.

4. The study of the mood in the troops recruited from the local population, what is the probability of joining these troops, in the event of anti-English speeches, to the insurgent people.

5. Conducting research on the situation in the vassal principalities.

After returning to St. Petersburg, he was seconded to the General Staff, made several inspection trips to the troops, and with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, he filed a report with a request to send him to Manchuria to the active army.

Upon arrival at the front, he was appointed commander of the reconnaissance division under the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops. Livkin's scouts did a great job of collecting data on the enemy, went to the rear of the Japanese, took "tongues", and participated in other military operations. Livkin's outstanding abilities manifested themselves here as well. Once the commander-in-chief called Livkin and said that on the right flank of the Russian army there was a large grouping of Chinese troops under the command of General Ma. This grouping is concentrated on the Peking-Mukden line, and there is a fear that the Chinese may join the Japanese, and this will seriously complicate the position of the Russian army. Since the intentions of the Chinese are not known, it is impossible to withdraw troops from this sector, although they could be used in other sectors of the front. He asked Livkin what could be done to find out General Ma's true intentions and to keep him from the temptation to hit the flank of the Russian army. Livkin proposed sending a small group of scouts under the guise of Russian merchants led by him to the headquarters of the Chinese general and try to find out his plans. Consent was given, and Livkin, without delay, set about preparing a reconnaissance operation.

With a document in the name of the Russian tea merchant Popov and with gifts for the general, accompanied by his comrades, acting under the guise of caravaneers, Livkin appeared at Ma's headquarters.

Initially, the "merchants" were greeted coldly and with suspicion. However, when Livkin was received by the general himself, the situation changed. The gifts presented, Livkin's ability to win people over, knowledge of Chinese rituals and customs contributed to establishing the necessary contact. Livkin stayed at General Ma's headquarters for several days and managed during this time not only to establish good relations with the Chinese, but also to make friends with the general himself.

In conversations, the general said that he was not going to help the Japanese and would not conduct any offensive operations. During the conversations, Livkin became convinced that the Chinese command was seriously concerned about the plans of the Japanese for conquest, considering them a direct threat.

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directly to China. Livkin did not find any signs that would indicate the preparation of the offensive; moreover, the friendly attitude towards him and towards the Russians in general testified to the benevolent intentions of the Chinese command.

The information received by Livkin was highly appreciated at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief and played a big role in planning the military operations of the Russian army on the Mukden sector of the front.

The further fate and career of this brilliant Russian intelligence officer and talented person changed dramatically. Under Mukden, he received a severe concussion, lost the power of speech, could not

move independently, and was retired with the rank of colonel. During his service he was awarded a golden weapon, the Order of St. Vladimir with swords and a bow.

In the last years of his life, being in a distressed situation (at times, due to bureaucratic red tape, he did not even receive the small pension that was assigned to him), he repeatedly applied to various authorities with a request to establish a pension due to his rank and merit, which would make it possible to carry out treatment and to exist more or less tolerably. However, his petitions were sent from one department to another, and no positive decision was made. On October 15, 1912, he arrived in St. Petersburg and submitted a petition directly to the tsar:

"The most merciful Sovereign Great Sovereign Emperor Nikolai Alexandrovich Autocrat All-Russian Sovereign most merciful

Asks retired Colonel of the Ural Cossack Army David Ivanovich Livkin

Last December, Your Imperial Majesty's most merciful order was issued to submit for consideration to Mr. Chairman of the Council of Ministers my request for an increase in pension or allowance.

On May 8 of this year, the Department of the State Treasury informed me that consideration of my application would follow immediately upon receipt of the additional information requested from the General Staff. Finally, in September, it was announced to me that all correspondence about the pension had been transferred to the Main Quartermaster's Office. Thus, 11 months have passed since the date of my request.

During this time, my health has deteriorated significantly, and one can fear that the desired help will come when it is already too late.

At the present time I have come to St. Petersburg again to consult with the doctors. Money for the return trip, and even more so for the prescribed

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I have no other immediate journey to the south; meanwhile, the final decision of my case, due to the necessary formalities, may be delayed for a few more months.

Being in a critical situation, again and again I allow myself to resort to your, Great Sovereign, mercy. Order now, without waiting for the final decision on my case, to give me a lump-sum allowance in the amount of several hundred rubles, so that I can carry out the prescribed trip and at least slightly improve my health, destroyed in the service of Your Majesty and Motherland.

Your Imperial Majesty's loyal subject Colonel David Ivanovich Livkin

October 15, 1912"

At this, the correspondence of David Ivanovich is interrupted. It is not known whether he received royal favor or not. Soon he died.

! RGVA, f. 970, op. 3, file 1594, p. 40. 2 Ibid., p. 74. h Ibid., p. 40.

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Podesaul Ulanov and lama Ulyanov

The Minister of the Court of His Imperial Majesty, Baron Fredericks, was clearly annoyed. Only at the last minute was he informed that the program of visits to the sovereign for January 14, 1904 should

to be changed, since the General Staff of the Army asked Nicholas II to urgently receive for a "confidential audience" two Don Cossacks who were going on a secret mission to Tibet. The sovereign agreed, and Baron Fredericks had no choice but to convey to the organizers of the royal hunt in the protected pheasant farm in Ropsha that His Majesty would not be able to come today and postpone the hunt for several days, which will be reported additionally.

Frowning in displeasure, Frederiks threw to his adjutant: – I hope you told His Majesty's guests that they need to come to the audience in full dress?

"I did," the adjutant answered haltingly, "but they prefer civilians so as not to attract special attention to themselves." Moreover, they are... Kalmyks.

The secret audience took place. In his diary on that day, the tsar wrote: "January 14, 1904... We got up early. I read a lot in the morning; twice ran around the garden with the children. After the reports received ten senators. I put on a Prussian uniform and went with Alix and Misha to breakfast with the German embassy on the occasion of Wilhelm's birthday. At 3 o'clock I received two Don Kalmyks - Officer Ulanov and Lama Ulyanov, who are going to Tibet ...".

The threat of a conflict with England over the Tibetan issue forced the sovereign to change his plans.

Russia has long pursued an active foreign policy in the Far East. This also applied to Tibet, which was in danger of an English invasion. Russia during this period began

get it right

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communicate with the Tibetan authorities. The flow of Russian pilgrims to this country has increased. In 1901, a delegation headed by one of the close associates of the Dalai Lama arrived in St. Petersburg from Lhasa.

The German newspaper *Der ost asiatische Lloyd*, published at that time in Shanghai, wrote: "Since the establishment of Russian rule in Central Asia, thousands of lamaist pilgrims flocking to Lhasa have spread the charm of the Russian name in Asia with their stories about the might of Russia. and thus unwittingly or deliberately contributed to the expansion of Russian influence.

Relations with Tibet were constrained by remoteness from Russia and mainly by the absence of well-explored routes of access to this country. Therefore, the tsarist government paid great attention to the study of the regions adjacent to Tibet and the territory of the country itself. This was important not only in order to maintain regular communication with her, but also to clearly understand the degree of probability of using the available routes for the transfer of British troops to Xinjiang, to the borders of Central Asia.

Several expeditions were organized to these areas under the auspices of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, including four led by Przhevalsky, as well as expeditions led by Roborovsky and Kozlov.

In addition to expeditions, other ways were used to obtain intelligence information about the situation in Tibet. The newspaper *Novoye Vremya*, which was published at that time in St. Petersburg, reported that he was on a secret mission there.

In 1902, it was decided to send a special reconnaissance group to Tibet under the guise of Buddhist monks, which was to be headed by a sub-saul N.E. Ulanov, a Kalmyk by nationality, who spoke Tibetan well and knew Buddhist customs and rituals. Prior to this, Ulanov was an officer in one of the Cossack regiments of the Don Army. In 1901, he was recruited to work as an interpreter with the Tibetan government delegation that was then in St. Petersburg.

In 1902, he was seconded to the Main Directorate of the Cossack troops and enrolled as a volunteer in the Academy of the General Staff.

Preparation for the operation lasted two years. Ulanov paid special attention to the study of topography, communications and communications, astronomy and other disciplines that could be useful to him during the upcoming campaign.

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The direction of the reconnaissance group to Tibet was caused by very important state reasons. England pursued an aggressive policy towards Tibet at that time. In 1888-1889, she carried out several military expeditions, and in 1904, using the favorable situation (the Russo-Japanese War), she launched an open armed intervention. The Tibetans offered stubborn resistance. However, the forces were unequal, and the British occupied Lhasa.

The Dalai Lama was forced to flee the country to Mongolia and settled there in one of the major Buddhist monasteries. He established contact with the Russian government, while at the same time maintaining contacts with the Chinese authorities, in whose formal dependence Tibet was.

Russian diplomacy made great efforts to prevent the establishment of complete British control over Tibet. St. Petersburg's position was that Tibet, being under the supreme power of China, should preserve a certain independence. Such a solution of the issue met the national interests of Russia.

However, after the departure of the Dalai Lama, events in Tibet unfolded in an unfavorable direction for Russia. Later, in September 1904, England signed an agreement with Tibetan officials who had no authority to do so, according to which China almost completely lost its power in Tibet.

At the same time, the struggle against the British did not subside. They maneuvered, and the Tibetan top dignitaries behaved unpredictably. The situation looked highly confusing. The Dalai Lama did not know what to do.

In this situation, the Russian government decided to speed up the dispatch of a reconnaissance group to Tibet and to understand in detail what was happening.

Much attention was paid to the preparation of the expedition by the Minister of War, Adjutant General Kuropatkin. To encrypt the operation, it was decided to dismiss Ulanov in order to avoid unnecessary conjectures in various military offices. Periodically, the progress of the work was reported to the king.

In January 1904, the following note was sent to the Tsar:

"On this January 3rd, Your Imperial Majesty was pleased to deign to send very secretly to Tibet to collect information about this country seconded to the Main Directorate of the Cossack Troops of the First Don Cossack Generalissimo, Prince of Italy, Count Suvorov of the Rymnik Regiment, Lieutenant Ulanov, for a period of approximately for one year in

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driving staff gelyuna! Potapovskaya stanitsa of the Donskoy Cossack Dambe Ulyanov and the translator of the sergeant of the same stanitsa Lidzhi Sharapova.

In order to keep this assignment secret, it would be necessary, according to former examples, to dismiss the lieutenant Ulanov in resignation under the heading "due to domestic circumstances" with the condition

re-admission to military service at the end of the business trip and with credit for the time spent in it for active service with the preservation of all rights.

The expense caused by this business trip in the amount of 13,840 rubles should have been attributed to the amount of a reserve loan from the Office of the Military Ministry.

In addition, the lieutenant commander Ulanov should have been released for arming him, his companions, as well as for gifts 5 Cossack-type rifles and 8 three-line revolvers with the proper number of cartridges.

The question is: will it please Your Imperial Majesty to deign to the foregoing?

Adjutant General Kuropatkin.

The highest permission was received. This circumstance indicates the great importance that the government attached to the forthcoming reconnaissance operation. This is evidenced by another document signed by the Minister of War.

"Tomorrow, January 14, the Sovereign Emperor will receive at 3 o'clock in the afternoon in a completely secret way in the Winter Palace the envoy Ulanov and Lama Ulyanov who are leaving for Tibet. The aforementioned persons have already been informed about the foregoing.

Please inform the Expedition of Ceremonial Affairs about this, indicating the private nature of the reception, and ask them to take measures so that information about this reception does not get into the newspapers ... Adjutant General Kuropatkin. January 13, 1904."

The group left St. Petersburg in January 1904 and remained in Central Asia until September, where preparations were made for the campaign. An important place was given to the execution of documents, according to which travelers had to follow to Tibet. According to the fragmentary data available in the cases, the members of the group pretended to be residents of the Chinese province of Xinjiang and, accordingly, had to have in their hands the documents that the indigenous people had at that time. Great assistance in preparation for the expedition was provided by the Russian representative office in the city of Ghulja, in Xinjiang, where the group arrived in October. Here, four more people were included in its composition. They were experienced guides and caravaneers from among the locals.

From Kulja, the group first moved along the roads leading deep into Chinese territory. She had a small caravan, an example

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but out of a dozen camels. The members of the group were dressed as Buddhist monks and by their outward appearance did not differ in any way from ordinary pilgrims heading to holy places.

But along the way, something unexpected happened. Immediately two people fell ill: the head of the reconnaissance group Ulanov himself and the constable Sharapov. The disease was some kind of unusual, no one in these places had heard of it, and local doctors could not treat it. All hope was on a healthy body of the Cossacks. Sharapov began to gradually get better, Ulanov's health did not improve. A few days later he died, and the group was left without a leader.

Leaving the group and the caravan in place, Ulyanov, as deputy leader, went to Ghulja, where he informed the Russian representation about what had happened and received permission to continue the journey. Further, the group followed under his leadership, which had its advantages: Ulyanov was a Buddhist religious minister in the Cossack troops, well versed in all the intricacies of the Buddhist religion and could naturally and believably play the role of a noble pilgrim. But he lacked the experience and military training of Ulanov, who brilliantly graduated from the military school and the Academy of the General Staff.

By the end of December, the group reached the Tsaidam Kalmyks living in the Chemen Mountains, in the northeast of the Tibetan Plateau.

It was impossible to move further, the mountain passes were littered with snow, frosts and snowstorms began. At the Kalmyks, the group wintered until March 20, and then set off again. When crossing the Tibetan border, there was a meeting with a warlike nomadic tribe of Tanguts. If they met Russian expeditions with hostility, they constantly disturbed them with daring raids, then the "pilgrims" were received with great respect. In his report, Ulyanov wrote: "I was considered to be a gegen, and thanks to this there were no raids on us, but, on the contrary, during the passage through their plagues, men and women with children came out to meet me to worship, and I accepted and blessed them, and again continued on their way."

The group arrived in Lhasa on the twentieth of May. The "Pilgrims" were greeted with great respect, mistaking Ulyanov for the Great Khubilgen or gegen (the highest representative of the Buddhist clergy). Both local residents and foreign pilgrims began to bow to him. However, Ulyanov began to evade the reception of believers and devoted all the first days to the worship of local hubilgens, gegens and other saints.

The suspicion that arose at first was replaced by complete trust in them on the part of those around them. Soon the local lamas were convinced that they had met in Ulyanov a great connoisseur of the teachings of the Buddha. Ulyanov, while preparing for a campaign in Tibet, wrote

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treatise in Tibetan on one of the controversial issues of the teachings of the Buddha, on which there was no agreement among Buddhist authorities. With the discussion of this treatise, he spoke to the local khubilgens during his visits to them, which completely removed any suspicions about his mission in Tibet. He began to be treated as a great connoisseur of the teachings of the Buddha and a major Buddhist religious figure.

However, despite this, British agents from among the Nepalese at first kept the group under close surveillance, but after a while they, too, became convinced that they were dealing with a religious authority and stopped surveillance.

Having made the first necessary worship to the saints, Ulyanov went to receive Goldan Tiva Rambuche, who ruled the country in the absence of the Dalai Lama. From an information point of view, this visit was exceptionally important, as it provided an opportunity to get first-hand information about the situation in the country.

At the reception, Rambuche said that after the anti-English demonstrations of the population, the British left Lhasa, but he feared that they might return again. According to him, the British are well aware that the people will not be able to offer them serious resistance and that they are more deterred by the likely negative reaction of other countries. Rambuche also expressed the opinion that the attitude of the population and lamas towards the Dalai Lama has not changed, the Tibetans continue to consider him their spiritual leader. He indicated that he was looking forward to the return of the Dalai Lama, but that the situation in Tibet itself was still dangerous because of the British military threat.

The group stayed in Lhasa for three months. During this time, Ulyanov met more than once with Rambuche and other senior dignitaries of the court, studied in detail the situation not only in the capital, but also in other parts of the country through conversations with pilgrims and caravaners arriving from there.

Ulyanov and members of the group also paid great attention to the study of the life and way of life of the population. There was an attempt to seriously study Tibetan medicine, for which an opportunity presented itself, albeit a very disappointing one. Two or three weeks after arriving in Lhasa, police officer Sharapov fell out of a window on the third floor of the building where they lived in an inexplicable way at night. He was brought into the house in a serious condition and sent for a local doctor. The doctor established several fractures of the bones of the legs, pelvis and spinal injury. There seemed to be hope for

that Sharapov would be able to move, there was none. However, the doctor said that in two months he would put him on his feet. And indeed, after a certain time, the Cossack began to

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govern. After two months he made a full recovery and was able to travel. Ulyanov's attempt to learn the secrets of Tibetan medicine was not successful. The doctor did not reveal any secrets to him, saying that, in accordance with local customs, they are inherited by one of the children.

Having completed all the cases, on August 15, the group set off on the return journey. It was impossible to stay longer, since winter could catch on the way and the return could be delayed for several months.

The group returned to St. Petersburg on March 17, 1906. The delivered information was highly appreciated and played a serious role in the development of Russia's policy on the Tibetan issue.

During the trip, Ulyanov kept a travel journal, where information about events, observations and other information was entered. In order to prevent strangers from reading it, he kept a journal in the Kalmyk language.

Ulyanov's information about the situation in Tibet aroused particular interest in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War. At that time, Russian diplomacy carried out delicate work aimed at stopping British expansion into Tibet and creating conditions for strengthening its positions in China.

In the diplomatic moves that were held at that time, not the last place was given to the question of the time of the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet. Contact with him was maintained constantly. Often his representative D.L. came to St. Petersburg. Khambo Dorzhiev.

In March 1906, after the reconnaissance group returned, a decision was made on the expediency of the Dalai Lama's departure to Tibet, or at least to one of the monasteries in the Chinese regions adjacent to Tibet. This information was brought to the attention of the Dalai Lama. Since the journey was long and unsafe, he asked to reinforce his convoy, which consisted of Buryat Cossacks. Consent was given. However, the issue was so delicate from all points of view that the request for an escort was repeatedly discussed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War with the Tsar himself. There was a fear that the Chinese authorities would perceive the presence of a large convoy as a lack of confidence in them and might suspect that they had some special plans to resolve the Tibetan issue.

As a result of negotiations with the Dalai Lama, it was possible to agree that the convoy would remain in its usual composition and would escort it only to the border with Tibet.

At the same time, the Dalai Lama raised the question of sending two scientific expeditions to Lhasa, which, if necessary, could shelter him and help him move to a safe place. In addition, he also proposed to place on the territory of Mongolia not far

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from the Tibetan border, a Cossack unit from among the Buryats, dressed in ordinary clothes, to communicate with Russian representatives and, if necessary, provide armed support to the Tibetan spiritual leader.

Preparations began for sending scientific expeditions to Tibet. One was to operate under the command of Captain Kozlov, the other under the command of Captain Kozakov.

However, in the future, this idea had to be abandoned. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that "all the governments interested in the affairs of this country will treat the fact of the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet with exceptional attention and, therefore, one cannot count on the fact that such a thing could escape from their vigilance."

a circumstance like the presence of foreign, especially Russian, expeditions in Tibet at that time. The arrival of Russian officers in Lhasa will, without any doubt, be detected and will serve as a basis for intensified intrigues on the part of agents of other powers, because scientific authority will not be recognized for the persons named above and their participation in the expedition will only serve as a reason to suspect Russia of what or hidden purposes”.

In view of this, the presence of Russian representatives in the retinue of the Dalai Lama should be kept to a minimum. At the request of the ruler to send an official representative of Russia with him, a negative answer was given. They agreed only to include in the retinue under the guise of a Buddhist monk one person - a Cossack foreman from the Buryats Dilykhov.

Russia made great efforts to normalize the situation in Tibet, it conducted active negotiations with China and England, seeking the speedy restoration of Dalai power in the country.
llamas.

The departure of the Dalai Lama took place in December 1906. At first, he settled in China in the Gumbut monastery, near Xining, not far from the Tibetan border, later moved to Lhasa.

Well-coordinated diplomatic steps of the Russian government made it possible in 1907 to conclude an Anglo-Russian agreement, according to which England recognized Tibet as part of China and undertook to maintain relations with it only through China.

Thus, the threat of British aggression was removed, China restored its control over Tibet, and normal conditions of government were restored in the country. An important role in this matter was played by Russian foreign intelligence, which, under the most difficult conditions, regularly supplied the government with the necessary information.

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Diary of Emperor Nicholas P. - M.: "Polistar", 1991. - S. 135. Oer Osÿ Azayzspe Poud. - 1901. - Mg. 5.

New time. - 1900. - 17 Oct.

Buddhist military cleric.

RGVIA, f. 447, d. 77, p. 29-30.

Ibid, p. 27.

Ibid, p. 88.

RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 1091, p. 14.

27

Mysterious Tokyo

In 1898, Colonel B.P. was appointed representative of Russian intelligence in Tokyo. Vannovsky, son of the former Minister of War. At first it was assumed that he would temporarily replace Major General Yanzhul there, who asked to be granted a six-month leave "for family reasons." But it turned out that the temporary appointment of B.P. Vannovsky lasted until 1903. Despite the experience of serving in military units, graduating with honors from the Academy of the General Staff, the colonel soon felt completely helpless as a military agent in Japan and understood why his predecessor was so eager to go to Russia, although the position was prestigious, and salary is high. The authorities in St. Petersburg more than once

expressed dissatisfaction with the quantity and quality of intelligence reports coming from Vannovsky. In the end, the decision was made to replace it.

Vannovsky's successor was appointed Lieutenant Colonel V.K. Samoilov. Despite his composure, endurance, and outstanding abilities as a scout, at first he was also somewhat confused. In a report to the General Staff dated May 24, 1903, he reported: "Everything related to the size of the army in Japan is a big secret, and any information can be obtained only by chance. The information communicated to me by foreign military agents, although different from ours, cannot be considered reliable.

Once in Tokyo, V.K. Samoilov stubbornly tried to use every opportunity to understand the situation on the spot in as much detail as possible. By some indications, he understood that Japan was preparing for a war with Russia, deliberately underestimating its military potential and data on the number of its troops. From the first days of his stay in Tokyo, Samoilov intuitively felt

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that the opinion that has developed among many high-ranking St. Petersburg dignitaries that Japan does not inspire special fears does not correspond to reality. But this had to be proved by obtaining reliable information about the extent of the covert militaristic preparations of this country. For this, secret agents were needed, and with the recruitment of agents, as before, things didn't work.

But the intelligence officer still managed to quickly find an almost optimal way out in the current situation: if it does not work out with the recruitment of local citizens, it is necessary to use representatives of other states in Japan more widely, more actively, especially those friendly towards Russia. In particular, those very "foreign military agents" about whose information he wrote with a certain degree of pessimism in one of his first reports to the General Staff, cited above. Of course, these persons were not direct "bearers of secrets" of the Japanese state apparatus and the army, but the fragmentary, sometimes contradictory information received from them provided material for analysis, clarification, verification and appropriate conclusions. Ultimately, this was a significant help in intelligence work.

Wasting no time, V.K. Samoilov becomes close to the French military attaché in Japan, Baron Corvisart, and establishes close contact with him. The following fact testifies to the results of this cooperation: already in June 1903, at the request of Samoilov, Baron Corvisart was presented for awarding the Order of St. Stanislav, 2nd degree.

In the second half of 1903, Samoilov, now a colonel, regularly sent information to the General Staff about all more or less noticeable changes concerning the Japanese army and, to a large extent, the navy. At the same time, political information related to the internal situation in the country and foreign policy events also came from him.

Samoilov's information testified to Japan's intensive preparations for war. The closer to the beginning of the war, the more alarming the information became. On November 27, 1903, Samoilov sent a report to the command about the information he received from foreign military agents. The information presented in the report was fully confirmed later by the course of hostilities, but they were not taken into account by the Russian command.

The following is an excerpt from that report:

"Having made an approximately correct calculation of our forces, they [military agents] are convinced that we will be defeated before reinforcements arrive. True, they take as a basis somewhat different data, namely: they consider our fleet to be undoubtedly weaker than the Japanese, the landing of the first four divisions is supposed to be in Chemulpo in two

three weeks after the announcement of mobilization, when, they add, our fleet will have already been defeated; the landing of the next four divisions - in another two weeks and the last two - in another week; in general, they believe that two months after the announcement of mobilization on the river. Ten divisions will be concentrated in the Yalu, the rear of which will be covered by reserve (territorial) troops. They do not suppose that before the decisive battle the Japanese would send all twelve divisions to the mainland, but only ten and part of the territorial troops. They consider our forces to be 6 divisions (72 battalions) and believe that this is not enough against 120 battalions”?

Later on from V.K. Samoilov received reports on more specific issues, including the state of combat readiness of each Japanese division, the rearmament of individual units, the call for reserve personnel for retraining, the condition of vehicles and their preparation for war, the preparation of military medical institutions, procurement military equipment abroad, especially for the navy.

At the end of December, on the basis of the latest intelligence reports from Japan, Korea and China, the General Staff prepared a note to the tsar on the modern combat readiness of the Japanese army and on the military preparations of the Japanese in Korea and North China, which noted: “Started in the spring 1903, the most thorough check of the mobilization readiness of the Japanese army was completed. In all divisional sections, testing sessions were held, and in some, training sessions were held for both reserve and recruit reserve ranks. The 4th Division, located in Osaka, had a secondary three-week training camp for 952 reserves in August this year; the same secondary musters of replacements were appointed this month in the 5th (Hiroshima) and 12th (Kokura) divisions.

During the summer almost all divisions replenished emergency supplies, inspected weapons and equipment for transport equipment stored in Kura, and made experimental landing of troops on the railway and on ships.

The mobilization, checked in every detail, and the inspections carried out showed that the Japanese army was completely ready.

The Red Cross also prepared for war. In October, there was a training and verification gathering of 237 Red Cross doctors. In Takeshika on the island of Tsushima, the sisters of mercy of the Red Cross were checked.

At the big autumn maneuvers of the 5th, 10th and 11th divisions (39 battalions, 108 mountain guns, 9 squadrons and 3 supply battalions, 30,000 men in total), a part of the reserves were called up to the troops, so that the units were in a somewhat reinforced composition than usual (in a company of 66 privates).

The replacements called to the training camp were fired in all divisions, but upon dismissal they were told to be ready, and vacations of the lower ranks were not allowed at all.

The divisions most prepared to be sent first as an expeditionary force are the 12th (Kokura), 5th (Hiroshima) and 4th (Osaka), especially the first of these. The headquarters of the 2nd division (Xi Dai) signed a contract for the construction, if necessary, within a day of a shed to accommodate 1200 horses. New premises have been erected in Udzina, intended for troops in the event of their concentration for boarding ships.

The Tokyo arsenal has been working hard since the spring of this year, and in the summer 450 rifles were manufactured per day. A significant consignment of artillery shells arrived in Kokura. Significant reserves of coal and foodstuffs have been procured on Tsushima Island.

According to reports, at present the Japanese army is provided with a convoy by half; in case of war, the rest is expected to be replenished on the spot, which, according to the conditions of the theater of war and the situation, does not present great difficulties.

The amount of canned meat, dried rice, biscuits and pressed tea available in the food warehouses is enough for the entire army.

The Japanese fleet is also ready: most of it was concentrated at Sasebo, from where the fleet left on December 27, no one knows where. The other day, Japan acquired two Argentine armored cruisers in Genoa, which will receive commands from England and arrive in Japan in early February.

This note was reported to the king about a month before the start of the war. From it it was quite clearly seen that Japan would begin hostilities in the very near future. However, no emergency measures were taken by the Russian command. First of all, there was no concentration of the navy, there was no accelerated transfer of troops to the areas of the proposed theater of military operations.

On January 3, 1904, Colonel Samoilov reported in cipher by telegraph: "Three days later, in the 12th division, the call for reservists." January 4: "Tsushima telegrams stopped." January 5: "4 more steamships of 20,000 tons." January 7: "According to information, on January 2, 6 transports stood in Kura, 10 went west." January 11: "Vehicles stop at Yekosoo, Kure, Ujina and Sasebo. A lot of military cargo is transported in Ujina. They hire a lot of coolies. Apparently, mines are being laid in Sasebo." January 13: "A dangerous sign: there is strong excitement in the army, they openly talk about an imminent war."

Judging by how events developed further, the information of Russian intelligence is clearly underestimated.

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On the night of January 27, ten Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron, which was stationed without proper security measures on the outer roads of Port Arthur, and disabled two battleships and one cruiser. On the same day, six Japanese cruisers and eight destroyers attacked the Russian cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets, which were in the Korean port of Chemulpo. In an unequal battle, the Varyag, which fought heroically, was seriously damaged and, in order not to become prey to the enemy, was flooded by its crew, and the gunboat was blown up. On January 28, Japan declared war on Russia.

The consequences of neglecting intelligence data had a serious impact on the entire course of hostilities and led Russia to a crushing defeat in this war.

Can we say that for Russia the very fact of the war with Japan was a surprise? Very doubtful. The political situation in the Far East has long predetermined the inevitability of a military clash between the two largest powers in this region, constantly competing in the struggle for the acquisition of new territories and spheres of influence. Japan sought to capture Korea and Northeast China (Manchuria). After the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Tokyo captured Taiwan and part of Northeast China, the Liaodong Peninsula. However, under pressure from Russia, supported by France and Germany, the Japanese were forced to abandon this peninsula. In 1896, Russia received a concession from China to build a railway across Manchuria (CER), and two years later leased the southwestern part of the Liaodong Peninsula (Kwantung) with the right to establish a naval base there (Port Arthur). Of course, the Japanese could not come to terms with such a situation, especially since in 1900 the tsarist troops occupied Manchuria.

Having concluded an alliance with England in 1902, Japan began to intensively prepare for war with Russia. This preparation continued for almost two years, which was hard not to notice even, as they say, with the naked eye. So, the very fact of unleashing the war was hardly a surprise for St. Petersburg.

But there was still a surprise. What was it? And this question can be answered quite definitely: in a series of crushing defeats of the tsarist army, which ended in complete collapse.

The ruling circles in St. Petersburg did not bother to carefully assess the real situation on the eve of the war, they relied too much on their own strength. In economic and military terms, Russia was, of course, much stronger than Japan. This indisputable fact played, paradoxically, its fatal role.

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He "lulled" the St. Petersburg strategists, creating an atmosphere of "self-blindness", unwillingness to notice certain circumstances, each of which, taken by itself, perhaps did not have a decisive significance in the overall alignment of forces. But ignoring them as a whole led to the fact that the war with Japan and the major defeats that followed one after another took Russia by surprise.

By the beginning of the war, the Japanese army, after mobilization, numbered 375 thousand people, while Russia had an army of 1.1 million people. The advantage is threefold, very impressive. At the same time, Russia's mobilization reserve was another 3.5 million people, while Japan mobilized only 1.2 million people during the entire war. As you can see, the total weight of "cannon fodder" was clearly in favor of Russia. The Tsarist naval forces and artillery, taken as a whole, were also superior to the Japanese, and this primitive arithmetic calculation gave rise to the dangerous illusion that the Japanese were a weak opponent.

And now about some individual features of the current situation. The first of these was that on the eve of the war, in January 1904, throughout the vast territory of the theater of operations, from Chita to Vladivostok and from Blagoveshchensk to Port Arthur, the Russian army numbered only 98 thousand people and 24 thousand border guard. These modest figures probably do not require comments.

The second feature was that the throughput of the Siberian railway was very low and at the beginning of the war could provide the passage of only three pairs of military echelons per day.

On the basis of what data did the Russian command then assume that the Japanese army would not soon be able to launch an offensive on land? This question will apparently remain unanswered. It is only known that large army reinforcements from the center of Russia came to the Far East ... seven months after the start of the war. Although this did not save Russia from a heavy defeat at Mukden in February 1905.

The number of examples of such unaccounted for features and circumstances could be multiplied. But the above-mentioned is probably enough to clearly illustrate the atmosphere of silence and complacency that reigned in St. Petersburg on the eve of the war.

If the tsarist authorities had listened in time and carefully considered the reports of Colonel V.K. Samoilov from Tokyo, to the note of the General Staff, prepared at the end of December 1903 on the basis of intelligence data from Japan, Korea and China, about the imminent Japanese aggression in the near future, then further

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events could have unfolded somewhat differently. Much, apparently, could have been avoided. If...

But only with the outbreak of war in the highest echelons of the Russian leadership comes a belated insight. K. intelligence reports are finally beginning to be heeded. No one needs to explain anymore that you can't save on intelligence, that the underestimation of secret information and the lack of

analysis of incoming data lead to irreparable consequences. Therefore, among other measures, urgent steps are being taken to intensify all types of intelligence activities.

In the theater of operations, intelligence is led by a special department of the quartermaster general of the headquarters of the Manchurian army, and since October 1904, after the division of the Manchurian troops into three armies, each of them creates its own intelligence department.

Intelligence, judging by the secret reports of the Quartermaster General Service of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army, was divided into three branches: "distant", operating abroad, deep behind enemy lines or neighboring countries, "near", sending individual scouts or small reconnaissance detachments into the territory of the enemy troops, and the so-called "flank reconnaissance", the functions of which included the solution of reconnaissance tasks in the zone of immediate proximity to the flanks of the army, as well as in more remote areas of China and Mongolia - countries kept neutral in the war.

Let us tell you in more detail what these three types of reconnaissance were. From the beginning of the war, the organization of long-range reconnaissance at the headquarters of the Manchurian army was carried out by a former military agent in Koreyeb, colonel of the General Staff of the Nechvolodov. His options were very limited.

At the end of April 1904, he sent three secret agents to Japan and Korea—foreign subjects of Chaffanjon, Barbier, and Meyer—who communicated the intelligence they received through Europe in "conditional language." The path was long, and the quality of the information left much to be desired.

The army headquarters also received secret information from the former Russian envoy to the Korean emperor, Actual Councilor of State Pavlov, from the representative in Beijing of the Russian Ministry of Finance, member of the board of the Russian-Chinese Bank State Councilor Davydov, and consular workers in China - collegiate adviser Laptev and court adviser Tideman.

Pavlov recruited a Korean M.I., who was on the Russian mission in Seoul. Kim with the task of "establishing continuous secret

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relations with the local Korean authorities and with secret Korean agents who, according to a condition previously made in Seoul, are to be sent to the Manchurian border both from the Korean emperor and from certain influential Korean

dignitaries."

Intelligence information from Korea also came from a former military agent in that country, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Potapov, who had extensive connections among foreigners in Seoul.

In late 1904 - early 1905, Lieutenant Colonel Linda, an employee of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Manchurian army, established contact with French subjects Eshar and Plarr with the aim of "involving them in long-range reconnaissance." Linda was sent to the headquarters of the Amur Military District and Vladivostok "to organize secret reconnaissance in North Korea on the spot."

Davydov, a member of the Board of the Russian-Chinese Bank, reported some noteworthy information of a military nature about the enemy and carried out certain special assignments. Friedberg, an employee of the Russian-Chinese Bank, was his main assistant in the organization of intelligence, who received information from the secretary of the Japanese military agent in Chifu (now Yankou, China).

Davydov also sent Chinese scouts to Manchuria, who were instructed to "in addition to collecting information about the enemy, inflict harm behind enemy lines by setting fire to his warehouses, damaging railways", that is, to carry out tasks of a sabotage nature.

Davydov, who had served in Japan before the war, continued to keep in touch with certain foreigners in Peking, including the Japanese, from whom he sometimes managed to receive valuable intelligence.

The former envoy to Korea, Pavlov, throughout the war, also supplied interesting information about the enemy thanks to the connections that he had previously had in Korea and Japan. One of his best agents in Japan was the French journalist Bale, who spoke Japanese well and knew the position in the Japanese army.

The information delivered by Pavlov and Davydov was reliable and, as a rule, was highly appreciated by the army headquarters.

In April 1905, Lieutenant Subbotich was sent to Japan under the guise of Serbian correspondent Marinkovich.

However, all these measures were clearly not enough to fully solve the tasks that were set for long-range reconnaissance:

- 1) obtaining information about mobilization plans in Japan;
- 2) the course of conscription of persons of all categories of the reserve and recruits;

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- 3) formation of new reserve and combat units;
- 4) accounting for reinforcements sailing from Japan to Manchuria and Korea, their places of landing and destination;
- 5) political, economic and financial situation of Japan and Korea.

No less difficult were the issues of organizing short-range reconnaissance, the main task of which was "collecting information about the enemy directly in the area of location and operations of his armies."

This task was solved by the following means: military intelligence (capturing prisoners, obtaining various types of documents, items of equipment, uniforms, etc.), secret intelligence (sending scouts, mainly Chinese and Koreans) and analyzing information from foreign press .

Persons familiar with the local conditions of life in this region, the peculiarities of life and customs of the indigenous population were mainly involved in the leadership of close reconnaissance. Among them were Major General Kondratovich, who had previously served in Manchuria and had connections among the Chinese and local missionaries, Captain Kuzmin, a former instructor of the Korean troops who had a good knowledge of the local language, Captain Nechvolodov, a former assistant to a military agent in China, Major General Vogak , who served for a long time in the Far East, staff captains Afanasyev and Rossof, who spoke Chinese.

In addition to the officers who were at the direct disposal of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Manchurian army, information from the Chinese was delivered by the following persons: the representative of the military commissar of the Mukden province in the city of Liaoyang, staff captain Penevsky, staff captain Blonsky, the military commissar of the Mukden province, Colonel Kvetsinsky, head Transport Service of the Army Major General Ukhach-Ogorovich and Khabarovsk merchant Tifontai, a Chinese by nationality.

The first information about the Japanese units with the numbers of regiments and divisions was received from the Chinese scouts, Staff Captain Penevsky.

At the same time, according to the assessment of the quartermaster general service of the Manchurian army, intelligence through agents from among the Chinese at the beginning of the campaign was conducted poorly for the following reasons:

"The Chinese agents were extremely temporary and not at all interested in their business, and in addition there were very few of them.

Due to the constancy of success that accompanied Japanese weapons, the Chinese agents were afraid to offer us their services, especially since the Japanese dealt with merciless cruelty with all the Chinese and their relatives who were suspected of having relations with the Russians.

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The most valuable information about the enemy was given by military intelligence through documentary data.

The latter included interrogations of prisoners, items of equipment and uniforms with numbers, personal badges, soldier's notebooks, diaries with a summary of the actions of the military unit, maps found in the bags of killed officers with inscribed positions of troops, envelopes from letters with the designation of the exact address of the Japanese soldier (army, division, regiment, company), etc. Most of the prisoners during interrogations gave fairly complete and reliable information. Experience has shown that "by gentleness and cordiality towards the prisoners, especially by playing on their pride, one could achieve more than by strictness and intimidation."

The third source of obtaining information about the enemy was the analysis of the foreign press, although even here there were difficulties. First of all, there was a shortage of translators, especially those with good knowledge of written Japanese. Yes, and the Japanese were very strict in ensuring that military information did not leak into the press. As an example, let us cite an excerpt from the Japan Times newspaper dated July 5, 1905. By this time, the outcome of the war had been decided, so nothing prevented the Japanese from writing frankly:

"From the very first days of the war, the Japanese press received an unquestioning order from the Government: to keep secret everything related to the organization, mobilization and movement of the sea and land forces of their homeland.

The government warned the press against disclosing military secrets, emphasizing how the press could harm military operations, citing examples from the recent Sino-Japanese war. It asked not to divulge any information which, however interesting to the public, could benefit the enemy even by mere hints, giving him indications of the intentions or expected movements of the Japanese.

How honestly the Japanese press responded to the call of the government is eloquently proved by the impenetrable secrecy that shrouded all the movements of the ships of Admiral Togo and the army of Marshal Oyama.

Nevertheless, it was still possible to draw some information about the enemy from the Japanese press. These included official reports of Japanese commanders (especially at the beginning of the war), separate announcements in Japanese newspapers. Of much greater interest were the correspondence of foreign military journalists who visited the theater of operations on the Japanese side and published their observations without censorship in their countries. These correspondences sometimes contained interesting information about Japanese

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Russian tactics, the morale of the Japanese army, some issues of its material and economic support.

The intelligence section of the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief obtained information from Japanese, English and German newspapers, although belated. An order was given to the head of the censorship department to submit to the quartermaster general under the commander-in-chief clippings from all received foreign newspapers containing information about the Japanese army.

And, finally, about the "reconnaissance of the flanks." What was this peculiar type of intelligence? The report on the activities of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Manchurian army noted:

"From the very beginning of the war, great importance was attached to our right flank, in view of the fact that the headquarters of the Manchurian army received reports about the movement of the Chinese troops of Generals Yuanshikai and Ma to the neutral zone and even to the rear of our location, and the true intentions of the Chinese government were unknown to us. There was no positive evidence that China would maintain strict neutrality until the end of the war; on the contrary, it was assumed that, given an opportunity, and provided that Japan made a landing, somewhere on the western coast of the Liaodong Gulf, China would be open to the side of Japan.

There was no exact information about the number of Chinese troops of generals Yuanshikai and Ma, especially the troops of the latter, whose number was sometimes exaggerated by Chinese agents to 100,000. At the end of March 1904, as a Danish correspondent and a merchant, Staff Captain Rossov was sent to the areas where the Ma and Yuanshikai troops were located to find out on the spot the exact location, number, condition and quality of the Chinese TROOPS.

For the same purpose, in April, under the guise of a Russian merchant, Yesaul of the Ural Cossack army Livkin was seconded.

In the regions of Mongolia, where the advanced cavalry units of General Ma were located, the commercial procurement officer of the Manchurian army A.G. Gromov was instructed along with the purchase of livestock, which he made in Mongolia, to collect information about the military units located there.

With the appearance of Khunhuz gangs (Chinese bandit formations) under the command of Japanese officers on the right flank with the aim of attacking the railway, it was decided, in view of the vastness of the area, to "divide" it between Yesaul Livkin and Gromov; the first was entrusted with the supervision of the southern part, the second - for the northern.

The left flank of the army throughout the campaign was under the supervision of a detachment of Colonel Madritov, who was still

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of his activities in peacetime he was familiar with the area and had Chinese agents there.

Reconnaissance on the left flank was also carried out by the military commissar of the Girin province (Manchuria), Colonel Sokovnin. The information he provided was distinguished by its completeness and reliability due to the wide contacts that he managed to establish during his long stay in the Far East with the Chinese administration and with representatives of all strata.

local population.

Colonel Sokovnin was entrusted with the recruitment of the Chinese Khandengyu, the leader of the independent freemen, who played a prominent role back in 1900 during the boxer uprising in China. Khandengyu had almost 10,000 troops of its own. There was information that he and his army could go to the service of the Japanese. This issue was of particular importance, since Khandengyu and his people were at a close distance from the Russian army.

Colonel Sokovnin met with Handengyu and offered him to cooperate, setting the following conditions:

- his people should not assist the Japanese and enter their service;
- they must conduct reconnaissance and report to the Russians all information about the Japanese; for the organization of intelligence will be allocated amounts for its purpose.

Handengyu agreed.

In addition, under the direct jurisdiction of the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief was the Chinese detachment Pingtui ("knocking down everything in front of him").

This detachment was formed voluntarily at his own expense by the Chinese merchant Tifontai, who wished to "serve for the benefit of the Russians." At the head of the detachment operating on the left flank of the Russian army was the colonel of the Chinese service Zhang Zhenyuan. He was an energetic, experienced officer who enjoyed great authority and personal influence among his fellow citizens. Thanks to him, iron discipline was observed in the detachment.

Other Chinese reconnaissance detachments, in general, did not justify the hopes placed on them, and almost no valuable information about the enemy was received from them. On the other hand, there were often complaints from the population about the so-called Chinese policemen who were in the Russian service, for the robberies and violence they committed, which eventually forced them to abandon the formation of Chinese reconnaissance detachments. By the end of August 1905 they were all disbanded.

During the war, the Russian command paid considerable attention to actions that later became known as "active

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events". It was about strengthening the influence of Russia in the Far East. One of the sections of the report on the activities of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Manchurian army for 1905 was specifically devoted to this issue:

"Measures to strengthen our influence in China, Manchuria and Mongolia

The Japanese, apparently, even before the war, and especially during the latter, resorted to tacit subsidies to win over the foreign press in the Far East in order to spread their influence, communicate information favorable to them and cover current events in a favorable way for them. form, not to mention the spread of false rumors for demonstrative purposes.

As a counterbalance, it was decided on our part to use the foreign press to support Russian interests.

By the order of HIS MAJESTY'S Viceroy in the Far East, then confirmed on December 15, 1904 by Adjutant General Kuropatkin, from September 10, 1904, the newspaper "China Review" was published at our expense under the leadership of the 1st military agent in China Colonel Ogorodnikov. The publication of the newspaper cost about 2,500 dollars a month. The purpose pursued by the publication of China Review was that, on the basis of information received from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, our embassy in Peking, consuls, etc., to convey the events of the war in a truthful form, since the Anglo-Japanese press in the Far East has always been inclined to depict our failures in exaggerated proportions and in the most gloomy colors for us, while with a great deviation FROM THE TRUTH.

In order to strengthen our influence in Manchuria itself and to disseminate among the local Chinese population reliable and favorable information about the state of affairs in the theater of operations, with the permission of the Viceroy, the newspaper Shengjingbao was published in Chinese in the city of Mukden under the leadership of the Mukden Military Commissar Colonel Kvetsinsky. The editorial staff of the newspaper consisted of civilian Chinese, and the printing house was private.

Since this newspaper, being the only printed organ in Manchuria in Chinese, gained wide distribution among the local population, the Japanese began to persecute Chinese employees through threatening letters to the editor.

The Chinese officials were also very unsympathetic to the newspaper, seeing in it an infringement on the rights of their absolute

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fiercely uncontrolled influence and pressure on the mood of society and therefore took all measures in its power to stop the newspaper.

Due to the above reasons, the publication of the Shenjingbao newspaper was discontinued at the end of last year.

It should be noted that the Russian leadership drew serious conclusions from the experience of the Russo-Japanese War. First of all, measures were taken to improve the organization of undercover intelligence. Much attention was paid to improving the collection and processing of incoming intelligence information. Structural distinctions between operational and informational work were introduced for the first time. The management of intelligence, the recruitment of agents and control over their activities were entrusted to the "special" (intelligence) unit of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. The processing and systematization of the received information became a function of a special "statistical" office work.

In 1906, intelligence departments were created at the headquarters of all military districts. The spheres of intelligence activity were distributed as follows: Petersburg v.o. conducted reconnaissance in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, England and Finland; Vilensky - in East Germany and England; Warsaw - in Germany and part of Austria-Hungary, adjacent to the Warsaw district; Kyiv - in Austria-Hungary; Odessa - in Romania, the Balkan countries and the European part of Turkey; Caucasian - in the Asian part of Turkey and Persia to the west of the meridian Amur - Hell; Turkestan - in Afghanistan, India, Western China, Kashgaria, Balochistan and eastern Persia; Omsk - in Western Mongolia and partly in China; Irkutsk - in Eastern Mongolia, Manchuria and Northern China; Amur - in Japan, Korea and part of Manchuria, adjacent to the borders of the district.

Intelligence was now conducted according to a single plan and under the general direction of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. A special training course for scouts was introduced at the General Staff Academy, as well as Japanese language courses. In order to more successfully coordinate the work of central and local intelligence agencies, special seminars were held in 1908 and 1910 for senior adjutants of the intelligence departments of military district headquarters. The seminars worked out the methodological and organizational principles of the work of intelligence agencies. The activities of the secret agents were significantly intensified both in the western and eastern directions. The requirements for checking the intelligence apparatus, the quantity and quality of incoming intelligence information have increased.

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TsGVIA, f. 400, op. 4, d. 327, p. 384.

RGVIA, f. 451, op. 1, file 1595, p. 35.

Ibid, p. 29-30.

Ibid, p. 39.

Here and below are excerpts from two secret documents:

a) Report No. 1 on the activities of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Manchurian army (from the beginning of the war to October 26, 1904) and the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief (from October 26, 1904 to February 25, 1905);

6) Report No. 2 on the activities of the intelligence department of the Quartermaster General's Office under the Commander-in-Chief from March 4, 1905 to August 31 of the same year.

Korea was occupied by the Japanese, and the Russian representatives were forced to leave its borders.

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The diversity of intelligence

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, a peculiar phenomenon spread more and more in the practice of Russia's international relations: attempts to independently "go out" abroad by individual ministries and departments in the form of permanent representatives or representative offices, the main goal of which was to conduct their own *vedka*. Let's give some examples.

Artur Raffalovich was officially the representative of the Russian Ministry of Finance in Paris, but in fact he was a big businessman, a bank tycoon and... an unspoken "agent of influence" who used his contacts in the French press to obtain large loans for Russia at the maximum favorable conditions for her. Raffalovich acquired many paid agents from among foreign journalists in Paris, who were used as "literary pushers" in favor of providing uninterrupted loans to Russia, as well as to remove suspicions from the French about the safety of their capital. Raffalovich had "his people" in almost all the major print media in France. The good disposition of the French press towards the Russian representative of the Ministry of Finance cost Raffalovich a tidy sum - 200 thousand gold francs a month. Russia also received millions on this. It is known, for example, that at that time over a quarter of all French foreign credits went to Russia.

Raffalovich's extensive contacts in the French press and among foreign journalists accredited in Paris sometimes allowed the clever businessman and financier to intrude into purely political affairs. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Count V.N. Lamzdorf in his diaries cites the verbatim text of Raffalovich's telegram to St. Petersburg, in which you are a financial agent

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steps with counter-propaganda proposals of a political nature:

"The National Agency has circulated an alleged dispatch from Rome, disturbing in content and concerning Russia's position on the Eastern question. Wouldn't it be useful to reassure the public to make a statement regarding the orientation of our policy? (We are talking about possible joint actions of England, France and Russia in support of Turkey. - Auth.)!.

No matter how the descendants assessed the personal qualities of Artur Raffalovich, it can be said without exaggeration that he, undoubtedly, was a prominent figure in the political life of the host country, combining in one person a businessman, a financier, and an intelligence officer. .

Another example. P.I. Rachkovsky led the agency of the tsarist police department in France. Rachkovsky had a well-organized and numerous "team" of agents, who mainly performed the role of paid assistants to the tsarist secret police. The materials of the "dark room" of the Russian embassy in Paris, stored today at the Institute of War and Peace in Palo Alto, California, say, for example, that the Russian terrorist Boris Savinkov alone was monitored in France by about 100 paid agents! This

one can quite believe it if one looks at dozens of secret photographs taken by various persons about the stay and secret meetings on French territory of this most dangerous enemy of the tsarist autocracy. Even surveillance of V.I. Lenin was much less intensive, although some of his letters, written in special ink, never reached Russia, and those deciphered by the Okhrana still lie in the vault of the War and Peace Institute.

Rachkovsky appeared in the French capital in the mid-80s of the last century. He put a lot of effort to achieve a prominent position in high Parisian society. According to French counterintelligence, Rachkovsky became the most influential professional intelligence officer in France in the entire history of Tsarist Russia. His social life was very varied. In the morning he could be seen at the Paris Stock Exchange, in the afternoon he met at breakfast with the editors of the leading Parisian newspapers and magazines, in the evening he gave luxurious receptions at his own villa in Saint-Cloud. Rachkovsky was closely acquainted with many prominent figures of the French counterintelligence, ministers, presidents of the country. One of the French newspapers wrote about this outstanding personality:

"If you meet him in society, you will never suspect anything, because nothing in his appearance betrays his sinister mission. Full, restless, with a smile that does not leave his face ... he is you

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looks like a good-natured cheerful guy - the soul of society. He has one big weakness - he is crazy about our tiny Parisians. But in fact, he is the most skillful of agents working in all ten capitals of Europe.

Perhaps the "tiny Parisians" occupied some part of Rachkovsky's soul. But that was not the most important thing. He was an experienced intelligence officer and rendered invaluable services to his country in terms of strengthening Russian-French relations. The French trusted Rachkovsky and used his services. It is no coincidence that the organization of the visit of the French Foreign Minister Theophile Delcassé to St. Petersburg was entrusted to Rachkovsky, and not to the French Ambassador to Russia, the Marquis de Montebello. A similar situation arose with the then French President Loubet. Here is what the Prime Minister of Russia, Count Sergei Yulievich Witte, wrote in his diary on this subject:

"The President of the French Republic, Loubet, told me that he so trusted the police talent and the talent of the organizer Rachkovsky that when he had to go to Lyon, where, as he had been threatened in advance, he would be attacked, he entrusted the protection of his person Rachkovsky and his agents, believing more in the police abilities of Rachkovsky than in the French guards placed around the president.

Rachkovsky's agents operated not only in France, but in Great Britain, Germany, and since 1912 in Italy. In Switzerland, the center of Russian political emigration, the agents employed three Genevan police officers who drew secret information for Rachkovsky directly from police files and strictly monitored the correctness of the presentation of intelligence data obtained for the Swiss government and transmitted to Russia.

P.I. Rachkovsky was a man of great organizational and creative talents. It was this last inherent quality that made it possible, after returning to Russia, to create a special secret department under the Ministry of Internal Affairs to gain access to the archives and ciphers of foreign embassies and missions accredited at the royal court. Rachkovsky personally led the operation to obtain English diplomatic ciphers, using the assistance of the head of the office of the British Embassy in St. Petersburg for this. In February 1906, the embassy secretary, Spring Rice, cabled London to the effect that papers had been disappearing from the embassy for some time, and that the courier and other persons connected with the embassy were in fact paid agents of the Okhrana. "Despite the fact," complained

Spring Rice, that a new safe was installed in the embassy, and new locks were cut into the archival cabinets, the classified materials continued

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"mysteriously" disappear"? According to Mr. Rice, this was the work of a bribed employee of the embassy, who, having made wax prints from the locks of archival cabinets, received duplicate keys from the hands of people P.I. Rachkovsky. It must be said that the suspicions of Spring Rice had a fairly good reason. As well as with regard to diplomatic ciphers, since Russia in those years was practically the only country where Rachkovsky's "specialists" constantly achieved noticeable success in deciphering secret telegrams that influenced the adoption of responsible foreign policy decisions.

Among the foreign representatives of the tsarist special services there were many persons of dubious persuasion - adventurers who were in the intelligence service of individual Russian departments. In this regard, the case of a certain Manasevich-Manuilov, an "official for special assignments" under the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was sent to Paris to carry out special assignments, is typical.

In May 1895, I.F. Manasevich-Manuilov appears in Paris as a correspondent for the Novosti newspaper, gets acquainted with an employee of the Paris prefecture and recommends himself as a "representative" of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, sent to secretly check the activities of foreign agents, who are allegedly "dissatisfied" in St. Petersburg. Demonstrating his knowledge of the agents and their then chief Rachkovsky, Manuilov laid out a lot of "intriguing" information to his interlocutor and offered, of course, for a substantial reward, to help the French secret services "expose" Rachkovsky.

But it turned out that Rachkovsky himself found out about this intrigue and summoned Manuilov to sort things out. He, sensing danger, decided to "make amends" with a sincere confession. As it turned out, he did not act on his own, but at the instigation of the then head of the St. Petersburg security department, Colonel Sekerinsky, and others, in the words of Rachkovsky, "Okhranen parasites." Obviously, Sekerinsky was at odds with Rachkovsky and plotted against him. And Manuilov had already provided Sekerinsky with "intelligence services" for a number of years.

After a conversation with Rachkovsky, Manuilov flees from Paris, but "emerges" in Rome as... an employee of the Russian representative office at the Vatican. This time, his secret duties include spying on Cardinal Ledochovsky, according to the recall of the police department, "the main leader of anti-Russian agitation among the Catholic clergy." In 1901, Manuilov's "activities" in the Vatican ended in scandalous exposure, but he remains in Rome to "observe" the local "Russian revolutionary groups." In 1902, Plehve again sent him to Paris with a secret mission "to establish immediate relations with foreign

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journalists and representatives of the Parisian press in order to counteract the spread of false reports about Russia in this press". Since 1903, he has been performing a similar task in Rome.

Already by this time, Manuylov was considered by the police to be a very unscrupulous person, "a man of surprisingly complaisant conscience", capable of fraud, forgery and financial fraud. And, nevertheless, with the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, he receives a task from his leadership: the collection of intelligence information about the Western European missions of Japan and a number of friendly states. Manuilov informs his superiors that he allegedly "infiltrated agents" into the Japanese embassies in Paris, The Hague and London, into the American mission in Brussels, and the Italian one in Paris. Isn't it too much? There was

whether this agency really? Very doubtful. These questions remained on Manuilov's "compliant conscience".

For his imaginary merits, he receives the Order of St. Vladimir and continues to develop a truly fantastic activity, the last "masterpiece" of which was, according to him, the extraction of the Japanese diplomatic cipher, and he acquired the opportunity "to be informed in this way about the content of all Japanese diplomatic relations". "In this way," it was noted in the documents of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, "indications were received of Japan's plan to cause damage to the ships of the second squadron on the way to the East"?

It was about the 2nd Pacific squadron of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, which was soon to be sent from Kronstadt to the Far East, to the war zone. From the Ministry of Internal Affairs, without due verification, information (or misinformation?) Manuylov entered the General Staff. And this is what it led to. The General Staff, believing their colleagues from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, hurried to alert the admiral just in case.

Immediately upon leaving Kronstadt, the admiral demanded extreme vigilance from the officers, citing the danger of a surprise attack by Japanese warships at any point along the route. The then envoy to Denmark, and later the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, A.P. Izvolsky:

"On the night of October 21, 1904, when the fleet of Admiral Rozhestvensky, heading for the Far East, was passing through the North Sea, a serious incident occurred in the Dogger Bank area. Having met with a flotilla of Hull fishermen and assuming that he was surrounded by Japanese ships, whose presence in these waters was reported to the Russian information bureau, the admiral ordered to open fire. One of the English trawlers [trawlers] sank and several others were badly damaged. One of the Russian cruisers - "Aurora" - also suffered. Admiral Rozhdestvensky no doubt found out about his mistake the next morning, but nevertheless continued

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without stopping his way and insisted on the version of the Japanese attack. This incident aroused great indignation in England and nearly led to a break with Russia. As an envoy in Copenhagen at the time, I was naturally the first to hear what had actually happened in the North Sea. A few days earlier, I had had the opportunity to visit the fleet during its passage through the Great Belt and could see in what a nervously elevated state the admiral and many of his officers were in order to understand what impression the news of the appearance of the Japanese must have made on them. - sky warships in European waters"5.

Of course, there was no real threat to Rozhdestvensky's squadron from the Japanese in European waters and could not be. Manuilov's "information" was apparently his own invention or the enemy's misinformation cleverly slipped to him, which almost led to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Great Britain, which could significantly complicate the already unenviable position of Russia at that time.

Manuilov's further career was very fleeting. In 1905, he literally overwhelmed his bosses with a huge amount of "documents" that turned out to be ... "glued pieces of paper in Japanese, devoid of any meaning." The last point in his career was the photocopies of pages of a Chinese dictionary sent to him from Paris, marked in the inventory as "secret documents".

The case with Manuilov is not isolated. There were also adventurers among the foreign intelligence agents of the General Staff. Of these, the most colorful figure, perhaps, was a certain Gidis, a double agent who worked simultaneously for Russian and Japanese intelligence.

José Maria Gidis (aka Gaydes, aka Joseph Geddes) is a Portuguese by birth, an English citizen, the son of the owner of the Shanghai Daily Press newspaper, a traveling salesman by profession.

In April 1904, being an agent of Japanese intelligence, he offered his services to the Russian military attaché in Tianjin, Colonel F.E. Ogorodnikov, and then to the consul in Tianjin, collegiate adviser N. Laptev, who, like Ogorodnikov, was engaged in intelligence work. From the very beginning, Gidis was under the suspicion of Russian intelligence officers, but, nevertheless, his services were used, and sometimes noteworthy information came from him.

The Japanese also suspected Gidis. In May 1904 they arrested him as a Russian spy, whipped him with a whip and sentenced him to be shot. However, they were later released due to lack of evidence.

May 21, 1904 Colonel F.E. Ogorodnikov sent a cipher telegram to the Quartermaster General of the Headquarters of the Manchurian Army, Major General V.I. Kharkevich the following: <... I forced the agent Gidis

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to hard work. The punishment he suffered from the Japanese is confirmed, but thanks to the persistence of Gidis, the Japanese apparently believed him. On the other hand, Gidis is angry with them for their cruelty and stinginess.

For a while, the doppelgänger worked for both. Control over him by Russian intelligence officers did not decrease, and in December 1904, having sorted out him, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to arrest him. Gidis was imprisoned until the end of the war.

In this case, in matters of verification of agents, representatives of the military department of the imperial foreign intelligence showed higher vigilance, efficiency and professionalism than their counterparts from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the case of Manuilov.

Lamzdorf V.N. Diary 1894-1896. - M.: "International Relations", 1991. - P. 305. Selected memories of S.Yu. Witte. - M.: "Thought", 1991. - S. 379. Zvonarev K.K. Agency intelligence. - Ed. General Staff of the Red Army, 1929. See TsGAOR, f. 102, DP 00, 1904, d. 102, p. 5, 7. Ibid., p. 10. Izvolsky A.P. Memories. - M.: "International Relations", 1989. - S. 29. ? TsGVIA, f. WUA, op. 6, d. 7, p. 276.

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Two Looks at Colonel Redl

A lot has been written about Alfred Redl, one of the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian military intelligence at the beginning of the 20th century. His personal life, many episodes of which are still covered with an impenetrable veil of secrecy, formed the basis of the plots of a number of feature films and literary works of the detective genre. Redl is often accused of being at odds with the principles of morality and the code of officer honor, his name is cited as an example of venality and treacherous baseness. According to many experts, Colonel Redl was "the most important agent of a foreign power of all the spies operating in Europe on the eve of the First World War." What is known about this person?

Alfred Redl, the son of a poor railway employee, was distinguished from childhood by versatile abilities, especially in the study of foreign languages. The town where the Redl family lived was located near the border of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with Russia, and therefore daily communication with people of different nationalities was quite natural and ordinary for the young Redl. The boy literally on the go caught and memorized the unfamiliar speech of many of his fellow countrymen, among whom were Austrians, Germans, Poles, Ukrainians. When Alfred was 15 years old, his parents enrolled their son in a cadet school, which he brilliantly graduated from among its most worthy and promising graduates. Talent in learning

foreign languages, the great diligence and diligence of the young lieutenant attracted the attention of the personnel officers of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, and Alfred Redl, instead of serving in one of the provincial military units, which was a common practice, immediately gets into the staff of this main army department of the country. The beginning of a military career is truly impressive.

In 1900, Alfred Redl, who by this time had already received the rank of captain, was sent to Russia to study the Russian language.

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and the situation in this "unfriendly Austro-Hungarian monarchy" country. He spends several months on an internship at a military school in Kazan. In his free time, Redl does not get bored. He leads a carefree life, attending numerous officer parties organized in his honor by local military and civilian "life-seekers".

In those days, Redl was completely unaware that his Russian colleagues were closely watching his behavior and way of life, studying his strengths and weaknesses, hobbies, and character traits. Later, these "observations" formed the basis of the characteristics given to him by Russian secret informants to be used as arguments in the process of the possible recruitment of A. Redl in the interests of the Russian Empire.

"He is a sly man, closed in himself, concentrated, able-bodied. Mindset - petty, - said in the description. - The whole appearance is sweet. Speech is sweet, soft, obliging. The movements are calculated, slow. Likes to have fun..."

Colonel Batyushin, head of Russian military intelligence in Warsaw, received this kind of information after A. Redl's return to Vienna. The fact is that it was from the territory of the Warsaw Military District that the organization of intelligence work on Austria-Hungary was carried out in those days. Batyushin was recommended to "continue the study in order to attract Captain Redl to secret cooperation", who by that time was firmly entrenched in the Russian department of the Austro-Hungarian military intelligence.

Colonel Batyushin successfully fulfilled the assignment given to him. He sent one of his best recruiters to Vienna, providing the most detailed information about the personality and character traits of Alfred Redl, a large amount of money in Austrian currency, and detailed instructions for encrypting (if the recruitment was successful) important information source.

Alfred Redl quite easily agreed to secret cooperation with Russian foreign intelligence. In a conversation with a recruiter, he said that he was ready to help Russia out of personal sympathy for the Russians, among whom he "left many wonderful and sincere friends in Kazan."

"Besides," Redl explained, "I really would not like the fire of war to flare up between our countries. So many lives can be swallowed up by this terrible conflagration.

In fairness, it should be said that the amount transferred to Redl at the first meeting could not but make a very strong impression on him: it was ten times the annual official salary of the young General Staff officer.

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Immediately, the legend of Alfred Redl's receipt of a large amount of money and the ways of its natural implementation in operational terms were discussed. By this moment, just in time, a notice of the death of a lonely distant relative of A. Redl came, and he - not without the help of a Russian recruiter - was immediately declared the happy "heir" of an impressive fortune.

Soon Alfred Redl acquires a reputation as a lover of the "dolce vita", a careless rake and a spendthrift. It is clear that all the expenses of the alleged heir were paid from the Russian treasury.

This "way of life" of the rake gave Redl great opportunities for making useful contacts and acquaintances in the upper strata of the then Viennese society. He invited many high-ranking officers to his "bachelor parties", who, over a glass of wine, often blurted out to Redl valuable information about the mobilization readiness of the Austro-Hungarian army and its new types of weapons. One of Redl's "sub-sources" was an officer of the Khorinka Guards. He regularly supplied his "dissolute" rich friend with secret materials, for which he generously paid and even promised to give the guardsman a luxurious Daimler car.

Leading the work, Colonel Batyushin never for a moment forgot about the need to strengthen the official position of Alfred Redl in the General Staff. He suggested that Redl name several names of low-value and suspected double-dealing agents from among local citizens, about whom he could safely report to his superiors, presenting the matter in such a way that the capture of "spies" was the work of his own hands and flexible mind - Alfred Redl.

The results of such a not so sophisticated operational cunning were not slow to affect A. Redl's official career. He began to appear more often than his other colleagues from military intelligence and counterintelligence in the memorandums and award presentations of the Chief of the General Staff. In 1907, having received the extraordinary rank of colonel, Alfred Redl became the second person in the apparatus of the Austro-Hungarian military intelligence and counterintelligence.

In almost all works that tell about Colonel Redl, the final, or rather revealing part of his biography is taken as the basis of the plot: Redl is a libertine, Redl is a rake, Redl is a suicide. This is the traditionally accepted narrative scheme. This negative stereotype, which has been established for decades, was created at one time by the chief of German military intelligence, Colonel Nicolai. Back in 1923, he was the first to give a "psychological portrait" of A. Redl in his book "Secret Forces", trying to nullify Redl's activities as an intelligence officer.

There are other opinions about the activities of A. Redl. According to, for example, the first Soviet military historian K.K. Zvonarev, the author of the book "Russian intelligence agency" published in 1929.

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intelligence of all kinds before and during the war of 1914-1918, "Redl was a very thorough person. He gave information three or four times a year, but on the other hand it was quite exhaustive and on all questions of interest to the Russian General Staff.

What did Redl actually hand over to the Russian General Staff? A well-known specialist in the field of covert operations during the First World War, Englishman Edwin Woodhall testifies: "Colonel Redl gave Russia a huge number of copies of documents, codes, photographs, plans, secret orders for the army, mobilization measures, reports on the state of the iron and highways, descriptions of samples of military equipment, etc."

According to E. Woodhol, among the most valuable materials for Russia were the Austro-Hungarian mobilization plans against Russia and Serbia. They contained a full range of all possible operations against the Serbs. According to the same E. Woodhol, they "indicated all the details, down to the last man and to the last gun: the method of movement of the necessary forces, the location of some units, the mobilization of others; at what points the attack on Serbia will take place, etc. All this was described in detail in tables, diagrams, drawings, maps". According to E. Woodhol, it was "a masterpiece of the General Staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army." Skillful use of the information received helped that, to the amazement of the whole world, the small Serbian army successfully repelled the attacks of the Austro-Hungarian troops three times and delivered heavy blows to them.

Of great importance was also the concealment by A. Redl from his General Staff of secret information that came to Vienna from Austro-Hungarian secret agents directly from

Russia. Moreover, A. Redl did this on his own initiative, in accordance with personal ideas about the scale of damage to the Russians from one or another secret hidden by him. Redl himself never appointed a fee for the services he rendered, he was paid quite generously. For example, for issuing to the Russian General Staff the name of a traitor who began selling secret documents of the Russian army to Austria-Hungary and Germany, Colonel Redl was "granted" without any requests from him about 4 thousand English pounds sterling, which at that time was a very substantial amount.

If historians of military intelligence have always disagreed about the personal qualities of Colonel Redl and the degree of usefulness of his documentary information for the Russian General Staff, then all experts, without questioning, unanimously accepted the story of the "accidental failure" of the Austrian colonel, set out by his chief - head of the intelligence bureau of the Austrian General Staff Urbansky.

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The plot of this story was very interesting. The case began with a letter that allegedly arrived at the main post office in Vienna "on demand" in the name of a certain Mr. Nikon Nicetas. The shape of the envelope and the spelling of the address attracted the attention of the post office employees with their "unusualness" and, after waiting for the allotted time, they decided to open the suspicious correspondence. Imagine the surprise of the postal officials when they found 7,000 crowns in an envelope with a small note! The note read: "Dear Mr. Nicetas. Of course, you have already received my letter of S/May, in which I apologize for the delay in the expulsion. Unfortunately, I could not send you money earlier. Now I have the honor, dear Mr. Nicetas, to forward to you 7,000 crowns, which I will venture to send in this simple letter. As for your proposals, they are all acceptable. Respectfully yours, I. Dietrich.

R.5. Once again I ask you to write to the following address: Christiania (Norway), Rosenborggate, No. 1, Else Kjernli.

The content of the letter was immediately reported to the Austrian police, and post office workers were asked to "let know" the authorities about the addressee who should receive this message. But, alas, Mr. Nicetas did not appear in the field of view of the postmen; the letter lay unclaimed and, moreover, two more new correspondences addressed to the mysterious person were added to it.

One May day in 1913, an elegantly dressed gentleman, having presented the relevant documents in the name of Nicetas, received his correspondence and left the main Vienna post office in the first taxi that came across. The detectives who rushed after him, warned by the administration of the post office, lingered a little and saw only the "tail" of the departing taxi. However, they remembered the number of the car and began to look for the taxi driver in order to interrogate him in detail. The search was successful, and the taxi driver said that he had taken the gentleman of interest to the police to the Kaiserhof cafe. At the same time, he handed over to the pursuers of the Nicetas a leather sheath from a penknife, which, as the driver said, "possibly belonged to the wanted gentleman."

In the Kaiserhof cafe, the Viennese detectives were disappointed. The "gentleman in civilian clothes" had already had breakfast and left in another taxi in an unknown direction. Where? Where to look for it? "In the Klomser Hotel," said one of the Kaiserhof employees, who happened to overhear a conversation between a passenger and a taxi driver.

The police rushed to the Klomzer.

- Do you remember which of your guests came to your hotel in a taxi half an hour ago? the pursuers asked the porter.

- How, how, I remember very well. This is Colonel Redl, Chief of Staff of the Prague Corps. Yes, there he is, he exclaimed.

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hotel porter, pointing to a respectable gentleman descending the stairs to the exit.

The detective rushed to the guest:

"Excuse me, Herr, did you drop that penknife case?" Is he yours?

Yes, thank you, he is mine...

With this suicidal short phrase, Redl, as it were, signed his death sentence.

For a long ten years, Colonel Redl selflessly cooperated with Russian foreign intelligence, until a fatal bullet fired by his own hand or - who knows? - one of his colleagues, did not interrupt his intelligence activity, which was extremely useful for Russia. In the Viennese newspapers in the "Incidents" section, only a brief stereotyped message was published: "Colonel of the General Staff Redl committed suicide in a fit of mental disorder. Lately he has suffered from insomnia. He was a talented officer with a great future ahead of him." And that's all.

A year later, the First World War began. It began extremely unsuccessfully for the Austro-Hungarian army, and it suffered a series of crushing defeats. In order to somehow explain these failures, the Viennese authorities apparently considered it necessary to recall Colonel Redl again. Remember in order to "write off" your failures as a "suicide".

! Woodhol E. The Story of Colonel Redl and Others. - M.: Publishing house of political literature, 1991. - P. 137. 2 Ibid. - S. 138.

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Russian intelligence

in 1914-1917

Preparations for the First World War (1914-1918) proceeded well in advance. In 1882, the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy took shape, which was updated five times, until 1912. In parallel, the Entente was taking shape - a coalition of France, England and Russia. At the heart of the confrontation were fights for colonies, markets, spheres of world influence. The situation progressed towards a tragic outcome through separate crises (North Africa, the Balkans), until the shootings in Sarajevo and the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand gave rise to a declaration of war. Italy, however, by this time left the Triple Alliance, and then joined the Entente. One way or another, the conflict engulfed not only Europe, but also Asia (Japan, Turkey), and at the last stage, the United States. In total, 38 countries were involved in the war.

The Russian-German front was one of the main ones. Here in 1915 there were 107 of the 268 divisions of the German bloc. Germany was preparing for the war especially carefully. Austria-Hungary helped her in intelligence activities against Russia. For this, both countries had favorable opportunities. Many people of German origin were in Russian, including military, service, were close to the royal court, connected by family ties with the German monarchy. Almost all enterprises in the electrical industry, chemical, and many metallurgical plants belonged to German firms. German capital also had positions in rail and water transport.

The main German intelligence network was deployed in Poland, Lithuania, and the St. Petersburg Military District. It was managed from the German and Austrian embassies of the capital.

This was taken into account by Russian intelligence and did not remain inactive.

On the eve of the war, significant transformations were carried out in Russian intelligence. The Main Directorate (GU) of the General Staff (GS) was separated from the General Staff, the supreme body of the military command of Russia, in which the leadership of military intelligence was concentrated. At that time, it was she who was the main form of intelligence activities of the Russian Empire. Specifically, since 1910, the department of the quartermaster general (OGENKVAR) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU GSh), responsible for organizing independent intelligence of a strategic nature in the countries adjacent to Russia, as well as for managing the intelligence activities of district headquarters, has been in charge of intelligence since 1910.

These reforms, as well as the tasks set, were enshrined in the relevant documents of the Russian military department. At the same time, there was a clear understanding in intelligence that the solution of these tasks on the eve of the inevitable war was possible only as a result of the creation in the countries of the future enemy of an effective agent network capable of obtaining the necessary information on key problems.

By the beginning of World War I, the OGENKVAR GU General Staff had some intelligence capabilities both in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and in the East (China, Korea, Mongolia). At the same time, the acquisition of sources was carried out mainly through work with well-wishers who offered their services. The headquarters of the military districts had their own sources.

Communication of sources with the Center was carried out by correspondence to conditional addresses in coded form.

On the eve of the war, Russian military intelligence obtained a number of important documents of a mobilization and strategic nature, including those on Germany (mobilization plan, information on the deployment of field and reserve troops, data on the fortifications of the strategically important fortresses of Breslau, Thorn, etc.). Important documents were received through Colonel A. Redl, well-known to readers. Intelligence received secret materials from Austria-Hungary and other channels. But at the same time, the armed forces of a potential adversary have not been studied comprehensively and deeply, in a complex. This situation had grave consequences during the first hostilities.

By the beginning of the war, intelligence was not able to fully solve the tasks facing it. First of all, there was not created a wide, well-conspired intelligence network in Europe, which would be able to constantly transmit proactive reliable information and work smoothly during the war.

Perhaps one of the most significant shortcomings in the work of Russian intelligence on the eve of the war was the carelessness and neglect

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conspiracy. Thus, newly acquired sources were photographed for their personal files in ordinary photo studios. The Germans, having received information about this, took countermeasures to identify employees sent to Germany. Counterintelligence was not effective enough. The gendarmerie corps directed its main efforts at fighting the "internal enemy", while the enemy agents, in fact, worked without hindrance in the area of the upcoming hostilities.

Although many intelligence data were received in a timely manner, they were far from studied enough due to the weak organization of information and analytical work. Often from the faithful data, false conclusions were drawn.

On the eve of the war, the activities of Russian intelligence were unjustifiably narrowed down - predominant attention was paid mainly to the study of the future front line, while the strategic rear of a potential enemy was left without due attention.

The lack of funds allocated for the organization of intelligence work also played its role.

The war made adjustments, but not all of them had the desired effect. A significant part of the OGENKWAR officers was transferred to the active army, which strengthened the intelligence of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the headquarters of the fronts. However, this circumstance, as well as the activation of enemy counterintelligence, led to the loss of part of the OGENKWAR sources. In East Prussia, for example, after the withdrawal of Russian troops and the loss of communication between sources and leaders, the agents self-liquidated.

The main task of Russian intelligence was to reveal the military plans of the enemy, to identify the groupings of his troops and the directions of the main attack.

Russian intelligence officers operating in Europe under conditions of limited time allotted for solving assigned tasks were sometimes forced to resort to extremely unusual methods to solve them. One of the intelligence representatives in Italy, who received the task within a few days to establish the direction of movement of a group of central German corps and did not have reliable sources for this, managed to pick up several people who were ready to carry out the tasks explained to him, and sent them to Germany on designated routes. As a result, it was found that the German corps were being transferred to the Western Front for operations against France! However, not all such impromptu, due to the loss or weakening of operational capabilities with the outbreak of war, were successful, and a number of important transfers of German corps were not timely.

revealed.

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But Russian intelligence also had successful operations related to obtaining important political information. In 1916, she managed to reach high circles in the Vatican and Spain, who had information of a strategic nature about Germany and Austria-Hungary. Intelligence had sources of documentary information at the main headquarters of Austria-Hungary, at the German general headquarters, at the headquarters and corps districts of Germany. Russian intelligence managed to find reliable approaches to the French telegraph agency "Gavas" and published a number of disinformation materials with its help.

In general, during the war years, Russian intelligence officers did not refuse a single opportunity that gave hope for obtaining information about the enemy. At the same time, the unsystematic use of this information significantly hampered the work on the most important problems that required quick and in-depth coverage.

The headquarters, which was supposed to be the central body directing all intelligence, failed to cope with this task. As a result, intelligence activities were not sufficiently organized; the zones of this activity between the headquarters of the fronts and armies were not strictly demarcated, which in a number of cases led to excessive, uncoordinated activity of various units in the same areas, and hence to frequent failures. The haste in the formation of an agent network often entailed its clogging by random people and provocateurs, which served as the reason for failures in work.

In the course of the war, the organization of intelligence was therefore improved in accordance with the experience gained. By the beginning of 1917, the intelligence network of military intelligence was already more clearly divided into training, depending on the performance of tasks. Everyone did their own thing, which increased the return and strengthened the conspiracy. Information was sent by mail, telegraph using ciphers, codes, sympathetic ink. "Post boxes", that is, auxiliary agents, whose tasks included only the delivery of intelligence reports already received, were widely used.

The work of intelligence, as experience was gained during the war, more and more acquired its modern appearance familiar to us. Auxiliary reconnaissance lines appeared: a communication system

resident with sources, operational photograph. The use of technical means has become more and more widespread.

Greater purposefulness of intelligence work was also facilitated by the coordination of the efforts of the allies in the Entente. In September 1915, representatives of the Entente agreed to form a coordinating body, the Inter-Allied Bureau, whose task was to combine information about the enemy received through various channels so that they become the property of all allies. By the end

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In 1915, the Inter-Allied Bureau already included the missions of France, Russia, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium and Serbia.

However, the coordination of the activities of intelligence links was implemented slowly, with difficulty. The projects prepared by the end of 1916 at the Main Directorate of the General Staff were not actually implemented. Despite the fact that a central intelligence apparatus was formed in the system of the General Staff, it actually continued to operate, as before, remaining mainly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters and headquarters of the fronts.

By the end of the war, there was still no center uniting various types of intelligence. Information was collected by military, diplomatic, industrial, financial, trade and other departments. None of the general staffs of the Entente countries, even by the end of the war, clearly formulated the very concept of "strategic intelligence", did not define a set of military, political and economic problems to be studied."

The reorganization of intelligence dragged on until the summer of 1917, when in the end it was decided to transfer the entire network of sources abroad to the jurisdiction of the OGENKWAR of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. This work was completed by August 1917.

Given the approaching end of the war, Russian intelligence by the summer of 1917 was preparing plans for the development of an agent network abroad in peacetime. At the same time, the task was to cover not only military issues, but all aspects of the political, economic and social life of the states of interest to Russia. By this time, the approach to the creation of agent networks was finally determined, where the initial and main point was the selection of an organizer-leader who had the ability to obtain the documents necessary for settling in a given country, who had the necessary connections and broad powers to attract sources to cooperation.

A significant shortcoming was the poor organization of informational analytical work of the Center. Often the received serious information was not deeply studied, analytical materials were superficial. Quite often, the conclusions and conclusions were adjusted to the moods "above".

Of course, the First World War ended in conditions of unprecedented political and social upheavals that led to two revolutions in Russia, unrest and revolutionary events in Germany, Hungary, and a change in the political map of the world. The scope and complexity of these phenomena, the crisis events in Russia, which engulfed almost all sectors of society, cannot but be taken into account when assessing the actions of Russian intelligence during this most difficult critical period.

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Given these circumstances, the shortcomings in its work do not obscure the main conclusion - the intelligence service has basically coped with the solution of the tasks that confronted it. Having formed during the war by the end of the summer of 1917 into an effective instrument of the state mechanism, it, however, did not have time to fully realize its potential. A new era has come, a change has taken place

system, institutions of the state, such changes that required fundamentally new intelligence and counterintelligence mechanisms that meet modern conditions.

! See Alekseev M. The state of undercover intelligence of the Russian army on the eve and during the First World War. As a manuscript. - M., 1994. * See Bolshakov I.A. Essays on military intelligence. - M., 1966. - S. 119.

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Results

So, it's time to sum up some results. Each stage of the formation and development of Russian foreign intelligence has its own characteristics, based on certain specific state interests and historical conditions. At the same time, one pattern cannot be overlooked: each of the stages is associated with an increase in the crisis situation inside and around the Russian state, an increase in military danger, and the threat of foreign invasion. Under these conditions, the role of foreign intelligence naturally increases.

Let's dwell on this issue in more detail. Let's start with 1549. Tsar Ivan the Terrible takes the first independent steps in the reorganization of state activity. Behind are the years of boyar rule (1538-1548), which was accompanied by the dominance of temporary workers, the struggle for power between warring factions, intrigues and murders. The crisis situation in the domestic political situation is close to a critical point. The collapse of the state can lead to the fact that it will become easy prey for aggressive neighbors: from the east and south - the successors of the Golden Horde (Kazan, Astrakhan and Crimean khanates), from the west - Lithuania, Poland, Denmark and Sweden. In terms of foreign policy, Rus' at that time had practically no allies.

First of all, the young tsar seeks to create a strong state core around himself, capable of quickly and effectively solving issues of domestic and foreign policy in the interests of strengthening the autocracy. The so-called Elected Rada, formed by him in 1549, became such a core - in fact, an internal unofficial "cabinet" with the widest powers. The Elected Rada included the Duma nobleman A.F. Adashev, court priest Sylvester, Metropolitan Macarius, Duma clerk I.M. Viskovaty, Prince A.M. Kurbsky. All of them were at that time the closest

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the king's followers. The most important role was assigned to Adashev, who headed the so-called Petition Order, which directed the activities of all other state institutions. During the reign of the Rada (1549-1560), radical reforms were carried out in the field of central and local government, the army and law (the most important orders are created, the "feeding" system is eliminated, localism is limited, the foundations of the archery army are laid, a nationwide code is drawn up - "Sudebnik").

In the field of foreign policy before I.M. Viskovaty and headed by the Ambassadorial order is tasked with collecting secret information about potential allies and opponents, and then eliminating the military threat in turn - first from the east, and then from the west. As a result of the successful implementation of this strategic line, in 1552 the Kazan Khanate was annexed to Russia, in 1556 - the Astrakhan Khanate, dependent on Ivan [The Siberian Khan Yediger (1555) and the Great Nogai Horde (1557)]. And only after that the struggle for Russia's access to the shores of the Baltic Sea began (the Livonian War of 1558-1583).

Tsars in Rus' changed, but Russian interests remained. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich continued the struggle for access to the shores of the Baltic. At that time, Russia's foreign policy interests and ties were growing significantly. And again, 1654 - the year of the founding of the Order of Secret Affairs and the intensification of intelligence work - was not chosen by chance. It was at the beginning of this year that the largest event of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich took place - the reunification of Ukraine with Russia. The tsar understood that the Commonwealth, which had until now held Ukraine in its

vassalage, just will not give up their positions in this region. Therefore, it was in 1654 that a special need arose to closely monitor the secret plans and aspirations of the then strong western neighbor. This work was carried out successfully - Ukraine was forever freed from gentry dependence, Russia was returned to its original territories previously occupied by the Poles - Smolensk, Seversk land with Chernigov and Starodub.

It was only under Peter the Great that it was destined to enter the Baltic and gain a foothold on its shores. This victory did not come immediately. There were also bad luck. The battle with the Swedes near Narva, for example, ended in defeat. They also learn from defeat. It was 1700. And in the next year, 1701, Peter created the quartermaster general service, which, in the Military Regulations of 1716, consolidates its legal position as an intelligence service! Peter attached particular importance to military matters. And, perhaps, the bias towards military priorities in the activities of imperial foreign intelligence began with him.

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The next important stage in the formation and development of the service is again connected with the mortal threat hanging over the country - the invasion of Napoleon. To the credit of Russian foreign intelligence and its leaders, it must be said that this time solid pre-emptive measures were taken, which made it possible to obtain the necessary secret information about the plans and intentions of the enemy in a timely manner. This made it possible to choose the correct strategy of military operations, which ended in a crushing defeat for the aggressor.

During the Patriotic War of 1812, for the first time, reconnaissance and sabotage detachments were organized on the basis of the partisan movement, subordinate to the army command and successfully operating behind enemy lines. Subsequently, this practice was widely used, including during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Many partisan detachments were led by career scouts.

From the first days of the invasion, Napoleon was under the influence of disinformation, which was spread by the Russian military command. False information that the Russian army was allegedly preparing for a general battle, brought to Napoleon through the available intelligence capabilities, to a certain extent fettered his actions, designed for a rapid advance into the interior of the country.

The next stages in the history of exploration (1856 and 1905), unfortunately, were already a consequence of the tragic events that had taken place. This happened through no fault of intelligence. On the eve and during the Crimean War, Russian intelligence made considerable efforts to obtain the latest samples of Western European weapons and military equipment, drawings of the most modern ships were obtained through agents. However, in the conditions of the serfdom and industrial backwardness of Russia, it was not possible to use these samples in time. The re-equipment of the Russian army with rifled firearms and the replacement of the sailing fleet with steam took place already after the defeat in the Crimean War.

By the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian intelligence service was acquiring more or less institutionalized structures. Priority is given to military issues. Therefore, all incoming secret intelligence information about the military potential of foreign states is concentrated in a single center - the so-called statistical department of the quartermaster general of the Army General Staff. Under the external guise of "statistical", this body performs purely intelligence functions: collecting and processing military-strategic materials on the armies of potential opponents, information about their military preparations, sending officers abroad with reconnaissance tasks, monitoring the recruitment and use of

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hire agents abroad, acquisition and development in the interests of the Russian army of the latest foreign inventions in the military field?,

From March 1, 1903, this intelligence center was "encrypted" under the 7th branch of the military strategic department of the 2nd quartermaster general of the General Staff. Its functions remain the same. The Center manages undercover intelligence, which is carried out by its permanent representatives abroad, individual employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of other ministries and departments in a number of foreign states, as well as the headquarters of military districts.

The measures taken to centralize intelligence work made it possible to expand its intelligence apparatus, increase the number of objects of intelligence penetration, and the volume of intelligence information obtained. At the same time, there were serious shortcomings in the work of intelligence. In a number of cases, reconnaissance was carried out haphazardly, lagging behind the requirements of the time. There was a certain separatism in the military districts, a desire to independently use the obtained information without the consent of the General Staff. In addition, in peacetime the headquarters of the districts did not have special reconnaissance departments. The poor professional training of career intelligence officers also had an effect, especially in matters of working with agents. A big omission was the lack of financial appropriations for the needs of intelligence, which soon had a very deplorable effect on the results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The General Staff was allocated annually 56,000 rubles for "hidden intelligence expenses" (the so-called 6th estimate), distributed among the military districts - from 4 to 12 thousand rubles for each. The military statistics department was allocated only about a thousand rubles a year for the needs of intelligence. The exception was the Caucasian Military District, which was separately allocated 56,890 rubles a year for intelligence and the maintenance of secret agents in Turkey. Meanwhile, Japan, preparing for a war with Russia, spent about 12 million gold rubles on the acquisition and maintenance of military agents.

The Russian government's underestimation of Japan as a strong and dangerous adversary led to disastrous results. Back in the 90s of the 19th century, a sharp reduction in military spending began. At the same time, even those insignificant amounts that were allocated for intelligence needs were dispersed between military districts, and the main direction (Turkey) turned out to be chosen erroneously. The force of inertia (endless Russian-Turkish wars throughout the 19th century) prevented us from drawing correct, timely conclusions from the real strategic situation on the borders of the empire.

At the General Staff, the Far Eastern direction of intelligence (China, Korea, Japan) was handled by the so-called 6th Desk of the 7th Department

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niya. This is not to say that little attention was paid to Japan there. However, a number of specific features of this country presented significant difficulties for the organization of intelligence work. Japanese government officials, fanatically devoted to the "divine mikado", refused to secretly cooperate with representatives of foreign intelligence agencies. In the absence of solid covert sources of information, one had to count on getting at least some fragmentary information from the press and other official publications. But here, too, the intelligence officers failed: most of the periodicals in Japan contained cleverly chosen disinformation, calculated to mislead the reader. In addition, the Russian intelligence agents sent to Japan did not speak the language, and the local translators assigned to them were entirely informants of the Japanese counterintelligence.

"Imagine that you are offered to acquire very important and valuable information contained in a Japanese manuscript," wrote one of the representatives of Russian intelligence in Tokyo, calling the hieroglyphs "gibberish," and that there is no other way for you to find out the contents of this manuscript. , provided that the necessary secrecy is maintained, how to send the manuscript to

Petersburg, where our only compatriot lives who knows such a written Japanese language as to be able to reveal the contents of a Japanese manuscript. Therefore, for a military agent, there is only one outcome left - to completely and categorically renounce all forms of intimidation! [supposedly] secret written data, especially since in most cases the offer of such information by the Japanese will only be a trap”?

The Russo-Japanese War revealed the crisis state of the entire state machine of the Russian Empire. The intelligence service, in spite of the significant shortcomings in its organization, sent separate reports on Japan's preparations for war. However, they were not given due attention in the highest echelons of power.

“Russia does not have a permanent government,” S.S., then British representative in St. Petersburg, wrote to his leadership. Rice. - Each minister acts independently, without coordination with other ministers. There is a curious situation. The emperor (Nicholas II) is a highly religious man without relevant state experience, and even without the advice of knowledgeable people, being surrounded by grand dukes - thirty-five in number, none of whom is on the war front. And next to priests and nuns, or just church women... There is no voice of the middle class. Aristocrats with no influence then

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how the bureaucracy - bureaucracy - lives on bribes. With all this, millions of people, due to circumstances, are getting poorer and poorer, bearing the burden of taxes and providing the state with everything necessary, not to mention a million drafted into the army ... "5.

These "independent actions" of various departments had a very detrimental effect on the course of events. Colonel of the General Staff Gurko, who was present at the declaration of war on Japan by Nicholas II in connection with the attack by Japanese ships on the Russian Port Arthur squadron, in a conversation with guards officers who volunteered to go to the Far East, said: “Our information about the military preparations of Japan against Russia was simply ugly. There was complete confusion between the reports of our ambassador in Tokyo and the military agent. Each of them expressed diametrically opposed opinions about Japan's preparedness for war.

No less harm was caused by intradepartmental "showdowns." Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the general organization of long-range reconnaissance was entrusted to Major General of the General Staff V.A. Kosagovsky, who immediately had serious complications in relations with the Quartermaster General of the Manchurian Army, Major General V.I. Kharkevich. In June 1904, Kosagovsky wrote in his diary: “Kharkevich was afraid that I would get in his way, and did everything in his power to slow me down this business. And, alas, he successfully achieved this vile goal of ruining the Russian cause. Kharkevich not only did not give me a single capable officer of the General Staff, but also turned his leg everywhere, undermining my prestige and turning Kuropatkin against me ... and in general the entire headquarters. And he brought me to such a nervous excitement that I was ready to strangle Kharkevich. The reconnaissance units of the armies acted in isolation. According to Colonel of the General Staff P.I. Izmestyev, their reports were of low quality, and there were cases when they “documented what was documented the next day”. In addition, there were own intelligence units at the headquarters of the Amur Military District and the headquarters of the rear of the troops of the Far East. Intelligence was also carried out by the headquarters of military units, which acted independently of each other. All this testified to the unacceptable disorganization of the intelligence leadership.

And, nevertheless, it must be said that it was the intelligence of the General Staff that was the central, most professionally trained structure in the system of external special services of the Russian Empire until October 1917. The conclusions made by the leadership of the tsarist intelligence after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War did not remain on paper. Anticipating a future military clash with Germany

Accordingly, since the beginning of the first decade of this century, the General Staff of the Russian Army has been sending to Germany the most trained and capable intelligence specialists who were supposed to "be aware" of the preparations for war from the German side, as well as supply the Russian armed forces with secret technical and scientific innovations that could be used against the armies of the Kaiser.

The main task of Colonel of the General Staff A.A. Michelson was the recruitment of reliable agents among employees and technical personnel of a number of firms working on the fulfillment of special military orders of the German army. Already his first steps led to noticeable results. He organized an invitation to Germany for a large group of officers of the Russian army - employees of the artillery committee and design bureaus, as well as specialists from the electrical department of the engineering department for "training" at such important facilities of the German military industry as the Rheinmetall plant in Düsseldorf, the Siemens-Schuckert plant in Berlin, the Krupp plant in Essen, the Carl Zeiss Jena optical factory and other key enterprises for military production. There, employees and colleagues of Colonel Michelson did not waste time in vain. One of them is Captain M.M. Kostevich - managed to recruit an agent who worked in a highly secret design bureau that developed heavy and super-heavy artillery systems. The agent gave Kostevich drawings of the latest German howitzers, forgetting to warn him that he was handing over the originals themselves, and not copies from them. Such an oversight was costly. The agent was captured by German counterintelligence, and Captain Kostevich, who managed to send documents to St. Petersburg, also ended up behind the walls of the Berlin Moabit prison for a while. This "episode" could not but affect the fate of Colonel Michelson. He was declared "persona non grata" and left Germany.

P.A. came to replace him in Berlin. Bazarov, who set to work on a large scale. He was interested in everything: the capacity, and the mobilization readiness of the railways in East Prussia, and the most important defensive structures in the areas of possible military operations, and new information about the location of ammunition depots and ammunition of the German army. He managed to obtain documents from the intelligence department of the German General Staff about his personnel and agents. Soon, an agent was detained in Warsaw, who showed an increased interest in Russian military facilities, and a "researcher" of Russian industrial architecture, in fact, a lieutenant of the German army, scout Damm, was arrested in the capital of the empire.

The information obtained by Bazarov and his people in pre-war Germany formed the basis of many operational measures in the line of military counterintelligence. In the Warsaw military district alone, almost one and a half hundred Austro-German SPIES were arrested.

The principle of the need to conduct active intelligence work, not only in wartime, but also in peacetime, has yielded good results. Suffice it to recall the recruitment in 1906 of the head of the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service, Colonel Redl, or the recruitment in 1910 of the colonel of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Jandrzej. These agents provided exhaustive information on all issues of interest to Russian intelligence in this region. New intelligence opportunities are emerging in a number of other countries in Europe and Asia.

The horizons of intelligence work have expanded, right up to Africa. For centuries, this continent remained "erga storpa" for Russia, and only at the end of the 19th century did an unexpected interest awaken in it in connection with the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War in the autumn of 1899. This interest was caused by scouts for quite professional reasons: in this war, for the first time, the British experienced in practice such "novelties" as explosive "dum-dum" bullets that caused severe injuries, automatic weapons, and new powerful explosives. For the first time, armored trains were used against cavalry. The first concentration camps and barbed wire appeared. The war in Africa was of interest not only to professionals, but also to the king himself. In one of the private letters

Nikolai P wrote: "I am completely absorbed in the war between England and Gransvaal; I re-read every day all the details in English newspapers from the first to the last line..." For the first time, hundreds of Russian volunteers were sent to Africa. Among them was A.I. Guchkov, later a well-known politician, founder of the Octobrist Party, chairman of the State Duma. Volunteers were not outside observers: they took part in hostilities, studied the real alignment of forces and the true interests of the leading world powers in southern Africa. Later, three times - in 1908, 1910 and 1913 - the remarkable Russian poet N.S. Gumilev. His poems about Africa are well known, but few people know, for example, his memo about Abyssinia - an information document characterizing the mobilization capabilities of this country ... It is no coincidence that during the First World War, N.S. Gumilyov served in the "near", military intelligence and was twice awarded the St. George Cross for courage and skillful actions.

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The fate of the tsarist intelligence officers after 1917 developed differently. Lieutenant General Nikolai Mikhailovich Potapov, head of the department of the quartermaster general service, which was in charge of foreign intelligence, remained true to his professional duty and in the first days after the revolution, namely on November 23, 1917, he was appointed chief of the General Staff. During the Civil War, he headed the Military Legislative Council under the Revolutionary Military Council, the highest body of military power in the Russian Republic. N.M. Potapov was transferred to the reserve due to age only in 1938, he died in 1946, having lived to see the end of the Great Patriotic War. The hero of the first imperialist war, Nikolai Stepanovich Gumilyov, unfortunately, became a victim of well-known tragic circumstances.

Until 1917, many employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to take an active part in the work of foreign intelligence. Among them were ambassadors. In 1905, for example, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, Zinoviev, obtained undercover copies of notes that had been exchanged between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and the Austrian ambassador to that country, Calice. Austria-Hungary entered into secret negotiations with the Turks, trying to get them to recognize their exclusive right to protect all Catholic institutions in the territory of the Ottoman Empire. As Zinoviev himself wrote, he followed the negotiations "very carefully" and drew information about them "exclusively from third-party sources"⁸. Later, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople obtained from a "very secret" source letters of a political nature, which were exchanged in 1910-1911 on the eve of the Balkan war, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War of Turkey with their Prime Minister®.

During the First World War, A. Mandelstam, a real state adviser, was seconded to the Russian mission in Bern to organize intelligence work on the warring countries from the territory of neutral Switzerland. On the instructions of military diplomats, noteworthy information was obtained about the naval forces of Turkey and Bulgaria, plans for the Dardanelles fortifications and minefields in the strait.

In January 1916, at the height of the war, the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.D. Sazonov memorandum with considerations on the need to increase the extraction of information on political issues in the bloc of countries warring against Russia. Information on these issues was proposed to be concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, these proposals were not implemented. The Russian state machine was practically programmed to collapse. Under these conditions, few people were interested in questions of political intelligence at the top.

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The Ministry of the Interior, or rather, its police department, on the contrary, activated its rather numerous foreign agents, which sometimes got involved in the implementation of certain foreign policy tasks. But the main function of this agency was to reveal the underground activities of revolutionaries, nationalists, who found themselves in exile,

anarchists and other "subversive" elements. The countries where the Russian political emigrants were located were literally flooded with agents of the police department, who often acted openly, in contact with the local police and counterintelligence.

The ministries of finance, trade, and industry were still engaged in exploration abroad to one degree or another. They usually had their own network of informants, but this network was narrowly focused on collecting information only of a financial, commercial or economic nature, mainly through open and closed specialist literature. This work was led behind the curtain by official representatives of these ministries at the Russian embassies.

Apart from all the departments mentioned above, there was the Ministry of the Royal Court, which had its representatives abroad. These were personally trusted representatives of the Russian emperor at the courts of foreign monarchs. They were charged with acquiring extensive contacts among high-ranking officials, relations with whom were built mainly not on an agent basis, but on a trust basis, although quite significant sums were sometimes spent on maintaining these connections. The main object of their interest was information about the behind-the-scenes life of the courts, but at the same time, of course, they did not miss the opportunity to obtain secret information of a political or military nature.

The tasks that were officially assigned to representatives at the royal courts are clearly visible from two letters written at the beginning of the 20th century by the German Emperor Wilhelm II to the Russian Emperor Nicholas II.

"Considering our close relations," Wilhelm wrote, "and the frequent exchange of letters and messages, which constantly and in vain sets in motion the complex mechanism of embassies, would you like to resume the old custom observed by our ancestors for about a hundred years, namely, to have each of us have a personal adjutant at his headquarters? Matters of a more intimate and private nature could proceed, as in former times, directly through them, and communications would thereby be greatly simplified.

In another letter, Wilhelm wrote to Nicholas:

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"As a military attache, I chose Major Count Landdorp - my personal adjutant. I gave him instructions that he should consider himself exclusively in your person, as was the case in the days of Nicholas Guy Alexander P. In his reports he is responsible only to me personally, and he is once and for all forbidden to enter into relations with anyone. - or to others, whether it be the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Chancellor. Thus, you can entrust him with any assignments, requests, letters, etc. for me and use it in any business as a direct link between us. If you wished to send someone from your retinue who would enjoy your full confidence, then I would accept him with pleasure, since I consider it extremely necessary that during serious events you could, if necessary, communicate with me as quickly as possible. me, without the cumbersome and immodest apparatus of the chancelleries of embassies, etc." 0.

With the outbreak of the First World War, these friendly contacts between the two monarchs ceased forever. The natural need to increase the role of undercover intelligence in a crisis, critical situation for the state came into force again, but the tsarist government was no longer able to do anything ... After the end of the war, a new stage began in the history of Russian foreign intelligence, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent volumes.

! According to the Great Encyclopedia, ed. S.N. Yuzhakova (vol. 6, p. 388), quartermaster general - a person in charge of the officers of the General Staff and "their special service."

For the first time in Russia, quartermaster ranks are mentioned in the charter of 1698, which introduced regimental quartermasters, and it is said about the quartermaster general that “he is not needed in the Russian land.” In 1701, Peter I approved the post of quartermaster general, which was taken by Prince A.F. Shakhovskaya.

In 1763, when Catherine the Great established the General Staff, the General Quartermaster Service was included in its structure. The post of quartermaster general was abolished in 1865, when the corps of officers of the General Staff was directly subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff.

Since 1892, in a number of military districts, the post of quartermaster general has been introduced again, and since 1900, in the General Staff. Its functions included preparatory work “on the conduct of hostilities and the defense of the state”, as well as the collection of “military-statistical information about foreign states”.

2 See Russian intelligence and counterintelligence in the war of 1904-1905. (documents) / Compiled by I.V. Derevianko. - M.: "Progress", 1993. - S. 319.

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3 Ibid.

4 See TsGVIA, f. 487, op. 1, d. 231, p. 1.

5 Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 - T. 1. - St. Petersburg, 1910. - S. 156-157.

6 Tÿe Teyetz oÿ Enepd\$Shr oE Ziq Sesÿÿ Srgÿpe All. - Gopdop, 1929. - R 425.

? TsGVIA, f. 76, op. 1, d. 217, p. 239.

\$ Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Empire, f. 151, op. 482, d. 298.

9 Ibid., 307.

0 From the correspondence of Wilhelm P with Nikolai P // Ed. Central archive of the RSFSR, 1925.

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